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It is with pleasure that I present CEDA’s latest major research 
report, A Greater Australia: Population, policies and governance. 
This publication is a culmination of two years of work and draws 
together 17 expert contributions from across Australia. CEDA 
has undertaken this project, under the editorship of Professors 
Jonathan Pincus and Graeme Hugo, to provide considered discus-
sion on the future population of Australia, dispel myths, highlight 
constraints and make policy recommendations. 
Population is a topic that receives much attention, but comment and debate is not 
always backed by rigorous analysis. 
Public unease with the population debate is often centred around government policy 
or planning failures, from inadequate service provision to poor infrastructure planning. 
This highlights the importance of government policy being developed from robust dis-
cussions and a strong foundation of facts. 
The key policy recommendations CEDA is making as a result of this publication are 
that: 
The Federal Government should establish an Australian Population Council (APC), to 
coordinate government service delivery nationally in response to population changes. 
The APC should be responsible for annual projections of demographic change for the 
purpose of ensuring smooth State and Federal Government service delivery. 
In particular, the focus should be on the areas of infrastructure delivery (roads and 
community infrastructure), education and health requirements. This would allow 
more proactive policy responses to population changes as they emerge, rather than 
reactively. 
In addition, the Federal Government should supplement the Intergenerational Report, 
which examines the ramifications of an ageing population, with a Future Generation 
Report, which examines the participation, education and training solutions that could 
mitigate the negative elements of Australia’s current age structure. For example, exam-
ining ways of ensuring longer workforce participation. 
The nation’s leaders must not shy away from having a robust discussion around 
Australia’s future demography and its implications for public policy. CEDA hopes this 
publication will provide an important resource in driving that discussion.
I would like to thank the editors and all the contributing authors for their work towards 
this publication.
Ultimately the greatness of Australia as a place to live and work will be determined by 
the policies underpinning population change. CEDA hopes this document will contrib-
ute to making a greater Australia. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Responding to the results of its Big Issues survey of members, and wishing to contrib-
ute usefully to an otherwise rather unsatisfactory public debate, in 2010 CEDA, with 
Dr Michael Porter as Research Director, started planning a major project on Australia’s 
population trends, challenges and associated policy choices. The first output was 
Jonathan Pincus’s essay, A population policy for Australia in CEDA’s Economic and 
Political Overview (EPO) 2011. The present volume is the major end product. 
It draws on CEDA’s expertise and networks as an independent, non-aligned organisation 
providing thought leaderhsip, to bring together the best ideas on the various dimen-
sions of a growing, diverse and ageing population. The editors asked experts from a 
range of disciplines and perspectives to paint a far richer and well-researched picture 
than was being offered in the rather limited political debate conducted in Australia.
Governments can and should use a wide range of policy instruments to optimise 
the consequences of changes in Australian demography. Through a suite of sensible 
social, environmental and economic measures, we can ensure that population growth 
is accompanied by considerable improvements in the Australian standard of living. 
CEDA’s purpose here is to provide expert and objective evidence and argument, to 
inform and stimulate the population debate.
Demography and politics
The population of Australia was estimated at 22.8 million in February 2012, making it 
the 51st most populous country in the world. With a settlement pattern dominated by 
six major cities, Australia is one of the most heavily urbanised countries in the world. 
And, as the Panel Report to Minister Burke on Demographic Change and Liveability, 
chaired by Graeme Hugo, noted: 
The population of no other medium sized or large country in the world is as influenced 
by international migration as Australia: 
• A quarter of the resident population were born overseas;
• Another quarter were Australian-born with an overseas-born parent(s);
• Almost one million were temporarily present at 30 June, 2009; and
• Around one million Australians are living in another country.
During 2009 and 2010, the Treasury and the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 
each released projections that showed the population expanding by more than half, 
to around 36 million in the coming four decades. This implied a slightly slower rate of 
population growth (1.2 per cent per annum) than was experienced in the previous four 
decades (1.4 per cent per annum). 
Unfortunately, these relatively modest population projections gave rise to an “anti-
growth” sentiment, and to concerns about a headlong rush towards a “Big Australia”. 
It was claimed that 36 million people would be unsustainable, being greater than the 
country’s “carrying capacity”. These concerns were reinforced by the announcement 
that the level of net migration had reached 320,000 in the year ending March 2009, a 
record, and twice the rate of natural increase. 
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The importance of good policies
Immigration brings advantages, but it also carries or accentuates some problems – like 
crowding in the capital cities. Australians can gain from moderate levels of immigra-
tion that are supported by good settlement arrangements, and by an adaptable suite 
of good social, environmental and economic policies – policies that are desirable, 
whatever the level of immigration, and whatever the size of the population. Fears of 
crowded Australian communities reflect fears of poor policies, since there are many 
examples of countries and communities that have prospered with large populations 
and high population growth rates. The more flexible and adaptable the economy, and 
the better our government policy settings, then the more likely the benefits of immigra-
tion will spread widely throughout the Australian population. (CEDA is of course not 
alone in its advocacy of better policies: the work of the Productivity Commission must 
be mentioned in this context.)
Moreover, there needs to be a feedback loop – if the Australian political system can 
cope well with the growth in population, then a larger population becomes more desir-
able. However, if the political system cannot cope well with a growing population, as 
has been widely asserted recently, then the rate of immigration should be lower.
The “barriers” to improved wellbeing arise mainly from policy and institutional restric-
tions, and not, in particular, from deficient water volumes or any insoluble problems 
of infrastructure provision. In particular, if we price infrastructure services fairly and 
efficiently, and facilitate the appropriate investment and associated finance, we can 
sustain and increase the average living standards of Australians.
The economics of population growth
By 2050, the Australian population will have increased substantially, and could well 
reach 40 million or more – barring catastrophes, and assuming a realistic rate of immi-
gration – and it will be a significantly older population.
As a practical matter, population policy in Australia boils down to immigration policy. 
The great bulk of immigrants to Australia are not admitted under family reunion or 
humanitarian grounds, but chiefly for economic reasons: their presence should increase 
the wellbeing of the existing Australian population. Who gains and who loses from eco-
nomic immigration is the focus of Chapter 4.1, by Jonathan Pincus and Judith Sloan. 
The standard case for admitting moderate levels of “economic” immigration to Australia 
can be summed up this way: “economic” immigration greatly benefits the optional 
immigrants; it may bring overall benefits (or at worst does little harm) to the existing 
Australian population generally; but some sections of the existing population can be 
significantly disadvantaged, depending on how the related policies are handled. 
However, the case for a larger immigration program may be understated. Most 
economic modelling of the effects of immigration ignores the possibility that a larger 
population would itself raise productivity (through economies of scale and scope), and 
may stimulate innovation. Countries with very low population growth can face major 
challenges and miss the flexibility from mobile injections of new migrant populations 
and a growing natural-born workforce. The relative youth, experience and diversity 
brought through immigration programs greatly enhances flexibility in a growing and 
changing Australia, an Australia with current city and rural densities far below success-
ful and rich foreign economies. 
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A more dynamic and vital Australia can benefit from economies of scale and diversity, 
as well as the creativity and cultural opportunities that have characterised growing 
populations in many countries. 
Demography
One of Australia’s leading demographers, Peter McDonald, provides a magisterial 
discussion of the difficulties of projecting the size and composition of the Australian 
population (Chapter 2.1). McDonald advocates a stochastic or probabilistic approach, 
which strongly argues against the setting of population targets.
Please note that we have not allocated chapters to specific subgroups within the 
Australian population. The future trajectories of growth will differ between the various 
subgroups. This comment applies especially to the Indigenous population: see Box 1, 
which draws on the Sustainable Population Study chaired by Graeme Hugo. In addi-
tion, we did not ask our authors to focus on differences in the effects on subgroups 
that may arise from faster or slower population growth, or from changes in the policies 
discussed in this volume. 
The net inflow of migrants has dropped sharply since 2009. Reacting to the deteriorat-
ing economic conditions and to concerns about unrelieved pressure on economic and 
social infrastructure, the Federal Government indicated that it would aim at a lower rate 
of immigration. It reduced the quota for permanent “economic” entry under the points 
system and tightened the rules for the temporary entry of students (who often achieve 
permanent residency on completion of their studies). But there are no moves to reduce 
the humanitarian quota; limit family reunions further, or to restrict the rights of New 
Zealanders to settle in Australia.
The Australian Government felt bound by international commitments not to set a quota 
on the intake of immigrants with 457 visas (the temporary visa for skilled workers). 
Government can, nonetheless, tighten the rules for this and other visas, or delay their 
processing. However, there is continuing pressure from business and allied interests in 
the opposite direction, for a relaxation of the rules and for speedier processing. 
In Chapter 2.2, Mark Cully and Laze Pejoski first outline the history of Australia’s migra-
tion program, leading to an extraordinary opening-up to immigration. The liberalisation 
of flows of people, great as it was, did not fully match its opening-up to global trade 
Box 1:the indigenous population
The precise size, composition and distribution of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) 
populations of Australia are unknown, and probably unknowable. ABS estimate has the current ATSI 
population at 563,000; non-ABS projections have this rising to about one million in 2040 – at twice 
the growth rate of the population generally. Indigenous population growth is currently held back 
by persistently high mortality rates. Although fertility rates have declined, they are still relatively 
high, due mostly to teenage fertility, and to the decisions regarding identity, made by children of 
Indigenous adults partnered with non-Indigenous persons. These population dynamics result in an 
age profile much younger than the Australian average: proportionately many more under 20, with 
countervailing deficiencies in the over-40s and, especially, in the over-55s.
Source: Sustainable Population Study, part 2.7.
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and capital flows. There have been recent changes in selection mechanisms, includ-
ing selection by employers and State Governments (subject to the points system); 
and fluctuations in the number of foreign students (who frequently obtain permanent 
residence). The chapter outlines developments in the models to forecast immigrant 
flows, a difficult task.
People self-select into the pool of potential migrants; actual migrant flows depend on 
demand conditions, and on administrative rules, which Mark Cully and Laze Pejoski lay 
out. Compared with the existing population, immigrants are younger, better educated, 
and less likely to speak English at home. By 2050, Australian births will no longer 
exceed deaths: the natural rate of population growth will approach zero, and so net 
migration will be the only source of population growth. As a result, in the meantime, the 
size and composition of the Australian population will even be more heavily influenced 
by net migration.
Absorbing immigrants
Half of the Australian resident population were either born abroad or have at least one 
parent born abroad. How has this enormous inflow affected attitudes? Will popular 
opinion make impossible or support the continuation of past immigration policies? 
Andrew Markus (Chapter 3.1) provides an excellent overview of surveys of Australian 
attitudes towards immigration, and towards various immigrant groups. Markus shows 
that, among western countries, Australians (and Canadians) are the most receptive of 
immigrants, with over 60 per cent of respondents in support of the existing intake or 
its increase. Moreover, those who agree that immigrants from many different countries 
make Australia stronger outnumber those who disagree by a ratio of more than 2:1. The 
most positive attitudes are towards immigrants admitted on the basis of skill, with 78 
per cent in support. In answer to the question “what do you think are the most important 
problems facing Australia today”, a little more than one in eight respondents nominated 
immigration and asylum issues as the “most important problem’. Nonetheless, the level 
of support does vary over time, especially in response to a rapid growth in the number 
of irregular arrivals – and, especially, “boat people” seeking asylum. Although these are 
still less than half Australia’s humanitarian quota; the inability of the government to find 
an acceptable solution keeps the issue contentious.
In this context, a vital policy is social inclusion, which for immigrants is the up-to-date 
version of the old policy of assimilation. Graeme Hugo, Patricia Njuki and Sanjugta 
Vas Dev, in Chapter 3.2, examine social inclusion in four areas of migrant settlement in 
Australia: improving employment outcomes, especially of recent humanitarian migrants; 
interventions for migrant children and youth who are at risk; locational disadvantage 
and regional migrant settlement; and dealing with racism and discrimination. 
Dealing with racism and discrimination is especially important, given that it is barely 50 
years since the White Australia policy was abandoned. The nature and the speed of 
change since then, in Australia’s economic, Indigenous and immigration policies, left a 
substantial number of Australians bewildered and antagonistic; and their feelings were 
not assuaged by a couple of what seemed to have been racially motivated riots. 
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Sustainability
Concern about the effects of increases in population commonly centre on the envi-
ronment, and on urban amenities and infrastructure. The first key message of the 
Sustainable Development Panel Report, led by the Hon Bob Carr, is that: 
“ A sustainable Australia is one that allows its people to live socially engaged and 
prosperous lives in a healthy environment. It means meeting the needs of the current 
population without compromising capacity to meet future needs.”
This volume offers a series of valuable contributions concerning sustainability, some 
historical, and others looking to the future. William Coleman (Chapter 1.3) surveys 
the views of economists (mostly) about the elusive idea of the optimal size of the 
Australian population. Presumably, the optimal population, whatever it is, is less than 
the maximum sustainable population, which is sometimes still characterised as the 
“carrying capacity” of Australia. In Chapter 1.2, Alaric Maude traces the history of this 
concept in Australia, including disciplinary differences in the frameworks of the “hard” 
sciences and the “social” sciences.
The idea that, without a larger population, Australia could not defend itself is captured 
in the slogan “populate or perish”, frequently shouted in the middle decades of the 
twentieth century. Mark Thomson (Chapter 1.1) finds that, whatever its merits in the 
past, the defense argument for a larger population is no longer convincing. 
Environment and climate
Bob Carr’s excellent definition, cited earlier, is a great starting point for discussion on 
sustainability. However, to go further, we need to address the impediments to sus-
tainable growth in the population and economy of Australia. These fall under three 
headings: the environment, climate change – which go together – and government 
policy.
To what extent will the natural environment and climate change put a cap on or hamper 
sustainable growth in population and living standards? Don Gunasakera (Chapter 2.4) 
summarises what is projected for the climate, worldwide and in Australia, and explores 
the implications for the pattern of settlement, and for the advantages or disadvantages 
of a larger population. In Chapter 2.5, Barry Brook argues that greenhouse gas abate-
ment is necessary at a global level, but can only be achieved, at reasonable cost and 
security, with a technological fix: he advocates much more serious consideration be 
given to the use of nuclear power generation in Australia. 
Graeme Hugo’s chapter 2.3 on population distribution shows there has long been a 
mismatch between the incidence of rainfall, by area, and the density of population 
settlement. Can a big Australia feed itself (and continue to be a large exporter of food)? 
Will the cities die of thirst, as some predicted would have happened by now? John 
Langford and Nathan Taylor (Chapter 4.3) show how trading in water rights allowed 
the maintenance of economic activity in the Murray-Darling Basin, despite the worst 
and longest drought in history. They draw on the Australian Water Project, which is 
being conducted by CEDA, Melbourne and Monash Universities, as Uniwater, and 
Harvard University. As the vast majority of Australians live in cities close to the ocean, 
desalinated water offers a secure and affordable supplement to catchment water; and 
there are new sources being tapped – rainwater runoff, diverted to urban wetlands and 
underground storage.
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Urban matters
A longstanding ambition of Australian politicians has been to encourage decentralisa-
tion. Graeme Hugo (Chapter 2.3) discusses the overall stability of the geographical 
distribution of Australia’s population, and the roles played by internal and external 
migration. He also points to some interesting recent trends, including rapid growth in 
the populations of many non-metropolitan coastal communities. Regions close to the 
large conurbations have grown (albeit with growing pains). Drawing on work of the 
Grattan Institute, John Daley (Chapter 4.4) shows that, although government efforts 
to promote economic and population growth in some regional areas may have been 
justified on equity grounds, they do not seem to have been effective; and were very 
unlikely to have added to the wellbeing of Australians generally.
Henry Ergas provides economic reasoning on urban infrastructure (Chapter 4.2). Ergas 
lists the salient characteristics of the Australian system of settlement, most of them 
familiar. The high incidence of home ownership, the low density of settlement, and the 
high dependence on urban transport were encouraged by favourable tax treatment 
and by the under-pricing of the services of schools, hospitals and roads. Productivity 
of urban infrastructure has not improved in years. Efforts to control “urban sprawl” have 
often been inefficacious, or inefficient and inequitable.
Ergas suggests that, unless governments have clearer and parsimonious objectives 
– COAG take note – policy is unlikely to improve. Although the task is complicated 
by environmental considerations and by NIMBY politics, the fact that governance is 
highly centralised may, slightly paradoxically, make it easier to institute improvements, 
especially in pricing. 
Ageing, health and productivity
The work of the Federal Treasury and the Productivity Commission has raised concerns 
about the fiscal demands of an ageing of the population and a flow through of earlier 
population trends. This “greying” of Australia creates demands for expensive social 
services and aged care, funded in part by tax revenues from a proportionately smaller 
base of tax payers. But the flip side of ageing is longer potential working lives, delayed 
major health costs and longer periods of wealth accumulation. These positive dimen-
sions to ageing need to be factored in, so that policies capture the enhanced capacity 
to sustain, and not restrict service provision later in life. But we also need to look at the 
full suite of financing options, including enhanced use of self-financing mechanisms 
that we are already using in childcare, education, health insurance and transport devel-
opment, and in social security itself through superannuation arrangements. 
It has been predicted that in Australia, by 2033, health and aged care will account for 
one-eighth of GDP. Over 70 per cent of the burden of disease is currently attributable to 
chronic condition; and that share will rise, as the population ages. Francesco Paolucci 
and Ian McRae (Chapter 3.4) outline ways in which the health system can be restruc-
tured to reduce the burden of chronic conditions. In addition to preventive measures, 
they emphasise the role of primary care, which should be integrated and coordinated 
with other services, and supported by the better use of information technology. Such a 
system should improve risk assessment, and early diagnosis and treatment, as well as 
assist in practitioner- and self-management of multiple, chronic conditions. 
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
12
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
13
I N T R O D U C T I O N
The new demographics, health care advances and resulting leisure and work-force 
needs, all call for a new look at the institutions and policy choices that underpin our key 
social and security arrangements. It is fundamentally great news that people are living 
longer, working for longer periods, and able to enjoy leisure and community engage-
ment well into ages that were once regarded as terminal or unproductive. However, 
if policies lack the flexibility to make use of extended lives and better health, then 
Australia could suffer a transitory loss of a high proportion of a skilled and productive 
workforce, which could lead to national atrophy. Australia requires education and train-
ing programs to sustain, re-skill and invigorate mature working and cultural activities, 
to encourage fuller and meaningful lifetime participation in work, leisure and community 
service. Good public policies will contribute towards making the Australia population 
healthier and better-educated, enjoying higher levels of life satisfaction. 
Paul Krugman famously said that: “Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it 
is almost everything.” In Chapter 3.3, Dehne Taylor explores how education and train-
ing are linked with increases in productivity. Essential for improvements in productivity 
are increases in human capital per head: higher workforce competencies, knowledge, 
adaptability and skills. The dynamic parts of the rest of the world are acquiring these 
fast. To accelerate the growth in Australia’s human capital, Dehne Taylor suggests 
some innovative extensions of the income-contingent student loan scheme, popularly 
known as HECS. (The Federal Labor Government has recently announced its intention 
to extend a HECS-like scheme to VET.)
As editors, we thank the contributors for their enthusiasm for this project, the quality of 
their contributions, and their cheerful responses to editorial interventions.
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1.1 Populate or perish p16 
 Mark Thomson
  This chapter examines if Australia requires a larger population for reasons of 
defence.
1.2   A century of debate about population and the environment:  p26 
Key issues   
Alaric Maude
  This chapter considers the natural environment both as a constraint on wellbeing as 
well as a resource contributing to economic growth.
1.3  Pipe dreams and tunnel vision: the course of population debate  p34 
in Australia   
William Coleman
  This chapter discusses the history of the population debate in Australia since the 
early twentieth century, and particularly the views held by economists.
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Populate or perish 
Mark thomson
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Introduction
Japan’s crushing victory over Russia in 1905 heightened fears of isolation and vulner-
ability in sparsely populated Australia. The response was a revival of the state-assisted 
migration programs, which had ceased with the 1890s depression. Between 1906 
and the start of WWI, around 150,000 migrants arrived on assisted passage.1 While 
economic growth and development were also considerations, the desire to bolster our 
defences by populating the vast empty spaces of the continent figured prominently. In 
1909, the recently retired Governor-General, Lord Northcote, conveyed the sentiment 
of the time when he said: “It would be comparatively easy for an Asiatic force to seize 
Port Darwin and march southwards at leisure,” concluding that “Australia must speed-
ily solve the problem of population or perish2.” 
Following the disruption caused by WWI, assisted migration resumed in unison with 
programs to redistribute Britain’s excess population across the Empire. Although far 
from a key motivation, defence remained a factor during this period, within which 
another 221,000 assisted settlers arrived.3 Still more migrants might have come but 
for the Great Depression, which once again put an end to government-sponsored 
immigration in 1929. 
A little over a decade and a half later, the situation was reversed by a close encounter 
with imperial Japanese ambitions. Well before the end of the war, the Curtin Government 
had plans in place for a rapid expansion of Australia’s population. As Australia’s first 
immigration minister, Arthur Caldwell, put it in 1946:
“ The call to all Australians is to realise that without adequate numbers this wide 
brown land may not be held in another clash of arms, and to give their maximum 
assistance to every effort to expand its economy and assimilate more and more 
people who will come from overseas to link their fate with our destiny.”4 
Over the subsequent four decades, an average of 100,000 migrants arrived in Australia 
every year. But while migration to Australia continues to the present day, the ratio-
nale has long since changed. As early as 1965, it was observed that: “The post-war 
immigration policy, which was thus adopted under abnormal conditions and for pre-
dominantly non-economic reasons, has since become a generally accepted part of 
economic policy.”5
Until recently, the notion of increasing Australia’s population to enhance its defences 
had been all but forgotten. But in late 2009 the then prime minister Kevin Rudd included 
national security in the list of reasons why we should embrace a “big Australia”.6 Since 
then, apart from a couple of supportive newspaper columns7, the idea has failed to 
capture the public imagination. It was no surprise whatsoever that the government’s 
2011 sustainable population strategy mentioned neither defence nor national security. 
Nonetheless, the questions remain: Can and should we boost our population to improve 
our defences? What follows attempts to answer those questions. 
Australia’s capacity for defence is affected by its population in two ways:
Directly through the availability of people to serve in the defence force; and •	
Indirectly by setting the scale of the nation’s economy. •	
These links are explored below in tandem with a discussion of how much defence 
capacity Australia needs. 
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People 
For much of the past decade, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) struggled to attract 
and retain sufficient numbers of personnel. However, over the past two years, the situ-
ation has reversed and the problem has been to find enough money to pay the surplus 
uniformed personnel that have been accumulating in the force. Although the 2008 
financial crisis probably reinforced the value of secure employment to defence force 
members, it’s equally likely that the decade-long $3 billion package of recruitment and 
retention initiatives introduced in 2007 has also played a role. In addition, continuing 
operations in Afghanistan provide a professional incentive for defence personnel to 
remain in service. Whatever the reasons, despite unemployment running at around five 
per cent, the defence force is having few problems maintaining its uniformed workforce 
of around 60,000 permanent and 20,000 part-time reserve personnel. 
Recent successes notwithstanding, concerns persist that forecast demographic trends 
will see the defence force struggle to maintain its numbers in the decades ahead. The 
argument is that the ageing of the population will lead to a diminishing proportion of 
young people and thereby result in a shortage of recruits. This has led to a least one call 
for a return to conscription.8 Given the slim prospects of that happening, an alternative 
remedy would be to generate additional potential recruits by accelerating population 
growth. 
A close examination of demographic forecasts for the Australian population undermines 
defence-based arguments for either conscription or a larger population. As Figure 1 
shows, the number of persons in the prime recruiting cohort of 18 to 26 is forecast to 
remain constant (or better) out to the century’s end. Moreover, barring a big increase 
in the size of the ADF, the number of people recruited into the defence force each year 
will continue to represent but a tiny fraction – less than 0.2 per cent – of the available 
pool. 
But what about the diminishing proportion of young persons in the population? If the 
economy-wide demand for people in the recruiting cohort remains fixed as a share of 
the population, the diminishing proportion of young people will result in scarcity. There 
are two reasons why this is not a serious concern. First, even if younger people are 
preferentially sought by employers, there is likely to be only a limited share of cases 
where substitution by older workers is infeasible. Mechanisation of agriculture, manu-
facturing, mining and construction has long ago removed whatever advantage there 
was in employing young workers. Indeed, apart from ground combat operations, the 
same is probably true for the defence force. Second, and more important, there is no 
evidence of a preference for younger workers. The youth unemployment rate (ages 15 
to 24) has not fallen below 10 per cent in almost two decades.9 At the time of writing, 
there were 281,000 Australians between the age of 15 and 24 years looking for work.
It follows that whatever problems there might be for the defence force in attracting 
and retaining sufficient numbers in the future, they are unlikely to be any worse than 
the problems today. If anything, the situation might actually be better. Today’s defence 
force is disproportionately male (85 per cent)10 and of Anglo-Celtic heritage (94 per 
cent)11, which means that it is drawing disproportionately on a limited segment of the 
available recruiting pool. The ADF has recognised this and has put programs in place 
to make the defence force more representative of the population it serves. There has 
been some progress on the gender front – over the past two decades the proportion of 
women serving full-time in the defence force has more than doubled. 
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The discussion so far has been based around sustaining the defence force on its 
present scale. With the defence force accounting for only a tiny fraction of the labour 
market (0.5 per cent), it’s hardly surprising that demographics are not a limiting factor. 
In fact, there is no reason why the current and forecast population could not support a 
defence force two or three times larger than currently in place. On recent experience, 
all that would be needed is a sufficiently competitive employment offer get more people 
into uniform. 
Yet a lingering question remains. What if our strategic circumstances were to dete-
riorate so severely as to demand a drastic expansion of the force? In WWI Australia 
mobilised a force of 416,000 from a population of less than five million, and in WWII 
more than 990,900 served from a population that was still only around seven million. 
No doubt the Curtin Government had these experiences in mind back in 1946 when 
they launched the great post-war immigration program. 
But times have changed. Nobody contemplates a return to the national mobilisations 
that typified industrial-age warfare in the first half of the twentieth century. In large 
measure, this recognises how fundamentally the advent of nuclear weapons has 
changed the nature of war. Consistent with this, the scale of armed forces held by 
major powers has declined substantially, conscription has become far less common, 
and plans for national mobilisation are non-existent. 
For Australia, there is another factor at play. Since the 1970s, the strategy for defending 
our island continent has been based on preventing an attack by interdicting enemy 
forces in our air and maritime approaches. By doing so, we fully exploit the benefits 
of our advantageous geography and maximise the benefit of privileged access to 
high-tech Western military equipment. Of course, the other advantage of an air and 
maritime strategy is that it substantially limits the demand for personnel. Rather than 
the hundreds of thousands of troops that made up the expeditionary forces of the 
twentieth century, our defence is now based on at most a couple of hundred aircraft 
and tens of vessels. 
Figure 1 
ForECAsT nuMbEr oF PErsons AGED 18 To 26
Source: ABS 3222.0 Population Projections, Australia 2006 to 2101
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Though it is rarely conceded, our small army would have at most a very limited role in a 
serious defence of the continent. It exists to help maintain order in nearby fragile states 
such as East Timor and the Solomon Islands, and to make small but politically impor-
tant contributions to United States ventures in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq. 
However, that doesn’t mean that the size of our population is irrelevant to our defence. 
Although we might not need a large army, we do need a large enough economy to 
purchase and operate the increasingly expensive military equipment upon which our 
defence strategy is built. 
Population, power and prosperity
To a good approximation, the size of the Australian economy is proportional to the size 
of its population. All other things being equal, if our population were to grow by 10 per 
cent, our Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would also grow by 10 per cent. We would 
also be likely to have a larger industrial base – though this would not readily translate 
into a military technological advantage given that only the largest of nations possess 
the economies of scale necessary to develop modern major weapon systems. 
So what impact would a larger economy have on Australia’s defence? To the extent 
that national defence is a pure public good, a larger population would not increase the 
demand for defence. A safe and secure country can be enjoyed by all, irrespective of 
how many people live here. Of course, this is something of an idealisation. For one 
thing, a larger population could give rise to additional population centres that would 
need to be defended against attack. But given Australia’s declared strategy of control-
ling its air and maritime approaches rather than close defence of its cities and industry, 
the increased demand for defence capacity (as a result of a larger population) would 
be slight. 
On the supply side, a larger population would provide more people to share the 
economic burden imposed by national defence. With a population 10 per cent larger 
than at present, we could maintain our current defence capacity with each person 
contributing nine per cent less on average than at present. But this would probably not 
be the outcome. National defence is not a binary quantity that is either adequate or 
inadequate. Rather, defence spending represents an investment to mitigate strategic 
risk. Higher levels of defence spending allow a wider range of risks to be addressed 
with confidence. Consequently, assuming that the demand for defence is elastic, if the 
per capita cost of defence were to fall we would probably choose to have more of it. 
A likely outcome would be that Australia would spend more collectively, but less per 
capita, on defence than at present. 
From an individual perspective, what could be better? A larger population would allow 
us each to pay less and yet enjoy better defence. However, it’s not that simple. First it’s 
worth examining some real world data. Table 1 displays economic and defence spend-
ing data for Australia and selected countries. The emphasis on North Asian countries 
is no accident. Those arguing for stronger defence have their sights firmly set on the 
rise of China. 
The first thing that is apparent from Table 1 is that some countries devote a substan-
tially larger share of their GDP to national defence. Given the precedents of Israel, 
Singapore and the United States, it’s clear that Australia could more than double its 
defence expenditure without increasing the size of its population. Of course, there 
would be an opportunity cost for taxpayers in terms of some combination of private 
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consumption and non-defence government services. But it would not be so large a 
cost as to distort our allocation of resources beyond that in other relatively prosperous 
countries. Moreover, in decades past, Australia routinely spent a greater share of GDP 
on defence than it does today, with peaks of five per cent and four per cent reached 
during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. 
It follows that there are two mechanisms available for strengthening Australia’s defence. 
We can devote a larger share of existing economic resources to defence, and/or we 
can grow the pool of economic resources that is available for defence by increasing 
the size of the population. While there are other avenues for boosting aggregate output 
aside from population growth, we assume that such steps will be pursued (to the extent 
that they are politically feasible) irrespective of concerns about national defence. 
Given that a larger population allows individuals to incur a smaller opportunity cost 
due to defence spending than would otherwise be the case, the question must be 
asked why other nations have chosen to instead devote a larger share of their available 
wealth to their defence. To some extent, it’s a question of timing. Even with strong 
immigration, substantial population growth takes decades to achieve. Indeed, popula-
tions are forecast to rise substantially in Israel, Singapore and the United States in the 
decades ahead (though there is no evidence that the affordability of defence is a driving 
factor for them). In any case, for countries such as Israel, Singapore and the United 
States, circumstances do not allow them the luxury of waiting for the day when a larger 
population makes defence more affordable. They have strategic imperatives that must 
be met today. Moreover, for the United States the demand for defence has historically 
waxed and waned over time as circumstances and policies changed, so it would make 
little sense to pursue a policy of aggressive population growth to satisfy what, on past 




DEFEnCE sPEnDInG  
(bIllIon us$)
DEFEnCE sPEnDInG As A  
sHArE oF GDP (PEr CEnT)
Australia 976 19.5 2.00
China 4854 70.4 1.45
India 1231 38.3 3.11
Indonesia 542 4.8 0.89
Israel 195 13.5 6.91
Japan 5058 51.1 1.01
Malaysia 193 3.9 2.01
Singapore 182 7.8 4.29
South Korea 837 22.4 2.68
Taiwan 380 9.5 2.50
United States 14,125 661 4.68
Source: The Military Balance 2011, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London.
Table 1 
DEFEnCE sPEnDInG AnD burDEn 2009
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From an Australian perspective, assuming that there is a strategic imperative for stron-
ger defence, timing considerations arguably favour population growth as a mechanism. 
Proponents of stronger defence invariably point to the rise of China in the decades 
ahead as the driving factor. With the timescales for China’s rise commensurate with 
those for significantly boosting Australia’s population, the possibility of bolstering our 
defences through a larger population is feasible. 
Irrespective of concerns about defence, natural fertility coupled with the established 
practice of addressing labour shortages through migration will ensure that Australia’s 
population grows. The question is whether the rate of population growth should be 
accelerated to make defence even more affordable in the future. National defence is 
one of many factors to consider in assessing whether to accelerate population growth, 
and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to survey these many externalities. What we 
can do, nonetheless, is assess the argument for spending more on defence. If the argu-
ment is compelling, the possibility of growing the population to support a larger defence 
effort remains viable – though still dependent on the net impact of a larger population 
taking other factors into account. But if the argument is spurious or manifestly weak, 
the defence-economic argument for a larger population can be dismissed. 
Before turning to look at whether there is a strategic rationale for substantially boost-
ing Australia’s defences, it’s useful to put current plans into an economic, fiscal and 
military context. The 2009 Defence White Paper set out a two-decade long program 
of modernisation and modest expansion of the defence force. Funding is based on 
average growth in the defence budget of 5.5 per cent nominal until 2018 and 4.7 per 
cent thereafter. In economic terms, this translates into an economic burden that will 
remain below two per cent of GDP out to at least mid-century.12 
Despite frequent claims of a looming fiscal crunch due to the ageing of the population, 
Australia is remarkably well placed to manage rising health and aged care costs later 
this century. Compared with most other developed nations, we have no debt worth 
worrying about and forecast levels of aged dependency are comparatively low. While 
there are going to be public policy challenges in the decades ahead, there is no pending 
fiscal crisis. If nothing else, the forecast 80 per cent rise in per capita GDP over the next 
four decades13 will ameliorate the pain of higher taxation if it proves necessary.
On present plans, Australia will spend more than a trillion dollars on defence between 
now and mid-century. For that sum we’ll have the ability to:
Conduct humanitarian assistance and relief missions that are substantial within •	
Australia and politically significant areas further afield;
Deal with most conceivable instances of instability in the fragile states of the South •	
Pacific and East Timor;
Resolve almost any credible disagreement with Indonesia consistent with our inter-•	
ests, including defeating an attack on our territory;
Deny our air and sea approaches to small or medium powers;•	
Support US ground operations on the scale and at the intensity presently occurring •	
in Afghanistan; and
Make militarily useful air and maritime contributions to US coalition operations in the •	
Western Pacific consistent with the ANZUS alliance.
So what more might we want to be able to do that would justify higher defence spend-
ing and potentially a larger population? 
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How much defence is enough?
Proponents of spending substantially more on defence have one thing in mind. China. 
They want Australia to develop military power on a scale sufficient to at least maintain 
a favourable balance of power between China and the United States and its allies.14 
The more ambitious (and pessimistic) want the military wherewithal to unilaterally resist 
China in the event that the US abandons its allies in the Western Pacific.15
Neither aspiration can be dismissed out of hand. There is no doubt that China’s rapid 
economic rise is changing the balance of power in North Asia. Over the past 20 years, 
China’s economy has grown by an average of 10.1 per cent a year16 and its defence 
budget by 10–12 per cent depending on the estimate used. In comparison, the United 
States is struggling with mounting debt and is cutting its defence budget.17 More 
importantly, long-term projections of economic growth for the two countries tend to 
forecast that the Chinese economy will overtake the United States sometime around 
2030.18 Add to this the simmering animosity between the two countries that has been 
apparent over the past few years – not to mention that the potential flashpoints of 
Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula – and the possibility of a twentieth-first century great 
power conflict is all too apparent. And it would be far from unprecedented: from the 
Peloponnesian wars of the 5th century BC to the cataclysm of WWI, the adjustment of 
established orders, when new powers emerge, has tended to be a violent affair. 
For some, this is sufficient justification for increasing defence spending to three or four 
per cent of GDP, at a cost of hundreds of billions of dollars over the decades ahead. So 
far the government has resisted taking up this option, and other US allies in the region 
appear in no hurry to increase their own defence spending. In fact, defence spending 
as a share of GDP has remained static or trended downwards in Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan over the past 15 years.19 Nonetheless, the proposal for substantially greater 
defence spending should be judged on its merits. History is replete with examples of 
countries going to war poorly prepared after clear warning signs were ignored. 
There are at least three arguments against Australia pursuing a major military expan-
sion in response to the rise of China.
First, it is often argued that China’s rise is unsustainable and that the balance of power 
will not change. This is usually accompanied by assurances about the resilience of 
the United States and its ability to “bounce back” once again. But while it’s true that 
China faces many hurdles on its path to industrialisation and prosperity, as did the 
United States, the basic mechanism of leveraging global trade to build productivity 
remains viable. Indeed, China’s rise is not unprecedented. Japan rose from the ashes 
of WWII and increased its per-capita GDP 10-fold in just four decades.20 The key differ-
ence between Japan and China is that the latter has a population 10 times that of the 
former. If China were to increase its per capita GDP by a factor of three, it would have 
an economy comfortably larger than that of the United States today.21 It may be that 
China’s path to prosperity is a difficult one, but it would be foolish to wager our security 
on the proposition that it is a dead end. 
The second argument is that economic interdependence will prevent the United States 
and China from stumbling into what would be a pointless and costly conflict. And 
costly it would be. Given the tight interconnectedness of the global economy, the 
consequences of a breakdown in trans-Pacific trade could quickly dwarf the 2008 
financial crisis. If only this could be counted on to keep the peace. The trouble is that 
most wars start because of fear, honour or stupidity rather than a sober assessment 
of costs and benefits. It’s worth remembering that the first age of globalisation was 
brought to a crashing halt by WWI. However, one critical change since that time has 
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been the advent of nuclear weapons. For more than 60 years, no two nuclear armed 
powers have fought a major conflict. If the specter of nuclear armageddon could keep 
the United States and the Soviet Union at arm’s length despite deep district and fun-
damentally incompatible interests, surely peace with China can be maintained. This is 
all the more plausible given that China is tightly integrated into the international system, 
whereas the Soviets were economically and politically isolated. 
What can almost certainly be discounted, because it would be profoundly senseless, 
is that China will ever renounce global economic engagement and emulate Japan’s 
behaviour in the 1930s and 1940s. However, ultimately there can be no guarantee 
that China and the United States will be smart enough to avoid a clash of arms over 
something more minor, and the fact they are preparing the wherewithal to do so does 
not bode well.22 If a conflict were to occur, it would be short, sharp and potentially 
catastrophic. Hopefully the more likely worst-case outcome is a “warm peace” built 
around a strategic stalemate.23 
At this point the argument for stronger defence is looking plausible; China’s rise cannot 
be dismissed and the possibility of war cannot be discounted. Yet the third and final 
argument against a redoubling of our defence effort argues to the contrary. Put simply, 
it is beyond Australia’s capacity to shape the course of Asian strategic affairs by the 
use of armed force in all but a limited set of special circumstances, irrespective of any 
credible boost to our economic capacity. 
Whatever additional military capability we might be able to muster would only tip the 
conventional balance of power temporarily in favour of the United States as China 
continues to grow. To put things in perspective, according to the Pentagon, Chinese 
defence spending increased by more than the entire Australian Defence budget in the 
three years between 2006 and 2009.24 With the Chinese budget compounding at eight 
to 10 per cent per annum the potential for Australia to make a difference will rapidly 
diminish in the years ahead. Like it or not, we have about as much chance of shaping 
the strategic destiny of Asia in the twentieth-first century as Denmark did in Europe in 
the 1930s. 
As for Australia standing alone against China after the United States has decamped for 
Hawaii just as Britain decamped west of Suez, the circumstances where this would be 
feasible are limited. No doubt there could emerge a situation where China had some 
limited interests that it could be persuaded to abandon due to the additional costs we 
could impose on them militarily (assuming a face-saving solution was available). But if 
armed conflict is afoot, China would have to be pursuing interests of very substantial 
importance to start with – why else would they invite international approbation and a 
costly disruption of trade to threaten us with force? 
But what if there was a complete breakdown of international norms and China began 
to emulate Japan of the 1940s? Because China has nuclear weapons, any notion of 
refighting the battle of the Coral Sea is fanciful – and not within our capacity anyway. By 
2050, China is forecast to have an economy 20 times larger than Australia’s,25 and no 
plausible program of accelerated population growth can redress that imbalance. If US 
protection was absent, China could take their time and do whatever they want to us. 
If this extreme scenario is to be taken seriously (it probably should not) the only course 
of action would be a nuclear weapons program. 
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Conclusion
A substantial case for accelerating the growth of Australia’s population cannot be built 
on the basis of defence considerations; and certainly not on that basis alone. In the 
decades ahead, we will have more than enough people to meet the manpower needs of 
our defence force many times over. And while a larger population would make defence 
more affordable by spreading the cost over a larger number of taxpayers, this would 
have to be balanced against the other costs and benefits of a larger population. 
Ultimately, the case for a larger population would have to be made on economic 
grounds, with the affordability of defence being but one consideration. Of course, the 
importance of defence in such an analysis increases with the scale of our defence 
effort; the more we spend on defence, the greater the opportunity cost. But as we’ve 
seen, the argument for a bolstering our defence effort beyond current plans is weak. 
A greater investment in defence would increase our costs without a commensurate 
improvement to our security. 
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There has been over a century of debate in Australia about the relationships between 
population growth and the environment. This chapter mainly focuses on the academic 
contributions to this debate. A wide range of disciplines have been involved, from the 
physical and environmental sciences to the social sciences and economics, and this 
has produced differences in the way population-environment issues have been framed 
and analysed, and in the policies advocated. This chapter reviews the history of some 
of the key themes and issues, and explores the ways that the debate has evolved over 
time.
Australia’s carrying capacity
The population-environment debate in Australia started in the early 1900s with dis-
agreement over how many people could be supported, or “carried”, by the land and 
other environmental resources of the young nation. The optimists, or “boosters” as 
they were termed, spoke of future populations of from 100 to 300 million people. Their 
arguments were based on comparisons with the United States and Europe, and they 
viewed land simply in terms of its area, not its productivity. If an area of land in Europe 
supported so many people, then the same number could be supported in Australia, 
although in making these calculations the optimists generally did leave out a large part 
of central Australia as too dry. 
A vocal critic of this position was Griffith Taylor, the founder of Australia’s first university 
department of geography (at Sydney University in 1921). On the basis of inventories 
of regional resources and latitudinal comparisons with other regions in the world, he 
proposed that the continent could support a maximum of 65 million at the standard 
of living of Western Europe, and later reduced this to 20 million at a standard of living 
comparable to that of the United States. His estimates of Australia’s population car-
rying capacity were based on the climatic potential for agricultural settlement and on 
industrial development based on the known coalfields.1 
Other estimates of carrying capacity were based on potential food production rather 
than areal comparisons with comparable but longer settled environments.2 In the 
1930s, Mullet and Wadham used calculations of the food production capacity of the 
land to estimate that a population of between 40 and 50 million could be supported.3 
More sophisticated estimates were produced in the second half of the century. Gifford 
and his colleagues, using data from the 1960s, calculated that Australia’s potential 
food production, combined with assumptions about agricultural technology, diets and 
standards of living, could feed a resident population of about 30 million if 50 per cent 
of food protein produced was exported, and up to 80 million with a lower protein 
consumption and no agricultural exports.4 These calculations were revised nearly 20 
years later, producing estimates of “supportable” populations of from 96 to 206 million 
people.5 However, the authors of the revised estimates concluded that:
“ The dramatic differences between the population estimates of the earlier and current 
studies is good evidence that the specified procedures are simply incapable of being 
used to infer anything meaningful for population policy.”6 
The carrying capacity of Australia was the subject of an inquiry by a House of 
Representatives Standing Committee in 1994. The Committee argued that this 
depended on human choices and not on the physical limits of the environment, and 
concluded:
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… it is not possible to determine a specific upper limit beyond which Australian 
society would be at threat. “Carrying capacity” is a combination of political, social, 
environmental and cultural factors. What is, or is not supportable, for the longer term 
will depend on whether people are prepared to modify their behaviour in resource 
use.7 
In recent years the concept of carrying capacity has largely fallen out of favour, not 
only because estimations depend on subjective assumptions, but also because it has 
limited relevance in an economy in which domestic shortages of renewable or non-
renewable resources can be overcome through trade, technological development or 
substitution.
Resource constraints
Population-environment issues were not matters of much public debate during the 
1930s to 1960s but interest returned in the 1970s, perhaps as a reaction to the rapid 
and sustained population growth of the post-war period8 The National Population 
Inquiry, which commenced its work in 1971 and reported in 1975, described the 
emergence at this time of new challenges to the policy of population growth through 
immigration. These included concerns over:
…the danger of depleting mineral reserves following the tremendous expansion of 
both Australian and overseas investment in the extraction and export of a wide range 
of mineral ores (iron, bauxite, uranium, coal); the increasing pollution engendered 
by industrial concentration and population growth in major capital cities; [and] fear 
of environmental deterioration of coastal playgrounds, estuaries, and native forests 
by excessive development and their uncontrolled use by a growing and increasingly 
affluent population.9 
This revealed a shift in thought about Australia’s population size away from the earlier 
focus on carrying capacity to issues of resource constraints and environmental 
quality.
Studies over the last four decades have generally failed to identify significant national 
resource constraints on projected population growth, but have identified some local 
and regional constraints. In the 1970s the National Population Inquiry did not express 
any concern over physical and resource constraints:
The conclusion relevant to this study which seems to follow from the kind of analy-
sis undertaken is that resources are not likely to impose an early ceiling upon the 
population that can be carried at existing levels of living. A minimum level might 
be three times the present population; the maximum might well be several times 
greater, depending upon such factors as technological developments, expanding 
markets, and increased availability of resources compared with the present state of 
knowledge.10 
However, Douglas, a geographer also writing in the 1970s, suggested that the limita-
tions to the population that Australia could sensibly support were related to the supply 
of land close to the coast and with relatively reliable water and reasonably fertile soil. 
This type of land was valued in Australia, and it was scarce. It was now in demand 
not only for agriculture and food production, but also for forestry, urban settlement, 
industrial development, mining, waste disposal and recreation. In addition, he pointed 
to the accompanying problems of coastal erosion and pollution.11 
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
28
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
29
S E C T I O N  1 . 2
Resource constraints were examined in much more detail in 2001 in a large study of 
options to 2050 for Australia’s population, technology, resources and environment, 
commissioned by the Commonwealth Department of Immigration and Multicultural 
and Indigenous Affairs. The study, by the CSIRO, explored the effects on infrastructure, 
resources and the environment of population scenarios out to the year 2050 based on 
net immigration rates of zero persons per year, 70,000 persons per year, and 0.67 per 
cent of the current population size each year. Physical modelling of a very large number 
of demographic, resource and environmental variables to identify future resource and 
environmental issues was used.12 It concluded that:
The only food issue related to a likely decline in fish stocks, and otherwise domestic •	
food production was projected to be adequate under all population scenarios to 
2050 and beyond, although increased consumption could reduce exports and con-
sequently affect international trade balances. 
Water availability was not likely to be a constraining factor under any of the popula-•	
tion scenarios, except perhaps in Sydney and Melbourne by 2100, provided that 
major changes in water management occurred over the next 50 years.
Stocks of oil could become a constraint on transport unless there was a major •	
transition to a new energy economy.13 
Using a different method of analysis, a 2007 report by the Australian Academy of 
Technological Sciences and Engineering (ATSE) came to broadly similar conclusions. 
Through an examination of climate change, water, energy, transport, waste manage-
ment and social infrastructure, and the planning and investment issues involved in 
accommodating a larger population, it concluded that there were no inherent physical, 
resource or technological barriers to the accommodation of a population of 30 million 
by 2050.14 However, Bartlett (2006) has questioned the adequacy of Australia’s coal 
and natural gas resources at the current high rates of export.14
Environmental quality
The effects of population growth on environmental quality also became an issue in the 
1970s. In 1971 the Australian Institute of Political Science held a summer school on 
immigration and population, and the proceedings were published as a book.15 Fenner, 
a biologist, pointed to pressures on resources, especially water, and to the growing 
pollution produced by an industrial economy. He questioned the capacity of the world’s 
ecosystems to cope with continued economic and demographic growth, and argued 
for a lower rate of population growth in Australia to enable the country to improve the 
quality of the social and physical environment, and for the eventual stabilisation of the 
population. In the discussion of Fenner’s paper, Borrie, a demographer, commented 
that this approach ignored the roles of technology and markets in overcoming resource 
shortages. Borrie also argued that slowing population growth was not an effective 
way to address environmental problems, and advocated economic and administrative 
means of changing environmental behaviour. 
In the same publication Neutze outlined the effects of population growth on the quality of 
life in the major cities as measured by accessibility, the social environment and conges-
tion. He advocated for slower urban growth distributed over a larger number of cities. 
Commentators again pointed to other ways in which the problems of large cities might 
be managed rather than through reduced population growth. Although Neutze was 
an economist who was criticised by social scientists, these differing opinions reflected 
different viewpoints on population-environment issues, broadly between environmental 
scientists on the one hand and social scientists on the other.
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A significant contribution to the environmental quality theme was made by a book pub-
lished in 1984 by the Australian Conservation Foundation.17 It contained four chapters 
on renewable and non-renewable resources, environmental quality and degradation, 
and environmental amenity. It concluded that a transition to more sustainable ways of 
using the environment depended on a reduction in population growth. A 1992 report 
by the Population Issues Committee of the National Population Council, which had 
been asked by the prime minister to examine the major issues that could arise from the 
increase in Australia’s population, reached some similar conclusions:
Population growth has a major impact on ecological processes and systems, natural •	
capital as an amenity, the ability of environmental processes to absorb wastes, and 
biological diversity, and these effects are not reflected in market prices.
Australia’s population concentration into large, low density cities has led to air and •	
water pollution and consequent public health problems, and to marine pollution, the 
loss of bushland and wetlands, reduced housing affordability and a declining quality 
of life.
“…national ecological integrity would be best served by an active population policy •	
that resulted in a reduced rate of population growth.”18 
Harding states that this was: “The first government commissioned study to recom-
mend that population-environment linkages should have a centrally important place 
in discussion of population/immigration in Australia.”19 However, the dominant view of 
Australia’s population issues over the last several decades has tended to marginalise 
the role of population growth in environmental degradation.
Defining population-environment problems
In the population-environment debate there has been considerable disagreement 
about which environmental problems can properly be regarded as caused by popula-
tion growth rather than by factors such as overseas demand or poor environmental 
practices. For example Fincher, a geographer, wrote in a 1991 report for the then 
Bureau of Immigration Research that:
“ Domestic population growth may cause congestion of recreation or wilderness 
areas. This can be managed, and indeed new recreation and wilderness areas can 
be (respectively) developed and identified. It also needs to be emphasised that the 
development of our tourist industry is partly driven by the demands of overseas 
residents and the investment of foreign capital, as our agricultural industry has been. 
The demands of overseas, would-be tourists and business people are transform-
ing many of our recreation and wilderness sites, as much as the demands of the 
domestic population.”
“ Claims of direct or simple links between population numbers and agricultural sus-
tainability, or the land degradation which prevents agricultural sustainability, are 
often far too simplistic. Land degradation in Australia is the product of damaging 
farming practices which have occurred through the past 100 years, and have been 
responses to the demands of export markets and foreign investors as well as to 
calls on local farmers to feed the Australian people. Large population size was not, 
and is not, the cause of this situation – in fact it has been argued that population 
levels were, in the past, too low and that inappropriate farming methods developed 
in part to compensate for this.”20 
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Similarly, in the 1994 House of Representatives Standing Committee’s report on 
Australia’s population “carrying capacity”, the Committee stated that it was troubled by 
many submissions in which:
The almost universal explanation offered for contamination of river systems, for 
problems of waste disposal, and for excessive water use is identified as population 
growth alone, without any attempt to suggest more appropriate land manage-
ment, developing new techniques in waste disposal and treating pristine water as a 
premium product.21 
A report in 2000 by the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering 
(ATSE), on Australia’s population futures, went further by classifying a range of environ-
mental problems according to their link with population growth. The report identified 
four problems with a strong link to population growth – the pollution of land and ground-
water; the pollution of coastal waters, rivers and lakes near major urban centres; the 
depletion of freshwater stocks near large urban areas; and urban air pollution. Another 
nine issues were considered to have only a tenuous link with population growth. One 
of these was greenhouse gas emissions, because:
… any increase in greenhouse gases from an enlarged population in Australia could 
be small on a global scale, might be off-set by greenhouse reductions in other nations 
(assuming immigration) and, importantly, would probably be caused by economic 
and transport patterns (as opposed to population per se).22 
Another was the loss of biodiversity, because this was caused by land clearing for 
agriculture, and agriculture was not directly linked to the size of the population within 
Australia.
The eight environmental issues that the report argued had no link with population growth 
(ie there was no reasonable possibility that an enlarged population could directly cause 
a significant worsening in the issue) included:
The degradation of soils through salinity, acidification and erosion, which the ATSE •	
report contended was the result of inappropriate land management practices, and
The degradation of rivers and lakes in rural areas, which the report argued was •	
caused by irrigation for agricultural production, not directly by population, and as 
much of this production was for export it would not be affected by population 
growth. 
The 2000 ATSE report also argued that urban environmental problems were not just 
the result of population numbers, but also of the structure and functioning of Australia’s 
cities (and particularly urban sprawl and consequent car dependency), the high level 
of resource use and waste production by world standards, and the low stocks of fresh 
water near the major population centres because of Australia’s dry climate. The report 
went on to contend that the application of a range of technological, behavioural, pricing 
and settlement planning strategies could improve environmental outcomes even with 
significant population growth.
The 1994 Standing Committee’s comment and the ATSE report both hint at a view 
that it would be (technically) feasible, with sufficient money, to counter any detrimental 
effects that population growth has on the environment. 
The 2000 ATSE report was the subject of a critique by Jones23, an ecologist, the follow-
ing year. He argued that the judgement of what was “strong” and what was “tenuous” 
was too subjective, that the cumulative effect of a number of “tenuous” issues could 
be substantial, and that the report downplayed the role of population if it is indirect, 
as in the case of irrigation to produce agricultural exports. Exports were needed to 
pay for imports, and demand for imports increased with population growth. He further 
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suggested the argument that much of the environmental damage caused by land 
clearing and habitat loss had occurred when the population was much smaller ignored 
the very high rate of land clearing over the last 50 years. 
A paper by Hamilton24 did not address the ATSE report, but implicitly argued against 
its conclusions on the “tenuous” link between population growth and greenhouse gas 
emissions. He contended that growth in population would directly increase energy 
used in households, travel by car, and air travel. Population growth would also increase 
the size of the economy, and through this indirectly increase energy use in the ser-
vices sector, manufacturing for the domestic market, construction, road freight and rail 
freight. A further argument has been that population growth caused by migration into 
Australia raises global greenhouse gas emissions as migrants adopt the high energy 
consumption patterns of the Australian population.25 
Disciplinary differences
Differences over the role of population growth in Australia’s environmental problems 
have frequently followed a disciplinary division, with some economists and social sci-
entists taking a restrictive view of the contribution of population growth and physical 
and environmental scientists taking a broader view. This division also spills over into 
differences over the policies to be followed to address these problems. An example 
of disciplinary differences was noted earlier in the contrasting views of Fenner and 
Borrie at the 1971 summer school of the Australian Institute of Political Science. More 
recent examples can be found in the contrasting opinions expressed in the debates 
over the 2002 CSIRO Future Dilemmas report referred to earlier26, and a 2010 report 
which used a development of the same CSIRO model of stocks and flows in the 
Australian economy. 25 These debates have been complex, and are not possible to 
cover adequately in this chapter, but the issues they raise should be central to public 
policy thinking on population-environment issues.
The major issues on which the disciplines tend to differ can be summarised as 
follows: 
Is population growth a factor in only a few of Australia’s environmental problems, or •	
in a much wider range?
Is population policy only about managing the Australian labour market through •	
controlled immigration, or is it also about protecting environmental quality and 
sustainability?
Can environmental problems be addressed solely through environmental policies •	
and better management, or does the limited success of these policies in the past 
mean that a reduction in population growth is also needed?
Will resource constraints be overcome through the effects of rising prices on tech-•	
nological innovation, substitution and exploration for new resources, or are there 
likely to be physical resource limits that pricing won’t overcome?
Can technology enable Australians to keep their present lifestyles, or is a substantial •	
reduction in the material and energy content of these lifestyles essential?
Can the environmental problems produced by the concentration of population •	
growth in a small number of large urban areas be managed by market-based poli-
cies, new infrastructure and better technology, or are there political, financial and 
engineering capacity limitations that will make this very difficult to achieve? 
Further progress in the population-environment debate in Australia is likely to depend on 
reaching a consensus between the disciplines on the answers to these questions.28
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Pipe dreams and tunnel visions:  
The course of population debates in Australia 
William coleman
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Introduction
Australia is notably, if not notoriously, a land of much space but few people. Its popula-
tion density is, correspondingly, almost the lowest of any country in the world: only 
Namibia and Mongolia record a lower figure. Australia’s extreme divergence from the 
common human experience has been a magnet for strong reactions; and Australia’s 
small population has frequently been judged as either a failing or a blessing. These 
judgments have been undaunted by the dense many-sidedness of the population 
question, including economic, demographic, geographic and strategic considerations. 
This very complexity has generated not so much a dialectic, but expressions of faith (in 
one direction or another), or (sometimes) agnosticism. As a result this debate has had 
little direction or progress.
This Tartarian wilderness
It is not entirely surprising that the earliest treatment of population issues in Australia was 
supplied by someone who never set foot on the continent, Edward Gibbon Wakefield 
(1796–1862). Although composed from within the walls of London’s Newgate prison, 
Wakefield’s 1829 Letter from Sydney vividly painted a picture of a recent and enter-
prising immigrant to New South Wales, who had been frustrated at every turn in his 
attempts to unlock the wealth that lay latent in his estate. With not yet 70,000 inhabit-
ants of New South Wales, the new arrival perceives Australia, “would never be anything 
but a half-barbarous, Tartarian, ill-cultivated, poverty stricken wilderness, until in the 
course of nature, some hundreds of years hence, the population should become more 
dense”.1 
Wakefield’s Letter is a plea for numbers; but it is a plea for numbers made much more 
significant by his analysis of how greater numbers would benefit. In the Letter (and 
later efforts) Wakefield reveals himself as a genuine political economist; and one whose 
economic ideas received a respectful nod from J.S Mill.2 
Wakefield had two themes. The first is the need for a larger population in order to drive 
wages down so as to generate a profit rate that will make investment worthwhile. To 
Wakefield the “evil attendant upon a scarcity of labourers” is “an extravagant rate of 
wages, which by giving to the labourer a very share of the produce, prevented the 
capitalist from accumulating”.3 
Wakefield’s second theme is a need for change in the structures of production if greater 
population is to use the Smithian division of labour benefits that a greater population 
makes possible. Here Wakefield targets the impolicy of settling immigrants to foster an 
economy of peasant proprietors. As Mill supportively noted:
“ Mr Wakefield was the first to point out that the mode of planting new settlements, 
then commonly practised – setting down a number of families side by side, each on 
its piece of land, all employing themselves in exactly the same manner, – can never 
be other than unfavourable to great production...”4 
What is needed for “great production” are production structures that specialise and 
produce “for surplus”, not subsistence households. Mill (following Wakefield) also sug-
gested that the specifically Smithian productivity gains realisable by a larger (and more 
specialised) workforce would be reinforced by the greater degree of “co-operation” 
that a greater supply of labour would allow. Thus two men shifting large objects will (by 
co-operation) shift more than twice the mass that one man would shift.
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Whatever the merits of Wakefield’s case for specialised production structures,5 it needs 
little comment that Wakefield’s hostility to increased population being realised in the 
form of “yeoman landholding” was opposed to the repeated and largely futile efforts 
at “selection” and “closer settlement” by Australian governments from the 1860s.6 But 
his stress on the “cooperation” productivity benefits of an increased labour input had 
repercussions on notions of an ideal population a century later.
1888 and all that
If Wakefield furnished some materials that could be deployed in the economic analy-
sis of population growth, the Centenary of European settlement in 1888 provided the 
occasion of some ebullient forecasts of Australia’s population growth over the next 
century. Australia’s population had increased over the preceding 10 years by a remark-
able 84.6 per cent (reaching the 3 million mark in 1888), a decadal rate not remotely 
approached again.7 
From London the Spectator declared: “There is every reasonable probability that in 
1988 Australia will be a Federal Republic, peopled by 50 million English speaking 
men.” A more sustained reverie was provided by Edward Pulsford, ardent free-trader, 
adversary of White Australia and ‘”one of the last survivors in Australia of the spirit 
of nineteenth-century liberalism”.8 In 1888 and 1988, an extensive article in the Daily 
Telegraph’s Centennial Supplement of 23 January 1888, Pulsford ventured Australia’s 
population in 1988 would be 60 million.9 The basis of this growth would be develop-
ment of the underdeveloped. He stated:
“ Whatever may be the condition of the purely tropical portion of Australia in 1988, we 
think we hazard little when we express the conviction that in that year the remainder 
of the continent will have been opened up and occupied, and that many blank 
spaces at present found on the map of Australia will before the next century be filled 
with the names of prosperous and populous towns.”
Pulsford’s optimism was also implicitly based on the pursuit of correct economic poli-
cies. The breakdown by colony he envisaged (New South Wales 20 million, Victoria 8 
million, Queensland 10 million, South Australia 10 million, Western Australia 10 million, 
Tasmania 2 million) indicates protectionist Victoria would have the slowest growth of all, 
and indeed would sink to the second smallest in numbers.10 
The upshot was confidence in the destiny of the small marginal society. He continued:
“ What notice could the fate of a handful of men at the other side of the world be 
expected to attract when the French Revolution with all its horrors transfixed 
mankind? Yet perhaps the coming centuries will regard the ultimate consequences 
of the foundation of these colonies as of greater imp than the French Revolution of 
1789.”
Pulsford sets the template for enthusiastic visions that recurred over the next two 
generations. 
Clearly these visions were entirely untroubled by the Malthusian bad fairy. This in some 
measure reflects that Henry George’s Wealth and Poverty – a highly popular analysis 
of economic growth in Australia – was vehemently anti-Malthusian. Part of the recipe 
of George’s influence was that he straddled left and right by combining an animus 
towards inequality with a robust defence of the market. George’s greeting card to 
population growth cohered both with the “liberal-left” of the day and with the interests 
of business.
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The grey 90s
The heady expectations of growth of the Centenary were not to survive the reverses of 
the 1890s – industrial disputes, banking crisis, drought and an economic contraction 
that was “one of the most severe ever recorded”.11 From 1891 the decadal popula-
tion growth rate sank each year; and in 1903 the annual rate was only 1.1 per cent, 
the slowest annual rate since 1810. This was due in significant measure to a slump 
in migration, but falling fertility also played a role. The crude birth rate had dropped 
from 35.5 in 1888 to 25.3 in 1903. This was first noted by TA Coghlan (1855–1926), 
Government Statistician of New South Wales, in his Childbirth in New South Wales: 
a Study in Statistics. He deemed that as a matter of public policy, “the decline in the 
birth rate is an extremely serious matter”12 and various other figures agreed. In the 
judgement of a later historian: “By 1903 many prominent Australians feared that the 
decline was evidence of national decay comparable with that in France.”13 In the space 
of 15 years it seemed Australia’s prospects had changed from leaving France in the 
dustbin of history, to joining her in the dustbin. A response was a New South Wales 
Royal Commission, chaired by Charles Kinnaird Mackellar, an energetic public health 
reformer who dominated its proceedings “in a manner uncharacteristic of his usually 
careful approach to scientific enquiry”.14 The Royal Commission gave the first ventila-
tion in Australia of “natalist” policies. 
The population anxiety of the new Commonwealth was aired also by Sir George Handley 
Knibbs (1858–1929) the inaugural Commonwealth Statistician, who wrote that:
“ The annual rate of increase in the Commonwealth population for the quinquenium 
1901–1906 was practically identical with the annual rate of Germany, the figures 
being respectively 1.49 per cent and 1.47 per cent. In view of the sparsity of the 
population of Australia... the rate of increase equal only to that of such a densely 
populated country as Germany cannot be regarded as satisfactory.”15 
Knibb’s choice of Germany as comparator might not have been entirely innocent in 
these years of burgeoning international tension. Obviously Australia’s population was 
not irrelevant to the consequences of those tensions. Visiting luminaries cautioned 
Australia on her vulnerability. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Baden-Powell, replying at a reception extended to him at Hobart, 
uttered a warning with regard to the Yellow Peril. The Chief Scoutmaster said he had 
travelled through China and Japan, both of whom were looking for neighbours who 
had territories they could dispossess, and he was extremely glad the Commonwealth 
was taking the course it was in, doing something to meet such an emergency.16 
Boosters and knockers
The agitated aftermath of the First World War was a time of “brave new worlds”. 
Some countries had revolutions. Others adopted Temperance. The visionary creed 
that Australia seemed to embrace was “development”, and its manifesto was Australia 
Unlimited by Edwin J. Brady of 1918, a one-time secretary of the Australia Socialist 
League, friend of Henry Lawson and publisher of Katherine Mansfield’s first short stories. 
Australia Unlimited’s 1083 pages and copious photographs is prefaced by Dorothy 
Mackellar (the daughter CK Mackellar of the previously mentioned Royal Commission 
on fertility). Its credo is forthright:
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We intend to utilise within the boundaries of our Commonwealth opportunities we 
have hitherto wasted or left underdeveloped. In this building up there will be oppor-
tunities for labour and capital unequalled in the histories of industrial civilisation ... It is 
the policy which is going to make Australia the richest and most powerful, … nation 
in the world.17 
Clearly the “rapid peopling of this great continent” would be requisite for these ambi-
tions. Brady did not seriously attempt a population target, but flags in passing 100 
million18 (and urges that Western Australia acquire a population equal to that of England 
and France combined).19 Brady’s tenet of a large population as a concomitant of devel-
opment was repeatedly given a still more quixotic expression by the Prime Minister Billy 
Hughes. He said: 
“ Increased population was necessary for Australia, which was one of the most fertile 
countries in the world, and had an ample rainfall provided that it was conserved. 
He instanced Mildura and Renmark, which, he declared, were veritable paradises 
without angels and flaming swords. Mr Hughes referred also to Burrinjuck, where, 
he asserted, a good living could be obtained from 10 acres of land. He maintained 
that the Murray Valley was destined to equal the Nile in value of production.”20 
Hughes had no very steady estimate of the population Australia should seek. Sometimes 
he suggested 25 million21, at others around 100 million. As quoted in the Brisbane 
Courier in 1921:
[Hughes] did not hold with gloomy pessimists that because of geographical causes 
Australia would never be able to hold a big white population. He believed that some 
day it would hold a population nearly as big as that of the United States (109 million 
in 1921).22 
The 1920s was certainly the period of heroic estimates of Australia’s potential popula-
tion; thus Albrecht Penck, hydrologist at the University of Berlin, mooted 480 million.
These fancies were confronted by Thomas Griffith Taylor, the “foundation head of 
Australia’s first university geography department, in Sydney”. In a highly influential 
1926 paper, “Frontiers of Settlement in Australia”, in the Geographical Review of the 
American Geographical Society23, Taylor argued that Australia was sparsely populated 
for good reason:
“ The writer sees no reasonable hope of close settlement in most of empty Australia, 
for the sufficient reason that nature has not endowed it with a suitable environment. 
No government can alter this fact.”
Taylor went on: “No regions better deserve the title of desert than the vast uninhabited 
(and under present conditions, uninhabitable) areas [of Australia].” These facts, he said, 
“were unpleasant (but) sensible men and women, however, had to face them....The 
nearest geographical parallel to inmost Australia was the Sahara desert.” He underlined 
this with numerous photographs of dismal “gibber plains” (in implicit rebuttal of the 
cheerful plates of Australia Unlimited) and the observation that Australia’s “frontier” – 
defined as “one person per four square miles” – had been retreating towards the coast 
since 1900. The empty spaces were becoming emptier still.24
Neither could the uninhabitable emptiness be transformed by infrastructure invest-
ment; “railways can do practically nothing to advance population in regions where the 
environment is not attractive”, with the consequence that “the £10,000,000 proposed 
to be spent on the building of the north-south [Alice Springs-Darwin] railway would be 
money wasted....the money could be put to considerably better use in districts capable 
of carrying large population.25 26 
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Taylor’s stony rebuttal of populationist imaginings provoked considerable ire. Such as 
this letter in the Sydney Morning Herald: 
Sir, 
It was reported the other day that, prior to his departure for the United States of 
America, Professor Griffith Taylor made the astounding statement that Australia could 
not carry a population of more than 20,000,000 people! As Schiller says – ”E’en 
the gods rebel in vain against such crass stupidity”. If he said that this wonderful 
continent of ours could accommodate 200,000,000 he would have been saying 
something nearer the mark. Why, Queensland alone has room and opportunities for 
a population of, at least, 60,000,000 people. If the learned professor talks in this wild 
fashion in America – well, Australia will not get much of an advertisement.
I am, etc
B HODSON.27 
The controversy reached the United States, where Australia’s consulate saw fit to rebut 
Taylor in the New York Times:
“ I desire to state that efforts of the Commonwealth and State Governments in 
Australia are centred in a policy designed to exploit vast areas awaiting only the 
advent of settlers to turn virgin country into highly productive land… Australia enjoys 
generous rainfall, and it is only a question of locking the water for discreet distribu-
tion to our rich lands.”28 
Taylor did not actually repudiate all hopes for the “fertile south east”. Perhaps in conse-
quence his own views on the population Australia could reasonably expect were mobile: 
sometimes he ventured 20 million (Geographical Review), sometimes 30 million,29 other 
times 40 million,30 and even, in his Environment and Race, 50 million plus31. For this last 
suggestion, Taylor received censure from what would later be called environmentalists. 
David Stead, “marine biologist, a founder of, and during its early years the main driving 
force behind, the Wildlife Preservation Society of Australia”32 repudiated Taylor’s upside 
estimate: “Personally, I find it hard to believe that Australia can support such a large 
population as, say 50 to 60 million on anything like our present standard of living or 
comfort with food drawn from its known natural resources.”33 
With few allies in Australia, Taylor gladly left Sydney University for a position at the 
University of Chicago.34 But Taylor’s message was not forgotten and was pressed 
again in 1942 in The Myth of Open Spaces, by William Douglas Forsyth, then of the 
Department of Information. Forsyth dryly observes that “in a 150 years of settlement 
less than 10 per cent of the land in Australia has been thought worth purchasing”.35 
He stresses that attempts to secure population growth by rural settlement would press 
against the universal momentum to urbanisation since the industrial revolution. But by 
this time the arguments for population had changed.
Optimum population 
The 1929 official inquiry by four eminent economists into protectionism, The Australian 
Tariff: an Economic Inquiry, had played Ricardo to Wakefield’s Smithianism on the 
question of population. The working model behind the Inquiry’s logic supposed the 
Australian economy being composed of two sectors: an agricultural sector, where 
a diminishing marginal productivity of labour prevailed; and a manufacturing sector, 
where a constant marginal productivity of labour prevailed. This assumption implied a 
stylised history whereby with a very small population of Australia would be exclusively 
agricultural, and consequently any population increase would push down marginal and 
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average productivity in agriculture, to the detriment of living standards. In this stylised 
history, population increases would depress productivity until the marginal productiv-
ity of labour in agricultural was reduced to equality with the marginal productivity of 
labour in manufacturing, at which point a manufacturing sector would appear, and 
absorb all further population increases. The expansion of the manufacturing sector 
would stave off further declines in marginal productivity. Nevertheless, the per capita 
income in the economy would still decrease with every increase in population, since the 
average productivity of labour in the ever expanding manufacturing is less than average 
productivity in the now stationary agricultural sector36. The upshot of this logic was that 
the Inquiry was tacit anti-populationist. But the Inquiry accepted as a parameter the 
impossibility of stopping population increases, let alone reversing it.
But a sense of possibility might have thrown some doubt of the inevitability of diminish-
ing average products in the face of a larger population. Suppose Australia’s population 
could be transformed back to that of 1829: would it really be true that a population 
of 65,000 would provide Australians a higher living standard than 65 million? Was 
there, indeed, any evidence of a Ricardian pressure on living standards while Australia’s 
population was growing 100 fold over the previous 100 years? Ricardian productivity 
effects, it would seem, must have been balanced by Smithian effects. That inference 
provided the context for the blooming of the concept of “optimum population” in 
Australian policy debates in the inter-war years, a concept which turned on a contest 
between Smithian and Ricardian productivity effects
This concept of optimum population supposed there was some unique population 
level – the optimum – that would, in given circumstances, maximise any given country’s 
output per head. 
There were two sources of this notion: Knut Wicksell (1851–1926) and Edwin Cannan 
(1861–1935).
The notion of an optimum population had been first aired by the neoclassical economic 
theorist Wicksell, who, having thrown over the evangelical Christianity of his youth, had 
adopted birth control as his religion. This new faith raised an economic question that 
Malthusianism of classical economics could never ask. Under Malthusianism, popula-
tion was endogenous; so no matter what technical conditions prevailed population 
would adjust until per capita income was such that net reproduction was zero. But if 
population could be controlled, then population could be a policy choice variable, and 
a “best” population that secured the largest per capita income could become a rational 
goal. In that regard, Wicksell’s work on “optimal scale” of the firm – the scale that was 
not too small or too large – was clearly suggestive of an optimal scale of an economy, 
and therefore of its population.
But it was Edwin Cannan at the London School of Economics who had articulated 
in 1920s the most distinct rationale for the existence of a unique per capita income-
maximising level of population; its existence reflected the operation within an economy 
of both diminishing and increasing returns. 
As we have noticed, if returns were diminishing at all levels of population (the Ricardian 
effect), then income per head evidently would rise with every reduction in population; 
and the optimum would be indefinitely small. But if returns were increasing with every 
increase in population (Smithian effects) then clearly income per head would rise with 
every increase in population; and the optimum would be indefinitely large. But suppose 
at low levels of labour input, increases in labour reap productivity gains through making 
possible a Smithian “division of labour” or “specialisation”. But suppose also, that at 
higher levels of labour input these benefits of specialisation and co-operation will be 
counterweighed by the reduced productivity of labour (manifested in the burgeoning 
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of Ricardian rents) that will be consequent upon the greater ratio of labour to natural 
resources. Specifically suppose that returns were increasing for low population, say 
below L*, but decreasing above L*. Then output per head is maximised at L*, the point 
where the elasticity of output to labour is unitary. L* is the optimal population (see Figure 
1). Any population below L* we could call “suboptimal”, and any population above we 
might call “supraoptimal”.
Benham
It was from Cannan’s class rooms that there arrived in 1923 at Sydney University FC 
Benham, “of those days…a self-confident, occasionally even brash, young man”37, who 
threw himself into Australian policy debates. In a chapter of The Peopling of Australia, 
Benham ventured the first estimate of Australia’s optimal population. 
He explains that at low population levels “a greater population will be able to take fuller 
advantage of economic co-operation per head”38 but at a sufficiently high population 
“instead of new occupations being created (in response to more people), there would 
simply be more persons in each existing occupation”, and the reduced “natural resources 
per head” would dominate. He moves forthwith from these a priori considerations to 
declare: “I am inclined to think that optimal population (of Australia) is somewhere 
between 10 and 15 million”39. Regrettably, Benham gives barely any justification of this 
conjecture, beyond suggesting that since between 1901–1913 productivity of labour 
rose by 30 per cent there could be no diminishing returns; a shaky inference that 
neglected both technical progress and capital accumulation. Perhaps Benham felt the 
thinness of his case because in his own book The Prosperity of Australia: An Economic 
Analysis40, he shies off any number. In considering the impact of greater population on 
division of labour and reduced natural resources per head, he concludes: “It is impos-
sible to say which of these tendencies would outweigh the other.”
In fact, in addition to empirical uncertainties, there are significant theoretical difficulties 
with the Benhamite notion of optimal population. 
Firstly, there is the embarrassment that at the Benhamite optimum all output is paid 
to labour.41 Thus the Benhamite optimum inadvertently takes the appearance of the 
Wakefieldian workers paradise and land owners’ nightmare. The optimum is supremely 
optimal for labour, but pessimal for other factors.42 
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That the Benhamite optimum has a wages share of one at the optimum raises a puzzle: 
In Wakefield’s vision was not the wholesale absorption of national income by labour a 
pathology of a sub-optimal population; a pathology that was to be relieved by the higher 
productivity that (Benham agrees) is secured by an optimal population? It appears we 
need to dig a bit deeper into the technology represented in Figure 1. But the most 
obvious rationalisation makes things still worse for the Benhamite optimum. The pro-
duction relation of Figure 1 is most easily rationalised as fundamentally one between 
the output per unit of land (Y/N =y) and factor intensity: Labour per unit of land, (L/N= 
l). In this attempt to capture the Benhamite vision we are to suppose that the average 
productivity of labour rises with labour per unit of land until some critical intensity is 
reached il*; and above that critical intensity the average productivity of labour falls with 
labour per unit of land. 
But under such an “intensity” characterisation of Figure 1 there is, in fact, no unique 
‘optimal population’; under such a characterisation the maximum average product 
of labour can be secured no matter how small the supply of labour. In Figure 2 the 
average product of labour is maximised at l*, as that provides the tangent ray from the 
origin. But l* can be secured no matter how small the total supply of labour simply by 
leaving some natural resources (“land”) idle. Thus all the productivity benefits that were 
supposedly dependent on a “large” population are secured by a population no matter 
how small. After all, the marginal product of land at any intensity less than l* is negative, 
and consequently land will be left idle; left idle until the ratio of labour to cultivated land 
has risen to l*. Thus for all L less than l*N, an increase in L would not cause an increase 
in the labour intensity with which natural resources are worked; it would only reduce 
the amount of land left idle. The “very march of the frontier” that excited populationists 
is revealed as no other than the market maintaining the productivity of labour at its 
maximum in the face of greater population.
The Benhamite optimum might seek – and find – refuge in other rationalisations of 
Figure 1. Taking up Wicksellian themes against Cannanite ones, one may argue that 
Figure 2’s intensity rationalisation of Figure 1 is mistaken; and that any increase in 
average productivity with population turns on the scale of inputs, rather than intensity. 
In this scale interpretation it will make a critical difference to the average productivity of 
labour whether one hour of labour is applied to one square metre of land; or a million 
hours are applied to a million square metres; despite the intensity being the same. To 
pursue the scale riposte to Figure 2’s intensity rationalisation of Figure 1 – if 999,999 
hours of labour input is withdrawn from cultivating the land then average productivity 
cannot be maintained by withdrawing 999,999 square metres of land from cultivation.
Figure 2 
AvErAGE lAbour ProDuCTIvITy MAxIMIsED no MATTEr HoW FEW PEoPlE
y
I* I
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In mathematical terms, the scale interpretation of Figure 1 could be captured by:
y = y(l)s(L)
s’(L) > 0 for L<Lcritical 
y’(l) > 0 and y”(l) < 0 for all l.
This will result in an average productivity of labour positively related to population for 
low levels of L, but a negative relation at higher levels; and so an optimal level of 
population.
However, there is also a difficulty in such “scale” rationalisations of the optimum 
population: as long as positive scale effects are operative there can be no produc-
tion equilibrium. As long as positive scale effects are operative, any enterprise can 
always increase its profit (or reduce its loss) by increasing the scale. Thus any enter-
prise always wants to get bigger: at least until scale economies are exhausted. Every 
enterprise wishes to assume a scale that will exhaust scale economies.43 Assuming 
scale economies are not exhausted by the Australian population – and even at the 
optimum population, scale economies are not exhausted44 – this means any single 
enterprise would like to assume a scale as large (strictly speaking, larger) than the 
whole economy. Such a wish hardly seems to accord with reality. 
An attempt could be made to salvage the scale rationale for optimum population by 
invoking the existence of scale economies that are external to the firm; so that while all 
firms will experience scale effects as the economy grows, no single firm has the private 
incentive to try to reap them by increasing their own scale. However, Tibor Scitovsky 
was not exaggerating in saying: “The concept of external economies is one of the most 
elusive in economic literature.”45 One might add that even if such economies can be 
identified – and Scitovsky judged examples ‘not easy to find’ – we are required to ask 
in a post-Coasian world why are these external economies not internalised? Again, 
answers to this query may be advanced, but the point is Benham’s seemly appar-
ent simple rationale for optimal population now ends up in a tangle of considerations 
regarding the force of “Coase’s Theorem”.
That both the scale and intensity rationalisations advanced above of Figure 1 are prob-
lematic does not, of course, imply no successful rationalisation of optimum population 
exists. The point is simply that the Benhamite optimum eludes the simple rationalisa-
tion which its advocates assumed it had.
Smithies
Not long after Benham’s effort, a different attempt at theoretical rationalisation of 
optimum population was provided by Arthur Smithies in 1938, on his return to Australia 
after completing a PhD under JA Schumpeter at Harvard46. Rather than analyse a single 
good economy, Smithies considers a two sector economy just as The Australian Tariff 
did implicitly. Whereas The Australian Tariff assumed constant marginal productivity in 
manufacturing, Smithies explores the implication of increasing marginal productivity 
in manufacturing, and demonstrates that alternative assumption destroys the anti-
populationism of the Inquiry.
Consider, said Smithies, an economy where one good (“boots”) is produced under 
perpetually increasing marginal products, and a second good (“potatoes”) produced 
under perpetually diminishing marginal products. It is clear that there is a welfare effi-
cient allocation of labour between the two sectors, that can be usefully presented in 
a diagram (Figure 3, not drawn by Smithies) which plots the marginal utility product of 
potato labour and the marginal utility product of boots labour.47 
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Crucially, Figure 4 shows an increase in population would increase the marginal utility 
product of labour in both sectors; and increase the average utility product of both 
sectors. However, further inspection of such figures reveals that increased population 
would not be indefinitely improving, as the marginal utility product of boots labour does 
ultimately diminish on account of the diminishing marginal utility of boots, (as manifested 
in the downward sloping portion of marginal utility product of boots labour). It is easy to 
see that a sufficiently large increase in population would bring that downward portion 
into play, with negative consequences. Therefore the overall conclusion is that some 
extra population is improving, but not an unlimited increase: “There is a magnitude of 
population which realises the maximum standard of consumption.”48 
Regrettably, Smithies rationalisation of an optimum population invokes theoretical 
problems that he is negligent in treating. To invoke increasing marginal products may 
create a unique optimum population, but increasing marginal products famously play 
mayhem with neoclassical distribution analysis. Certainly, it is impossible for labour to 




EvEryboDy HAPPIEr WITH MorE PoPulATIon
Marginal utility product of boots labourMarginal utility product of potato labour
Potato labour Boots labour
Marginal utility product of boots labourMarginal utility product of potato labour
Potato labour Boots labour
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characterisation of the allocation of labour in Figure 3 will not represent the market 
equilibrium.
But however incomplete and theoretically beleaguered was the notion of optimum 
population, several Australian economists in the 1930s and war years felt they could 
show the existence of an optimum, and even quantify it. For example, the Queensland 
Bureau of Industry, under the direction of Colin Clarke, estimated Queensland’s optimal 
population at 5 million. The Bureau also deemed the optimum size of a Queensland city 
to be 200,000, perhaps surprisingly low. 
However, in the post-war period, the attraction of the concept of an optimum popula-
tion waned. Already by 1949 Peter Karmel, the economist most expert in demographic 
issues at the time, was stating: “With regard to the optimum population of Australia, 
it should frankly be stated that we have very little knowledge of what such a popula-
tion should be.”49 Economists in the subsequent 50 years found little appeal in the 
concept.50 As a result, the National Population Council in 1991, extensively shaped by 
economists, concluded: “It is inappropriate to enumerate an optimum population level 
or carrying capacity for Australia,” and this was also the view of the National Population 
Inquiry report of 1975.
Australians as an endangered species
Perhaps Australia’s rapid growth in population in the post-war took the wind out of esti-
mates of the optimum, as population glided past the lower bound of Benham’s “10–15 
millions” in 1959, and the upper bound in 1981. But while the “baby boom” is firmly fixed 
in retrospective perceptions of the post-war period it did not dominate the conscious-
ness of the first wave of post-war population commentators and controversialists. On 
the contrary, their vision was deeply coloured by the decline in fertility and population 
growth in the inter-war period, during which the fertility rate dropped from 3.119 in 
1921 to 2.178 in 1936. In 1936 SH Wolstenhome, an economics honours student at 
Sydney University, prepared the first cohort projection of Australian population51,52 that 
concluded that – even after allowing for annual immigration of 45,000 – population 
would peak at about 8.9m in 1981, and then begin to fall. The 1944 National Health 
and Medical Research Committee estimates were slightly more despondent still.
Arthur Calwell’s How Many Australians Tomorrow? of May 1945, used these projec-
tions to raise the alarm, and clamour for policies to encourage fertility and immigration. 
He stated:
“ I wonder how many of us have ever thought how much we Australians are like 
koalas? We both belong to dying races…In 1945 there are 7 million Australians but 
by 1965 there will be only about 8 million if we go on reproducing at our present 
rate. And after that according to the statisticians, our population will come to a 
standstill and get smaller and smaller every year …if we are prepared to bleed to 
death in the national sense, as we have been doing for more than a decade, our end 
is certain and inevitable.
 Population is our number one problem …and it my duty to awaken my fellow 
Australians to the perils that will always hang over them unless this land is peopled 
to its carrying capacity.”
Immigration would appear to be the obvious remedy. And the memory of Arthur Calwell 
is inseparable from his role as Australia’s first Minister for Immigration from July 1945. 
But it is worth stressing that in How Many Australians Tomorrow? Calwell does not 
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invoke immigration is a leading remedy for low population growth. He contends that the 
principal problem is fertility not immigration. The policies that he favours are natalist.
The advocacy of natalist policies to solve an alleged population problem was not 
restricted to one party or one “social philosophy”. At the 12th Summer School of the 
Australasian Institute of Political Science in 1947 William Wentworth (not yet an MP) 
avowed: “It seems inevitable that unless (there is) a radical change in policy or outlook, 
we shall experience in about 1950 a fall in the number of births quite without precedent 
in this country. There is catastrophe only four or five years ahead.”53 He suggested 
that the parents of a child would be eligible for a tax rebate for life, even after the child 
had passed 16 years. Wentworth also proposed that suffrage be based on children. A 
father would have an extra vote for every son; a mother would have an extra vote for 
every daughter.54 
These positions soon lost their currency as the post-war population surged; in 1949 
and 1950 population was growing at 3.24 per cent per year. Attention shifted to 
immigration rather than population, and for about 20 years it seemed Australia was 
unconcerned about population.
A tired brown land?
Since 1970 population controversy has reappeared. It was initially centred upon anxiet-
ies about global population growth in the context of “limits to growth” consciousness, 
and reinforced by concerns for the Australian environment.55 In the 1990s these anxiet-
ies were reinforced by a hostility to population that, although rooted in life sciences, 
was “anthropocentric” rather than “biocentric” in orientation, in that the focus was on 
the loss of amenity and “urban quality of life” supposedly resulting from higher popula-
tion.56 The creation of micro parties such as the Stable Population Party of Australia and 
Stop Population Growth Now Party – supplementing the creation in 1988 of the green 
pressure group Sustainable Population Australia – are manifestations of this “quality of 
life” case against population.
But not all contention has been negative. At the National Population Summit of 2002 
the then Victorian Premier Steve Bracks collected a number of public identities (includ-
ing Malcolm Fraser, Bob Hawke, Phil Ruddock, Anne Summers, Tim Flannery and 
Tim Costello) to contribute to a collection of papers that in tendency is population-
ist.57 Malcolm Fraser voiced sentiments that brought to mind an earlier period, stating: 
“There is no reason why we could not grow 2.5 times by the end of this century (2100). 
We would then be a nation of 45 to 50 million people. Our influence would be infinitely 
greater than a nation that has stood still for 50 years.” Economists – who had largely 
left the study of population for demographers – were also favourable. Ross Garnaut, 
implicitly reviving an argument of Benham and Smithies, suggested that Ricardian rents 
are “of small importance in contemporary Australia” but overheads are significant, and 
so larger population would be beneficial. Alan Fels argued that small population denies 
economies of scale, and fosters a lack of competition. Max Corden was another mod-
erate populationist economist. From economists resisting the “think big” of the 1920s, 
it appeared economists were resisting the “think small” of the 1990s. 
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Conclusion
A retrospective on attempts to understand the implications of Australian population 
growth is not impressive. We see analysts sometimes misled by current demographic 
tendencies – and blindsided by later demographic shifts; other times casting a priori 
net that become tangled in submerged complexities; or fixated on one dimension of a 
problem with many aspects. Australian population has proved a complex topic that at 
the same time both calls for intense study and defies it. 
I would like to thank Jonathan Pincus for his useful criticisms of an earlier draft. I am 
also indebted to the comments of Graeme Wells, and to John Hawkins for drawing my 
attention to the significance of Edward Pulsford. 
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2.1
Forecasts and projections of  
Australia’s population 
Peter Mcdonald
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S E C T I O N  2 . 1
Conventional population projections
Until 2002, official Australian population projections were made only by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics and they were published as projections, the outcomes of sets of 
assumptions about what future demography might be. The ABS projections are long-
term, at least 50 years into the future, and are based on assumed scenarios relating to 
the future levels of the three input parameters: fertility, mortality and international migra-
tion. The assumptions or scenarios are derived from analysis of past trends and expert 
opinion about the future directions of these three parameters. Conventionally, the ABS 
makes a large number of projections leaving it to users to select the series that they 
consider most appropriate. However, in presenting the results of these projections, the 
ABS gives priority to one, central projection and most users adopt this for their planning 
purposes. As a matter of course, agencies of the Australian Government across the full 
range of responsibilities base their future estimates on the ABS projections. 
This situation changed in 2002, when the Department of the Treasury issued its first 
Intergenerational Report based not on the ABS official projections but upon its own 
projection of the future.
In 2002, the Australian Treasury published its first Intergenerational Report (IGR) and, 
importantly, associated the outcomes of its population projection with long-term impli-
cations for government receipts and outlays. The first IGR called for adjustment of 
the then policy settings (in health expenditure) on the basis of a projected deficit of 
receipts against outlays by 2050. The argument was made that planning had to begin 
immediately for the fiscal deficit that would arise from the ageing of the population by 
2050. This very definitive association of current policy with population outcomes in 50 
years time had the effect of providing long-term population projections with a degree of 
certainty that they had never had before. The Treasury did not surround its projections 
with warnings about uncertainty, as the ABS had always done, because current policy 
recommendations were based on the projections. The media reported the IGR results 
largely uncritically.
There have been two more IGRs published since 2003, in 2007 and 2010, and so the 
situation of competing official projections has continued. However, the most recent 
ABS (2009) and Treasury (2010) projections were very similar to each other. It might 
have been presumed that this similarity would have provided both projections with 
greater credibility, but the 2010 IGR results were met with both acceptance and disdain 
in the media. While the 2009 ABS projection of a 2050 population of 35 million went 
almost without comment, the 2010 IGR projection of 36 million caused a storm. 
In the media, the 2010 IGR, like its predecessors, was reported in the language of 
certainty (with my emphasis added in the citations): 
Australia’s population is expected to reach 35 million by 2050 according to projec-
tions from Treasury’s Intergenerational Report.1 
Treasury now says it expects migration numbers to tail off to an average of 180,000 
for the next 40 years.2 
Forecasts from Treasury’s latest intergenerational report predict that Australia’s 
population would reach 36 million by 2050.3 
The Federal Government’s recently released 2010 Intergenerational Report argues 
that rapid population growth is needed to support an ageing population.4 
However, with greater frequency than at any previous release, the 2010 IGR was also 
greeted with disdain (with my emphasis in the citations):
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Its (Treasury’s) projections of future budgetary costs in 2049–50 are of no value. 
Treasury does not know with any precision what will happen in the next 40 years. 
IGR1, in 2002, told us that by 2041–42, the ageing of society would put the budget 
in deficit by five per cent of GDP. Yet by 2007, IGR2 had virtually halved the forecast 
deficit that year to 2.7 per cent of GDP. And now IGR3 has halved it again to a 
forecast deficit of just 1.3 per cent of GDP. 5 
Successive reports have shown absurdly different population projections. For 
example, IGR2002 estimated that, 40 years later, Australia’s population would be 
25.2 million. Five years later, IGR2007 predicted that the population would rise to 
28.5 million. Three years later, IGR2010 predicts Australia’s population in 2050 will 
be 35 million. The differing reports show that Treasury’s population predictions are 
worthless.6 
The disdain from these journalists arose from the high degree of inconsistency between 
the three successive IGRs, over a period of just seven to eight years as shown in 
Table 1.
Table 1 
PoPulATIon AnD FIsCAl DEFICIT ouTCoMEs In suCCEssIvE InTErGEnErATIonAl 
rEPorTs
In fact, the differences between the IGRs are due very largely to the effects of higher 
levels of migration upon the age structure of the population. The age distribution of net 
migration to Australia in recent years has been very young, younger than it has ever 
been, with over 70 per cent of net migration being aged less than 30 years.7 Many of 
these immigrants go on to have babies in Australia adding to the impact of immigration 
on the age structure. The popularly heard view that immigration does not influence the 
age structure because immigrants themselves grow old is incorrect. Immigration has 
only a small impact on the age structure because the annual number of immigrants is 
small compared to the size of the total population. The impact of immigration on age 
structure is also subject to diminishing returns, that is, the effect becomes smaller 
as migration increases. This is why, as shown in Table 1, it takes lots of immigrants 
and lots of population increase to have a relatively small effect on the age structure of 
the population. Nevertheless, an increase of population from 26 million to 36 million 
reduces the fiscal deficit from five per cent to 1.3 per cent of GDP. 
The release of the 2010 IGR gave release to a debate about the desirable size of 
Australia’s population in the future. This debate continued through the 2010 Federal 
election with both major parties promising to lower migration. Labor proposed future 
net migration of 180,000 per annum and the Coalition, 170,000 per annum – essen-
tially the same levels used in the 2009 ABS projections and the 2010 IGR projections 
that led to the projected population of 36 million by 2050. The political debate also led 
to the appointment of a Minister for Population, the first in Australia’s history. Under 
his overview, an enquiry into Australia’s future population was launched. The enquiry 
reported in June 2011. The most significant statement in this report is the following:
(MIllIons)
EnD PoInT FIsCAl DEFICIT  
(As A % oF GDP)
IGR1: 2002/03 25.2 5.0
IGR2: 2007 28.5 2.7
IGR3: 2010 35.9 1.3
Really Big Australia 0?
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It is more useful for governments, businesses and communities to focus on ways of 
improving our wellbeing, protecting our environment and making better use of the 
resources we have, rather than trying to determine an absolute limit to our population 
and focusing efforts on restricting growth in order to not exceed this “limit”.8 
The report also refers to the high degree of uncertainty that must be attached to long-
term population projections and the limited scope that any government has to influence 
the end result. Given this position of government, there is a question about how the 
next IGR should be constructed and, more broadly, about how population forecasts or 
projections should be made into the future. These are the questions that are addressed 
in the remainder of the chapter.
Stochastic population projections
Faced with similar dilemmas, the direction in world demography is towards stochastic 
population forecasts.9 The stochastic approach attaches probability distributions to 
future trends in the input parameters, fertility, mortality and migration. These distribu-
tions are obtained from an analysis of past time trends and/or through the use of 
probabilistic (subjective) expert opinions. Effectively, the inputs are the same as con-
ventional projections, analysis of past trends and expert opinions about the future, but 
the stochastic approach is more programmed or objective in its portrayal of the future. 
Stochastic projections also enable probability statements to be made about the likeli-
hood of particular outcomes. For example, Tom Wilson, using the stochastic approach 
has recently reported that there is a 95 per cent probability that Australia’s population 
in 2050 will lie between 29 and 43 million. Wilson also said that this range adequately 
covered future uncertainties such as “fertility rates, major recessions, government 
migration policy, major crises which generate refugee flows and demand for labour in 
the Australian economy”.10 Interestingly, Wilson’s most likely estimate for population 
in 2050 was 36 million, the same as that previously projected by the conventional 
approaches used by ABS and the Treasury.11 
Hyndman and Booth in an earlier stochastic projection of Australia’s population were 
much more circumspect especially about the time frame of the forecasts:
Time series methods such as we have used here are most useful for short to medium-
term forecasting. The width of the prediction intervals shows that the methods 
become increasingly less informative over time, and as a result we have chosen to 
restrict our forecasts to 20 years.12 
My own view is that the language of stochastic forecasts such as “95 per cent con-
fident”, while framed to convey uncertainty succeeds in providing an undue level of 
certainty to the forecasts. The difference between the Wilson forecast and the Hyndman 
and Booth forecast provides the evidence. The Hyndman and Booth forecasts were 
95 per cent confident that Australia’s population in 2023 would lie between 22 and 26 
million. The Wilson forecast is 95 per cent confident that Australia’s population in 2023 
will lie between 26 and 28 million. Why are the two forecasts so confidently different? 
The answer is not that they used different methodologies but that Australia’s demog-
raphy changed immediately after Hyndman and Booth had completed their forecast; 
both fertility and net migration increased substantially. This suggests that in making 
forecasts, greater attention should be given to better methods to assess changes 
in demographic parameters in the short-term. The following propositions should be 
applied to population forecasting and population projections in Australia.
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Short-term forecasts of fertility
Getting the number of births wrong in the short-term involves substantial costs. In 
the six years from 2004 to 2009, there were 152,000 more births in Australia than 
there would have been if the number of births had been as projected in the 2003 IGR 
population projections. This is equivalent to over 250 primary schools each with 600 
students, or 8000–10,000 primary school teachers. Gearing up to build schools or to 
train teachers constitutes a substantial problem when the projections are so wrong so 
fast.
The annual number of births is not only a product of the number of children that women 
have across their lifetimes (the quantum of fertility), it is also a product of when (at what 
age) they have their births (the tempo of fertility). Changes in the timing of births and 
their flow-on effect into future years are the main cause of errors in forecasting births in 
the short-term. Despite this knowledge, little attempt has been made to take the timing 
of births into account in making birth forecasts.
Proposition one
We cannot possibly know what the levels of fertility, mortality and migration will be in the 2050s.
The mothers of the 2050s are not yet born themselves. How can we possibly estimate how many •	
babies they will have and when they will have them?
If labour demand is the main driver of migration, what will labour demand be in the 2050s? Or •	
humanitarian or family migration?
There is considerable dispute about the future trend in mortality (slowing down or continued •	
improvement). 
Proposition two
For long term projections (eg. 50 years), it is more logical to do “what if” projections or scenarios 
because then we can see exactly what is involved in reaching a particular outcome. And it is 
transparent that the outcome is a “what if”.
Proposition three
For most policy purposes, we would do better making forecasts of population in the next decade 
that are based, not only on recent demographic trends, but also on predicted behavioural change 
(fertility) and estimates of future labour demand (migration).
Proposition four
Some features of population are able to be forecast on a longer-term basis, especially the future 
aged population. The population aged 80+ in 2041 is a projection forward of the population aged 
50+ now. Fertility will have no impact on this population and migration will have only a minor 
impact. There will be a range of variation in mortality, but stochastic projections are able to handle 
this variation very well.
This gives rise to the possibility of using different approaches for different age segments of the 
future population.
Proposition five
Future demography is not determined by statisticians, economists or demographers sitting in their 
offices and exogenously dreaming of the future, stochastically or otherwise. Future demography 
will be endogenously determined by social, economic and environmental factors.
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Forecasting of births, whether by conventional methods or stochastic, relies upon 
age-specific fertility rates (and their sum, the total fertility rate) as input along with the 
projected female population by age. In other words, the only factor taken into account 
in estimating whether a woman will have a birth in a given year is her age. In fact, age 
alone is not a good predictor of whether or not a woman gives birth. Age alone tells 
us almost nothing about the timing or tempo of fertility. The reason that forecasting of 
births is so often wrong in the short-term is that no attention has been paid to changes 
in the timing of births in the forecasting method.
McDonald and Kippen have investigated the use in forecasting of births of three 
parameters: age, parity and the duration of time since the previous birth.13 They have 
observed that, at least in Australia, rates of second and higher order births by age, 
parity and duration have remained essentially constant in Australia from 1981 to 2000. 
The implication of this is that if we are able to forecast first birth rates by age, the 
incidence and timing of all subsequent births can be predicted with great accuracy. 
To forecast first births, we must use birth cohorts of women so that we can take into 
account the proportion that has already had a first birth. 
Figure 1 shows the number of children ever born to Australian women reaching age 
30 in the given year. The lowest block in the chart shows the proportion that has no 
children by age 30. This proportion rose from just under 20 per cent in 1981 to almost 
50 per cent in 2006. This demonstrates the massive change in the timing of the first 
birth that took place in Australia over these years. However, it is also evident that the 
delay of the first birth slowed to a halt in the most recent years shown in the chart. At 
least in the short-term, we could forecast that the timing of first births for cohorts of 
women will not change in the future. This means that the timing of all births subsequent 
to the first could be forecast on the basis of the already forecasted first births.
The accuracy of forecasting of births subsequent to the first is also supported by 
Figure 1 – the proportions having second, third and fourth births by age 30 have also 
levelled off in recent years. Errors in this forecasting method will be much lower than in 
forecasts that use only age because the birth history of each woman (her current age, 
the number of children that she has had already and the interval since the most recent 
Figure 1  
PArITy (THE nuMbEr oF CHIlDrEn EvEr born) DIsTrIbuTIon oF AusTrAlIAn WoMEn 
rEACHInG AGE 30 In THE GIvEn yEAr, 1981–2006
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birth) are all factored into the forecast. This is an important point. Errors in forecasting 
births are not only due to errors in forecasting future birth rates, where there are timing 
changes, forecast errors are also due to poor specification of the population that might 
have a birth. For example, in the McDonald-Kippen analysis, while women aged 28 
were much more likely to have a birth than women aged 38, women aged 38 who had 
their last birth three years ago were much more likely to have a birth in a given year than 
women aged 28 who had had their first birth 10 years ago. 
Figure 2 demonstrates the effectiveness of the McDonald-Kippen method. Births from 
2000 to 2005 were projected from 2000 assuming that rates of birth by age, parity and 
duration would remain constant over this period at the 2000 levels. The trajectory of the 
projected total fertility rate (TFR) is the same as that of the observed total fertility rate. 
The method correctly projects a turning point in the trend in the total fertility rate. Failure 
to project this turning point using only age as an input parameter led to the forecast 
errors that have already been noted for projections of births made around 2002 or 
2003. Because McDonald and Kippen assume constant three-parameter birth rates 
in the projection, the projected upward trend in the total fertility rate is due entirely to 
the fact that the structure of the population at risk is considered in terms of three char-
acteristics (age, parity and duration) rather than one (age). The addition of parity and 
duration to the description of the population structure, given constant first birth rates 
in the projection period, enables the projection to take into account the cumulated 
population outcomes of delay of the first birth over many years prior to the projection 
period. Thus, this is a method that builds in the effects of the tempo of fertility.
In future, births should be forecast using this three parameter model. In Australia, it 
would be safe to assume that rates of second and higher order births by age, parity and 
duration remain constant into the future. There is some possibility that the introduction 
of paid maternity leave may alter the time to the second birth (as it did in Sweden in 
the late 1980s) as women time their second birth in order to qualify for paid leave. This 
would have to be monitored in the Australian case but, for the time being, the constant 
assumption is likely to be reasonable. This means that forecasting of births becomes a 
matter of forecasting the timing and incidence of the first birth. Models for this purpose, 
including stochastic models, could be investigated. The methodology described here 
would also be enhanced if birth registration data were available by age, parity and 
duration since the previous birth.
Figure 2 
ProJECTIon oF FErTIlITy FroM 2000–2005 usInG THE MCDonAlD-KIPPEn APProACH
 












A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
56
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
57
S E C T I O N  2 . 1
yEAr











Sources: (1) ABS Technical Note – ‘12/16 month rule’ Methodology for Calculating Net Overseas Migration from September quarter 2006 and onwards. (2) 
ABS. 2011. Australian Demographic Statistics, March Quarter 2011. ABS Catalogue No. 3101.0. Canberra: ABS
Future net overseas migration
In 2006, the Australian Bureau of Statistics changed the definition of the population 
of Australia to better reflect the long-term presence in Australia of temporary resi-
dents.14 Prior to 2006, temporary residents had been included in the population but 
in a relatively inaccurate way. The new definition introduced in 2006 is that a person 
is counted into or out of the Australian population if he/she did or did not spend 12 
out of the past 16 months in Australia. This is measured through observation of pass-
port movements. The main effect of the change in definition has been the inclusion of 
many temporary residents in the Australian resident population category, who would 
not previously have been counted as Australian residents. It is believed that the two 
categories most affected are overseas students and Long-Stay Business (457) visa 
holders. For two years, Net Overseas Migration (NOM) was published using both the 
old (category jumping) method and the new (12/16) method. In 2004–05, NOM using 
the new method was 19,000 higher than by using the old method and, in 2005–06, it 
was 24,000 higher (Table 1).
The data in Table 2 indicates clearly that the large increase in NOM that occurred 
from 2004–05 to 2008–09 was associated with the very large increase in arrivals of 
long-term temporary immigrants, many of whom would not have been counted into the 
Australian population using the pre-June 2006 definition. From 2004–05 to 2008–09, 
the increase in net migration of permanent settlers was 15,000 while the increase in net 
migration of long-term temporary immigrants was 107,000. 
Table 4 shows the dominance of students in the temporary migration gain. Many stu-
dents in Australia for more than one year return home in the teaching break at the end 
of the year and would not have been counted in the Australian population using the 
pre-June 2006 definition because they did not spend a continuous 12-month period 
in Australia.
In 2008–09, the number of temporary long-term arrivals exceeded the number of 
temporary long-term departures by almost 200,000 and, using the new definition, this 
number was added to the Australian population. International students were by far the 
largest sub-group of these temporary migrants. The very high level of NOM became 
Table 2 
nET ovErsEAs MIGrATIon (noM), AusTrAlIA, 2003–04 To 2009–10 bAsED on THE olD 
(CATEGory JuMPInG) METHoD THE nEW (12 FroM 16 MonTHs) METHoD (THousAnDs).
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the subject of considerable debate during the 2010 election campaign but most par-
ticipants in this debate were unaware that the high level of migration in 2008–09 was 
due to the temporary movement of international students. The debate was even more 
ill-informed because the Australian Government, through a policy change relating to 
progression to permanent residence by students made in February 2010, had already 
put in place mechanisms that would substantially reduce the numbers of international 
students in net terms flowing in and out of Australia. Between 2008–09 and 2009–10, 
net migration to Australia fell from 300,000 to 198,000 (Table 2). In the 2010 elec-
tion, the Labor Party had favoured a net migration level of 180,000 while the Liberal 
party favoured 170,000. Thus, there is very little difference between the major political 
parties.
The analysis above strongly suggests that net international migration in the next 
decade should be forecast by breaking international migration into at least nine com-
ponent movements: Skilled Permanent, Family Permanent, Humanitarian, International 
Students, Long-Stay Business, Working Holiday Makers, Australian Citizens, New 
Zealand Citizens, and Other Temporary. Potentially, the student movement could be 
further subdivided into types (university, vocational, school and other). Some of these 
movements will be largely a function of labour demand in Australia (Skilled Permanent, 
Long-Stay Business, New Zealand Citizens and, to a lesser extent, Working Holiday 
Makers). Labour demand and wage levels in Australia relative to other high-income 
countries will also have a strong bearing on the net migration of Australian citizens. It 
is interesting to note that in 2008–09, net migration of Australian citizens was close 
to zero and that fewer Australians left in 2008–09 than had left in 2004–05 (Table 
TEMPorAry MovEMEnT sub-CATEGory nET ovErsEAs MIGrATIon 
International Student 122
Long-stay Business (457) 31




Source: ABS. Migration 2009–10. Catalogue No. 3412.0. Canberra: ABS. Table 3.16. 
Table 4 
nET ovErsEAs MIGrATIon by sub-CATEGorIEs oF TEMPorAry MIGrATIon, 
AusTrAlIA, 2008–09 (THousAnDs)
Table 3 
CHAnGEs In ArrIvAls, DEPArTurEs AnD nET MIGrATIon by broAD MovEMEnT 
CATEGorIEs, AusTrAlIA, 2004–05 To 2008–09, (THousAnDs)
MovEMEnT CATEGory 2004–05 2008–09
Arrivals departures net Arrivals departures net
Australian citizens 69 91 –22 81 83 –2
New Zealand citizens 38 17 21 48 17 31
Permanent settlers 76 4 72 92 5 87
Long-term temporary 
immigrants
142 60 82 279 90 189
Source: ABS. Migration 2009-10.ABS Catalogue No. 3412.0. Canberra: ABS. Pp.30-31.
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3). This had a lot to do with the favourable employment circumstances in Australia. 
The Humanitarian movement will be determined by government policy and the Family 
movement is likely to continue on a gradual rising trajectory in line with the travel move-
ments of young people.
In the short-term, however, it will be the student movement that drives the main fluctua-
tions in net international migration as has been the case in the past five years. Recently, 
the Australian Government has announced a new, more liberal policy designed to 
attract higher numbers of international students to Australia and provides a means 
for these students to remain in Australia for two to four years after they graduate (to 
start from 1 July 2012).15 These initiatives will flow through to a higher level of net 
international migration.
In the absence of an economic recession, the strong likelihood is that net overseas 
migration to Australia will rise again through 2012, 2013 and beyond. Given the new 
initiatives in relation to overseas students and the likely continuation of strong labour 
demand, it will be difficult for the Australian Government to maintain net migration 
around its preferred level of 180,000. 
Long-term prospects for population
Like fertility in the long-term, net overseas migration is unknowable in the long-term. Net 
migration in the 2040s will be determined by labour demand in Australia and Australian 
wages relative to the rest of the world in 2040 and by the policies of whatever govern-
ment Australia has at that time. Given the extreme uncertainty surrounding long-term 
levels of fertility, mortality and migration, the conclusion of the Australian Government’s 
recent report on population policy that Australia should not have a population target is 
highly apposite.
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Introduction
In late September 2009, social researcher Mark McCrindle issued a press release 
claiming that Australia’s population would reach 22 million on October 1.1 He went on 
to speculate as to whether the new arrival would be a baby boy or girl. The Herald Sun, 
along with many other newspapers, fell for the bait and ran a story picturing a doting 
young couple with their new-born child. Still, the reporter was smart enough to point 
out that the new arrival was more likely to be an incoming migrant than a baby. In fact, 
migrant arrivals adding to the population have been out-numbering births on an annual 
basis since the mid-1990s.2 In all likelihood this situation will continue for many years to 
come, not only due to fertility rates remaining below natural replacement levels but also 
as a result of Australia’s increasing openness to migration flows.
In this chapter we explore how and why Australia has become more open to migration 
flows. This openness has been much less heralded than the opening of the Australian 
economy to capital and trade flows but, we argue, should be seen as an additional 
element in Australia’s embrace of globalisation in the last quarter of the 20th century. 
We go on to examine some of the implications of this trend continuing for the popula-
tion of Australia. 
There are three features of migration flows that matter for the future of the population 
of Australia: size, mix and character.
On size, it is not pre-ordained. It is true that the tools to regulate the size of the net 
migration intake are available to government. It is also the case that Australia has more 
scope than most in enforcing its migration regulations, a virtue of being an island state. 
It is wrong to infer from this, though, that government can and should set and adhere 
to migration or population targets. Besides the fact that government cannot regulate 
against the return of Australian citizens or people leaving Australia, be they Australian 
citizens or otherwise, nor the ebb and flow of trans-Tasman movements, it is not at 
all apparent that government can buck wider economic and social forces that drive 
people movement. These forces are pushing movement levels – inflows and outflows 
– higher.
On mix, it is important to recognise that new migrants are atypical. A new migrant and a 
new-born child both add to the population but they are not otherwise equivalent. New 
migrants are mostly of prime-working age, are better educated than the population 
at large, come mostly from countries whose first language is not English, are over-
whelmingly drawn to cities, have in many instances a social and cultural background 
which makes Australia foreign to them for at least in the initial years of settlement, and 
have networks and connections that span the country they left and Australia, facilitat-
ing their settlement and further entwining global relationships. As population growth 
due to natural increase gradually peters towards zero in coming decades – a result of 
the demographics of ageing – the attributes of new migrants will shape and alter the 
dimensions of the population of Australia even more than they do now. 
On character, migrant flows are becoming more transitory and transnational and, in the 
process, testing the conventional idea of migrants as settlers. The scale of temporary 
migration in Australia is large. On any given day, there are around one million temporary 
migrants resident in Australia, a stock of people that is steadily churning as visas expire, 
their places taken by those newly granted visas. There are also substantial flows, both 
out and back in, of Australian citizens. The number of Australian-born people living 
abroad is estimated by the OECD to be around 320,000 in 2005–06, equivalent to 
1.9 per cent of the Australian-born population resident in Australia and elsewhere.3 
Many of the Australian citizens on the move were, of course, once new migrants. 
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Since 2002 Australia has permitted dual nationality, in common with a growing number 
of countries. While data is hard to come by, and one should be cautious about over-
statement, significant numbers of people are now constructing for themselves a 
transnational identity.
The good news is that Australia is better placed than other developed nations to harness 
the benefits of, and changing attributes towards, migration for those who presently 
live here and those to come. It has well-developed systems for managing migration 
flows, for screening and selecting migrants in those categories where visa numbers are 
limited, and for settling and integrating migrants who choose to call Australia home. 
This stands in marked contrast to many other countries who resist the arrival of new 
migrants while their resident population age, wither and expire.
Australia’s migration in historical context 
The title for this chapter is prompted by Geoffrey Blainey’s opening lecture in his 2001 
Boyer series. In Australia Unlimited, Blainey argued that much of Australia’s history from 
the mid-19th to the last quarter of the 20th century was guided by a vision: “All of the 
vast continent had … to be developed and peopled.”4 This found common expression 
in the phrase populate or perish, first uttered by former prime minister Billy Hughes in 
1935.5 
When Arthur Calwell was appointed the first immigration minister in 1945, the popula-
tion of Australia was 7.6 million and at its most homogenous since white settlement. The 
Census of 1947 recorded that 10 per cent of the population had been born overseas. 
Four in five of these had been born in the United Kingdom, Ireland or New Zealand. 
The number of Chinese migrants, which had reached around 40,000 in the wake of the 
19th century gold rush, had dwindled to 6400.6 
The scale of the post-war migration influx was truly remarkable. Figure 1 shows the 
annual number of visas granted (under what has come to be known as the Migration 
Program)7 was equivalent to adding more than one per cent to the population for every 
year throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In part this was to compensate for relatively high 
return rates – as can be seen by the sizeable gap between the number of visas granted 
and the net migration addition to the population. Years before a working holiday maker 
program was introduced, canny young Brits took advantage of a subsidised passage 
to Australia to experience life abroad and worked to save the money for the return trip 
home. Others returned to by now restored countries in Europe.
Since the mid-1970s, there has been a close correspondence between the relative size 
of the Migration Program and the migrant contribution to population – the population 
spike in the late 2000s, as discussed below, a rare exception. It is likely that this close-
ness is due to a better alignment between costs and motivations of individual migrants, 
following the removal of subsidised passage and the effective opening of migration 
pathways to people of developing countries, a result of the abandonment of the White 
Australia policy. 
If the period up to 1970 can be thought of as fulfilling Billy Hughes’s maxim, the ensuing 
quarter century showed a degree of ambivalence, with macro-economic conditions 
becoming the main determinant of government set Migration Program planning levels. 
Sharp cuts were introduced in the wake of the recessions of the mid-1970s, early 
1980s and late 1980s. Since the mid-1990s, though, there has been a steady increase 
in the Migration Program and in the net migration intake, a result of more liberal policy 
settings, especially an openness to greater flows of temporary migrants.
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Figure 1 
THE MIGrAnT ConTrIbuTIon To PoPulATIon GroWTH, 1953–2011 (PEr CEnT)
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Over the decade ending 2010–11, the Migration Program averaged 139,400 per year, 
and in 2011–12 is expected to reach a record high in volume terms, double the size of 
the program a decade earlier. The net migration intake peaked in 2009 and is now back 
in alignment with the Migration Program. 
The legacy of these migration flows is a transformed population, one that would be 
close to unimaginable to an Australian from its post-World War II starting point. For a 
start, it is a population that is three times larger. Whereas migrants made up one in 10 
of the population in 1947, by 2010 it was approaching three in 10. Of the six million 
people in Australia who had been born overseas, almost four million had been born in 
a country where English was not the main language. And, whereas the United Kingdom 
and New Zealand have continued to be major sending countries, they now jostle for 
first place in different visa categories among migrants from China and India. 
Migration flows and the population count
For clarity, it is worth spelling out the interaction between migration flows and popula-
tion numbers.9
The concept of who counts into the population is a political and social construct, often 
contested. In Australia, the concept adopted for use in official statistics is persons 
who are “usually resident” in Australia. What constitutes usually resident has evolved 
over time. The present definition is that persons arriving in Australia add to the popula-
tion count if they spend at least 12 months in a 16 month window living in Australia. 
Conversely, those who leave Australia and are away for at least 12 months in a 16 
month window are subtracted from the population count.
The 12-in-16 month rule means the vast bulk of the almost 30 million border crossings 
per year have no bearing on population numbers. It also means that people who are 
not permanent residents of Australia can be counted as additions to the population, so 
long as they satisfy the residency rule. Persons who have counted into the population 
remain in it even if they leave Australia – however many times – so long as their time 
out of Australia adds up to fewer than four months within a 16 month window. The 









































































Source: Department of Immigration and Citizenship and Australian Bureau of Statistics. The net overseas migration data for 2011 are from DIAC forecasts.
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
64
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
65
S E C T I O N  2 . 2
education courses will be included in the population count for at least the duration of 
their course. On the other hand, most working holiday makers depart Australia within a 
year and therefore do not add to the population count, nor subtract from it when they 
leave. 
Within this framework, net overseas migration (or NOM) comprises the net gain or 
loss of population through immigration (or return migration) to Australia and emigra-
tion from Australia. Estimates of NOM are obtained from passenger travel cards that 
travellers complete when they exit or enter Australia in combination with information 
from passport control and passenger movement systems. The Australian Bureau of 
Statistics publishes official population statistics quarterly. These include the compo-
nents of population change: at a national level this comprises births less deaths, and 
NOM arrivals less NOM departures. 
Preliminary estimates of NOM are published with a two quarter lag. They are modelled 
on patterns of traveller behaviour observed in final NOM data for the corresponding 
quarter one year earlier. Final estimates of NOM are published with a six quarter lag, to 
allow sufficient elapsed time to encompass the usually resident rule.
Various attributes of NOM arrivals and departures are captured from the passenger 
travel cards and other administrative systems. This includes visa and residency status. 
Table 1 shows the visa and residency status of NOM for the year ending December 
2009, the most recently available final data. It ought to be noted that 2009 was a year 
of exceptionally high population growth attributable to migration, for reasons discussed 
in more detail below. Here remarks are confined to illustrating conceptual issues in the 
table.
Table 1  
vIsA AnD rEsIDEnCy sTATus oF noM ArrIvAls AnD DEPArTurEs,  








Permanent 88 .5 5 .9 82 .6 Persons holding a permanent 
resident visa granted under 
the Migration or  
Humanitarian Programs. 
Planning numbers are set 
annually.
– Skilled 41.5 3.5 38.0
– Family 35.0 2.4 32.6
–  Humanitarian and other 
permanent
12.0 0.0 11.9
temporary 238 .8 92 .2 146 .6 Persons holding a temporary 
resident or visitor visa. 
Numbers of these visas are 
generally uncapped.
– Students 138.6 36.5 102.1
– Skilled workers 30.7 14.9 15.8
– Working holiday makers 33.1 12.4 20.7
– Visitors 36.3 18.9 17.4
– Other temporary 0.2 9.4 –9.3
citizens 119 .8 99 .3 20 .5 Citizens of both countries 
have the right to live and 
work in Australia.– Australia 39.1 18.4 20.8
– New Zealand 80.7 81.0 –0.3
other 31 .6 34 .5 –2 .8 Includes returning  
permanent residents and 
other unknown.
Total 478.8 231.9 246.9
Source: Net Overseas Migration Travellers Characteristics Database, Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
Note: Visa and residency status is defined at the point of entry or exit.
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The visa and residency status of those counting into, or subtracting from, the Australian 
population is as at the time of entry or departure. The very low number of departing 
permanent residents, relative to arrivals, is because most permanent residents go on 
to become Australian citizens who are then recorded against this category should they 
depart from Australia.
As can be seen, the net migration figure is a result of large movements of people in 
both directions in many different sub-categories. The scale of the flows was equivalent 
to 3.2 per cent of the total Australian population (measured at the start of the reference 
year), an indication of the rate of population churn or openness to people movement.
Over the reference period, the smallest contributing arrivals category (disregarding the 
“other” category) was permanent arrivals. Astute readers may wish to know why the 
number of arrivals in this category fell far short of the approximately 184,000 visas 
granted under the Migration and Humanitarian Programs in that same period.10 The 
main reason is that many of the visas granted under these programs went to people 
already in Australia as temporary migrants, especially former students.
The granting of a permanent residency visa to a temporary migrant already onshore 
has the same effect on the population as one granted to a person outside Australia. 
On the one hand, the temporary migrant adds to the population, either in the reference 
year or an earlier one. On the other, granting a visa to them denies a place that would 
otherwise have gone to a new permanent resident coming from offshore, which does 
not therefore count into NOM. If, taken to a logical extreme, all permanent residency 
visas went to onshore temporary migrants, the permanent arrival contribution to NOM 
would be zero, irrespective of the size of the Migration Program. In fact, it can be 
shown that, subject to certain conditions, the level of net overseas migration is largely 
set by the size of the Migration Program, even where the number of temporary visa 
grants is uncapped.11 This transition in visa status also helps to explain why temporary 
resident arrivals are much larger than departures, rather than in balance.
Migration flows, globalisation and the nation state
The categorisation of migration flows in the preceding table reflects the administrative 
rules in place when people migrate to and from Australia, not the underlying forces that 
drive flows. There is a growing literature on the determinants of migration flows, with 
important contributions coming from both economics and sociology.
We do not intend to cover this literature in this chapter,12 but rather wish to make a 
different point: these underlying forces constrain the effectiveness of the administrative 
rules designed to determine the numbers of immigrants admitted, as well as who is 
admitted from among those seeking entry.
Consider, for example, household formation that traverses national borders. In 2001–
02, Australia granted 33,300 visas to foreigners who had married or partnered with an 
Australian citizen or permanent resident. In 2011–12, that number is expected to reach 
42,000, a figure insufficiently high to fill a growing backlog of applications. With more 
people crossing international borders for tourism, business, long-term stays or study 
– the United Nations World Tourism Organisation,13 for example, reports that interna-
tional tourist arrivals reached 940 million in 2010, up from 25 million in 1950 – there 
are bountiful opportunities for cross-national relationships to form. Liberal democratic 
states may, in some instances, find this disquieting, but it is an area that most find 
extremely difficult to regulate and control.
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Another example is temporary migrant workers. Australia has operated a temporary 
skilled worker program, colloquially known as the 457 scheme – in reference to the 
visa sub-class number – since the mid-1990s. The program allows employers to hire 
foreign skilled workers, subject to satisfying various sponsorship and eligibility require-
ments, such as paying the going rate for the job, if they are unable to source workers 
locally. There is no cap on the number of visas that can be issued. As can be seen in 
Figure 2 the inflow of workers under this scheme is highly responsive to labour market 
conditions in Australia, here measured by the number of job vacancies, as reported 
each month by the ANZ Bank: the two series move closely in tandem. 
This was most evident during the labour market downturn associated with the global 
financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. Total job advertisements peaked in April 2008 at 
275,000 then fell by more than half to trough at 125,000 in July 2009. Monthly applica-
tions for temporary skilled worker visas peaked at 6300 in June 2008 then reached a 
trough of 2500 in October 2009. The magnitude of the peak-to-trough decline was 
similar in both series, 55 per cent for job vacancies and 61 per cent for temporary 
skilled workers. Since the trough, both series rebounded in line with improved labour 
market conditions during 2010, then fell away again during 2011 as below-trend growth 
in economic activity moderated the demand for labour.
Both examples serve to illustrate the point that migration flows are greatly influenced 
by social and economic forces to which governments can respond to positively – 
through adaptive and flexible policy settings – or negatively, through attempts to stop 
or reverse these forces, with the attendant risk of failure. Australian Government policy 
has become increasingly adaptive and flexible over time. An important adaptive feature 
is the extent to which those other than government and individual migrants, are given 
agency and influence in the migration system. 
With respect to skilled migration, employers now have such a significant role that it can 
be reasonably characterised as a hybrid system.14 Traditionally, applicants for skilled 
migration were selected on the basis of their attributes and capabilities (assessed 
via a government-administered points test); permanent residence was granted with 
no requirement to have arranged employment beforehand. Since the mid-1990s, 
employers themselves have been given the ability to select migrants through employer 
Figure 2 
AnnuAl GroWTH In Job vACAnCIEs AnD vIsA APPlICATIons For TEMPorAry sKIllED 
MIGrAnT WorKErs, 2004–11
















































































Source: Department of Immigration and Citizenship and ANZ Bank. 
Note: Growth rates are derived as 3 months ending over same period one year earlier.
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sponsorship, subject to eligibility conditions, such as meeting the requisite level of 
proficiency in English. The rationale here is obvious: employers know what skills they 
are seeking and if they can identify these themselves, while adhering to government 
set rules, it is more efficient for all parties (employers, migrants, government) to facilitate 
their role in the selection process.
Similar arrangements have now come into play, or are being developed, for state 
and territory governments via state migration plans, for large resource employers via 
enterprise migration agreements, for niche occupations that fall outside normal skilled 
migration channels (for example ski instructors) via labour agreements, and for regional 
areas of Australia via regional migration agreements. Following the recent Knight review, 
consideration is also being given to expedite the granting of visas to higher education 
students where providers wishing to enrol them accept the bona fides of their student 
status, rather than have government administrators make this assessment.
The two examples described above also reinforce the point made in the introduction 
that the scale of migration flows is not pre-ordained by government fiat. Attempts to set 
migration or population growth targets will either not be met in practice, or give rise to 
unintended and perhaps undesirable consequences (such as skill shortages). Analysts 
in the United Kingdom, for example, are sceptical that the government can meet its 
pre-election commitment to reduce net migration to below 100,000 per annum by 
introducing tighter entry policies.15 The most recent data from the Office for National 
Statistics shows net migration to the United Kingdom was 252,000 in 2010,16 a rise 
from the previous year, driven by a fall in emigration.
There are good reasons for thinking that Australia’s open stance towards migration 
will continue, with high and possibly growing levels of inflows and outflows. Inflows are 
likely to be driven by unmet labour demand, with an ageing population providing fewer 
new workers to maintain and grow economic activity levels. Outflows will correspond-
ingly rise because of the in-built circularity inherent in much temporary migration. They 
may also rise with greater opportunities abroad for emigrants and returning migrants.
As the living standards of those in newly industrialising countries converge with those 
in the developed world, migration dynamics will alter. There will be greater competition 
between countries for skilled migrants, and emigration from the developed world will 
rise as immigrants return to their country of origin. A possible implication of this is that 
Australia’s highly selective policy settings around skilled migration may need to become 
less selective so as to maintain a constant inflow of new migrants. The likelihood of 
this eventuating is low. The main reason for drawing this conclusion is that Australia’s 
draw on the international pool of migrants is relatively slight. For instance, China is now 
the largest source country for entrants under the Migration Program, but that consti-
tutes only around two persons per annum per 100,000 of the Chinese population. 
As Chinese living standards rise, so too will educational attainment and professional 
employment, raising the likelihood that more Chinese nationals will meet Australia’s 
selective requirements.
One area where Australia is certain to face growing competition from other countries 
is international education. For tertiary education, Australia ranks third among OECD 
nations in the overall volume of students.17 Other countries will seek to enter this market, 
or increase their market share, as Australia’s experience shows that it is a profitable 
economic activity and creates a flow of potential future settlers through a two-step 
migration process. This is not, however, a static market. The number of international 
students in 2009 was 3.7 million, almost double what it was a decade earlier. Around 
2.2 per cent of tertiary students enrolled globally studied outside their home country in 
2009. Both of these figures are likely to rise in coming years. Australia remains very well 
placed to, at the very least, maintain a constant volume of international students. 
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We have shied away in this section from discussing the flow of irregular migration as 
there is little that can be said with certainty. With a non-contiguous border and a univer-
sal visa system, Australia has a much greater ability to counter irregular migration flows 
than just about any other country in the world. Testimony to this is the number of visa 
over-stayers, which numbered fewer than 54,000 in June 2010, and represents around 
one per cent of those arriving in Australia on temporary visas. Most visa over-stayers 
are tourists who depart shortly thereafter. The number of asylum seekers arriving by 
boat has surged in the past couple of years. History suggests these surges come 
in cycles.18 Those granted protection in recent years have been absorbed within the 
existing planning levels for the Humanitarian Program.
Migration flows and population forecasts and 
projections
The preceding section should not be taken to mean that governments are powerless to 
regulate migration flows or the attributes of immigrants. It requires adaptive strategies, 
not reactive ones. The main adaptive strategy the Australian Government has at its 
disposal is responding to forecasts of the likely near future. Since 2010 the Department 
of Immigration and Citizenship has developed a short-term forecasting model of NOM 
arrivals and departures. The forecasts have a four year horizon. They are revised quar-
terly and made publicly available on the department’s web site.19 
The model is based on data showing the propensity of different categories of visa grants 
to flow through to NOM arrivals, while NOM departures are forecast from trend data 
on the relationship between the stock of different visa and residency categories and 
outflows from that stock. The model incorporates Treasury forecasts on the Australian 
economy and International Monetary Fund forecasts on the global economy – as these 
are related to inflows of temporary skilled workers, emigration, and return of Australian 
citizens – and assumes no policy change over the forecast period. That means, for 
example, the size and mix of the Migration and Humanitarian Programs in the current 
year is assumed to continue over the duration of the forecasts. The model can be used 
to test scenarios, such as a change in the economic outlook or a policy change, for 
example a variation in the size of the Migration Program. It can also be used to iden-
tify changes in parameters when flows in visa categories depart significantly from the 
forecasts. It therefore provides government with highly valuable information that it can 
draw upon when considering policy options around the size and mix of the Migration 
Program or the likely consequences of changes in visa policy settings.
Had such a tool been available from the mid-2000s, it would have been possible to 
advise the government more precisely about the looming population growth conse-
quences of the growth in temporary visas, especially among international students. The 
growth in visas granted to students arriving from outside Australia doubled in the space 
of four years, from 117,400 in 2004–05 to 226,900 in 2008–09. This was not matched 
by growth in students departing from Australia having completed their course. Many 
remained to do further courses. Many lodged applications for permanent residence as 
a skilled migrant, and remained in Australia pending the outcome of their application. 
As a result, temporary residents counting as NOM arrivals in the population soared, 
with no corresponding increase in NOM departures, pushing the overall level of NOM 
to record highs and Australia’s overall population growth to among the fastest in the 
developed world. It was not until the nexus between student visas and permanent 
residence was severed in 2010 that the adjustment came as offshore student visa 
grants fell and NOM departures started to increase. The most recent data from the 
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Australian Bureau of Statistics shows that the fall in NOM has now ceased, and the 
Department’s forecasts are for it to gradually increase to around 200,000 persons per 
annum by 2015.
Beyond 2015, the size and mix of NOM arrivals and NOM departures will shape and 
transform the population in Australia even more than it has done over the past 60 
years. This is because the relative importance of natural increase in population growth 
will diminish, while that of the net migrant intake will increase.
Elsewhere in this volume there are discussions of population projections, which we do 
not intend to rehash. An important implication from our preceding analysis, however, 
is that the size of the future migration intake is highly uncertain, as are the various 
sub-components. They are, as the econometricians say, stochastic variables. If that 
is accepted, it makes long-term population projections like those published by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, and those included in the 2010 Intergenerational Report, 
hazardous to use as a basis for population planning. Demographers are increasingly 
looking to Bayesian and stochastic approaches to population projections, ones which 
assign probabilities to different population outcomes. It may be fruitful to explore these 
in Australia (as Peter McDonald suggests, in Chapter 2.1). 
One useful application of population projections can be to answer “what if” style ques-
tions. As the parameters around fertility and mortality rates are far more stable than for 
net migration rates, it is possible to answer questions about the future population of 
Australia by supposing there are different average levels of net migration.
This approach is adopted to project the size of the overseas-born population in Australia 
by 2050 using a standard demographic model. As far as possible the model is designed 
to be consistent with that used by Treasury in the 2010 Intergenerational Report.20 Four 
different net migration scenarios are modelled, incorporating the latest official data on 
births, fertility rate, deaths, life expectancy and the age-gender composition of NOM.21 
Core assumptions are an unchanged total fertility rate of 1.92 births per woman from 
2011 and continuing upward trends in life expectancy. The four scenarios are a high 
level of NOM (300,000 per annum), a medium level (180,000 per annum), a low level 
(100,000 per annum) and a no net migration scenario. The assumption of a constant 
level of NOM – rather than, say, a constant rate of NOM to population – follows the 
approach taken in the 2010 Intergenerational Report and the medium NOM scenario is 
the same as that used in its base case projection.22 For each scenario the total size of 
Figure 3 








































































Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics and Department of Immigration and Citizenship projections.
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the Australian population is projected for each year through to 2050, and the size of the 
overseas-born sub-population within it. The results are shown in Figure 3.
Focusing just on the 2050 projections the results show:
For zero NOM the total population is projected to be 25.6 million, around 4.3 million •	
of whom would be born overseas. This would represent a decline from the current 
level of 6 million;
For a NOM of 100,000 per year, the overall population rises to over 31 million with •	
around 8.2 million being born overseas;
With a NOM of 180,000 per annum the total population would reach 35.5 million of •	
whom a projected 11.4 million would be overseas-born; and 
Finally, a NOM of 300,000 per annum, very high by historical standards, would result •	
in a projected population of more than 42 million, with over 16 million overseas-
born.
One way of interpreting Figure 3 is that the number of overseas-born in the population 
is almost certain to rise. The endogenous demand for new workers is almost certain to 
guarantee a level of NOM above the low-level scenario of 100,000 per annum, given 
rising aged dependency ratios. If NOM was to be at that level it would roughly ensure 
that the share of overseas-born in the population remained constant. In other words, 
any average value of NOM in excess of that level will result in an increasing share of the 
Australian population that is overseas-born.
The ability of the existing resident population to absorb and welcome these new 
migrants will be a challenge, but our history since post-World War II ought to give us 
confidence.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the inter-relationship between migration and population, a 
topic that often generates more heat than light. We have endeavoured to provide light, 
and have come up with several conclusions that are important pointers for the future 
of Australia.
First, Australia is likely to remain a country that attracts and welcomes a high proportion 
of immigrants. A variety of reasons support this conclusion, including the reception and 
opportunity Australia provides to migrants, its openness to migration flows, and the pull 
factors of rising labour demand as the population ages and cross-border household 
formation.
Second, the size, mix and character of migration flows are key determinants of what 
the population of Australia might look like by mid-century; and more so than over the 
previous half-century. Although the degree of uncertainty around each of them is high, 
it is likely that the size of the migrant population will rise, as will its share of the total 
Australian population. Our best way of facing the future is to be adaptive and flexible, 
drawing upon sound knowledge of the near future.
Finally, Australia has an enviable record in managing migrant entry and settling new-
comers. Our overseas-born population has the lowest unemployment rate among 
OECD countries, and the children of migrants do as well as the native born in interna-
tional secondary assessment tests, whereas they do worse in almost all other OECD 
countries. There is no reason to suspect that we won’t be able to maintain this high 
international standing.
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The views in this chapter are to be attributed to the authors, and not to their employers 
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Introduction
The Australian population debate has been dominated by the numbers issue: How 
many Australians? A big Australia vs a small Australia? What is Australia’s carrying 
capacity? What is Australia’s optimal population? This dichotomisation and simplifica-
tion is unfortunate because the challenges and opportunities presented by population 
change in Australia over the next few decades are as much to do with population 
composition and spatial distribution as they are about numbers. This chapter focuses 
on the spatial, and argues that an important part of any sustainable population strategy 
for Australia must involve consideration of where the future population will live and the 
configuration of the settlement system and policies which work toward achieving a 
better balance between the distribution of resources and population.
The present preoccupation with gross numbers has not always characterised the pop-
ulation debate in Australia. Concerns about population distribution go back a century 
and indeed were often front and centre in the debate. Accordingly after summaris-
ing the main features of the contemporary Australian population distribution, a brief 
historical review of policy and public concern with the spatial dimension of Australia’s 
population is presented. The attention then turns to factors that have shaped the past, 
and will influence population distribution into the future. Policy issues relating to future 
population distribution are then presented.
A distinctive population distribution
In discussing Australia’s population distribution, one is confronted with a striking 
paradox of mobility and stability. On the one hand Australians are the most mobile 
society in the contemporary world. The 2006 census indicated that 16.8 per cent of 
Australians had moved their permanent place of residence in the last year and 45.5 
per cent in the last five years. Moreover, 23.9 per cent of the Australian population was 
born in another country, the highest proportion for any middle-sized or large country. 
In addition, at any one time there are almost one million foreigners in Australia on some 
form of temporary visa; and about one million Australians reside abroad. Hence the 
Australian population is one of the most residentially mobile in the world.
On the other hand, there has been a great degree of stability in the overall spatial struc-
ture of the national population distribution. About a century ago the geographer Griffith 
Taylor argued that the structure of Australian population distribution had been fixed by 
the 1870s and his argument is still substantially sound. Figure 1 shows the centre of 
gravity of the Australian population since 1861 and indicates that it has moved very little 
over the subsequent 150 years. Despite massive population growth the basic structure 
of the spatial distribution of the population has remained fairly stable. This is in contrast 
to the United States where there has been significant westward and southward shift in 
the centre of gravity of the population distribution over the same period.1 
Moreover, despite a popular narrative of massive internal migration from non-metro-
politan to metropolitan areas, there is also a high degree of stability in the proportions 
of the national population living in metropolitan, other urban and rural areas. Figure 
2 indicates that there has been relatively little change over the last few decades in 
the proportions of the national population living in the three main sections of state 
categories identified by the ABS.
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Figure 1 
AusTrAlIA: CEnTrE oF GrAvITy oF PoPulATIon, 1861–2010
Figure 2 
AusTrAlIA: CHAnGInG DIsTrIbuTIon oF THE PoPulATIon bETWEEn urbAn AnD rurAl 
sECTors, 1921–2006
Source: Calculated from ABS Historical Statistics
Source: Australian Censuses, 1921–2006
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As well as being relatively stable, the Australian population distribution and settlement 
system are distinctive. Figure 3 shows the spread of population across Australia is quite 
uneven involving:
A low population density of two persons per km•	 2;
A high level of urbanisation – 87 per cent live in urban areas;•	
A concentration within capital cities – 64 per cent;•	
A strong coastal orientation with 81 per cent living within 50 km of the coast; and•	
An uneven density – 76 per cent of the people live on 0.33 per cent of the land area •	
with a density of 100 persons or more per km2 while 0.8 per cent of the population 
live on 70.5 per cent of the land area at a density of 0.1 persons or less per km2
Table 1 shows there has been an overall shift away from the southeastern states to 
the northern and western parts of the country. In 1947 the states of New South Wales, 
Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania accounted for 78.4 per cent of the national 
population, but by 2006 they had 67.9 per cent of the total. The offsets were that 
Queensland increased its share from 14.6 per cent to 19.7 per cent and Western 
Australia from 6.6 per cent to 9.9 per cent. This has been a function of structural 
change in the Australian economy in the last 30 years, with the south eastern states, 
heavily reliant on manufacturing, suffering substantial losses of jobs in this sector.
Although there has been little change in the proportions of the national population living 
within metropolitan and non-metropolitan Australia, there have been substantial shifts 
within these sectors. Figure 4 shows contemporary patterns of population change 
by statistical local area, with a clear pattern of growth being concentrated in coastal 
areas and areas around major regional cities and a few internal mining areas. On the 
other hand, those losing population tend to be located inland. It has been argued by 
Figure 3 
AusTrAlIA: DIsTrIbuTIon oF THE ToTAl PoPulATIon, 2006
Source: ABS, 2008, 192
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Table 1 
AusTrAlIA: DIsTrIbuTIon oF PoPulATIon bETWEEn sTATEs AnD TErrITorIEs, 
1881–2006
Figure 4 
AusTrAlIA: sTATIsTICAl loCAl ArEA PoPulATIon CHAnGE, 2009–10
Source: ABS, 2011a
sTATE/TErrITory
1881 1901 1921 1947 1961 1976 1996 2001 2006
PEr CEnT
New South Wales 33.3 35.9 38.6 39.4 37.3 35.5 33.9 33.8 33
Victoria 38.3 31.8 28.2 27.1 27.9 26.9 24.6 24.7 24.8
Queensland 9.5 13.2 13.9 14.6 14.4 15.2 18.2 18.7 19.7
South Australia 12.3 9.5 9.1 8.5 9.2 9.1 8.1 7.8 7.6
Western Australia 1.3 4.9 4.9 6.6 7 8.4 9.6 9.8 9.9
Tasmania 5.1 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.4
Northern Territory 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 1 1 1
Australian Capital 
Territory
0 0 0 0.2 0.6 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.6
total (per cent) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
total (million) 2 .2 3 .8 5 .4 7 .6 10 .5 13 .9 18 .3 19 .4 19 .6
Source: Rowland, 1982, 25; ABS, 2000, 2003, 2006
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some2 (e.g. Holmes, 1994) that there are two regional Australias – the coastal areas 
challenged by dynamism and growth, and inland Australia experiencing stability or 
decline. Certainly there is considerable variation across regional Australia in economic 
and demographic development. This is evident in Table 2, which examines the rate 
of population change in Australian remoteness areas.3 There is a pattern of higher 
population growth levels in more accessible areas although the impact of the mining 
boom is evident in the recent increase in growth in very remote areas after a decline 
recorded up to 2006.
More than three decades ago the CSIRO wrote:
“ That Australia is a dry continent is an intrinsic part of our national ethos, and the 
present distribution of population is in a large measure related to the supply of water 
and the disposal of effluents.
“ The availability of water constitutes one of the major factors in determining the size 
and distribution of Australia’s population.”4
While water has played, and will continue to play, an important role in shaping Australia’s 
population distribution, pointed to a substantial mismatch in Australia between water 
and population. Table 3 presents his data which showed that Far North Australia had 
52 per cent of annual mean surface run-off but only two per cent of the national popu-
lation while Southern Australia had only half of this proportion of the run-off but 82 per 
cent of the national population. Moreover, he pointed out that the water resources in 
the more closely settled parts of the country were already under pressure at that time 





GroWTH rATE (%) PA
1996–2006 (‘000) 1996–2001 2001–06 2008–09 2009–10
Major Cities of Australia 2069.2 1.8 1.4 2.2 1.8
Inner Regional Australia 330.2 0.3 1.4 2.1 1.8
Outer Regional Australia 9.3 –0.7 0.8 1.7 1.2
Remote Australia –12.2 –0.7 0.0 0.9 0.8
Very Remote Australia –5.7 –0.5 -0.2 1.2 1.1
total 2390 .8 1 .2 1 .3 2 .1 1 .7
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics
Table 2 
AusTrAlIA: PoPulATIon CHAnGE by rEMoTEnEss ArEA, 1996–2010
FAr norTH AusTrAlIA (%) souTHErn AusTrAlIA (%)
Population 2 82
Potentially Arable Land 4 65
Annual Mean Surface Run-off 52 27
Source: Nix, 1988, 72
Table 3 
THE MIsMATCH bETWEEn WATEr AnD PoPulATIon
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“ By far the largest volumes of uncommitted water are in northern Australia and 
Western Tasmania. In the most heavily populated regions of south western and 
south eastern Australia surface waters are committed to a high degree and the 
consequences of climate change are potentially most serious.”5
The CSIRO (1973), writing 15 years earlier, concluded also that most of the available 
water in closely settled south eastern Australia had been committed.
Debates regarding population distribution
Debates on Australia’s population go back to the early nineteenth century.6 However, 
concerns about the distribution of the population and the balance between urban 
and rural populations began to be expressed only in the early years of Federation.7 
Environment had played an important role in shaping Australia’s population develop-
ment but it was not until the 1920s that there was a substantial public discourse on this 
issue. Until then the dominant philosophy was to expand Australia’s population to facili-
tate development.8 This philosophy gathered strength in the early years of Federation. 
Powell9 demonstrates that Brady’s10 work Australia Unlimited was representative of 
the prolific booster literature of the time. It proclaimed a mix of imperialist, nationalist, 
racist and expansionist sentiments underpinned by a faith in the nation’s unlimited 
resources; these optimistic views were embraced by many in government, the media 
and in industry. However, as Borrie11 points out, this optimism was increasingly being 
countered by scientists who questioned the ability of Australia to absorb unlimited 
population growth (see Maude and Coleman in this volume). While there were many 
such commentators, the geographer Griffith Taylor12 13 was the most outspoken and 
controversial. He argued not only that environmental limitations were a major constraint 
on Australia’s “carrying capacity” but also greatly restricted the parts of the continent 
that could be closely settled.
The early decades of the post World War II period represented a high point of concern 
about population distribution in Australia and the potential and practice of decentralisa-
tion. There had been a history in Australia of anxiety about the “balance” between 
urban and rural populations14 and this was part of the thinking behind land settlement 
schemes following the two world wars.15 However, in the 1950s and 1960s focus of the 
discussion of decentralisation moved from agricultural expansion and rural depopula-
tion to a concern with rapid growth and emerging diseconomies in Australian cities. 
There was discussion about relocation of manufacturing and service activities into non 
metropolitan areas rather than an extension of agriculture at the centre of decentralisa-
tion policy. State governments produced reports on decentralisation16 17 18 and there 
was debate on how much encouragement of decentralisation was desirable, and 
whether it should be more selective.19 By the late 1960s the focus was on selective 
decentralisation and especially the potential role of “growth centres” in decentralis-
ing population and encouraging growth in regional areas.20 By the early 1970s, the 
concentration of the Australian population in capital cities had reached unprecedented 
levels and was attracting increasing concern.21 Neutze22 had analysed the increasing 
diseconomies apparent in Australian cities; there was concern that large cities added 
to income inequalities23; and there was increasing pressure to develop a coherent 
national urban development strategy.24 With the development of the Cities Commission 
and the Department of Urban and Regional Development in 1972, the newly elected 
Labor Federal Government saw Canberra become involved in settlement and popula-
tion distribution for the first time in the post-war era.25 A National Growth Centre Policy 
was developed and investment in regional centres like Albury-Wodonga was initiated.26 
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Moreover, there were the beginnings of a search for developing a comprehensive 
national settlement policy.27 Such was the level of activity that in 1978, Pryor28 was 
able to compile an impressive list of state and federal authorities and specific policy 
measures related to decentralisation. However, as Whitelaw and Maher pointed out: 
“Attempts to create a national settlement strategy in the early 1970s lost momentum 
with a change in government.”29
Since then, from time to time interest in regional development has flared in the Federal 
arena but there has been no attempt to develop a comprehensive national settlement 
policy. The establishment of Regional Australia in 2010 as a separate Federal Government 
Department has signalled the continuation of government interest in development of 
regional areas. The continuity of this interest is reflected in the Australian Government 
responses to the United Nations’ triennial surveys on national population strategies. 
While the official position on other aspects of population (population size and growth, 
immigration, emigration etc.) has consistently been satisfaction with the existing situ-
ation, this has not been the case for the spatial distribution of population.30 Table 4 
shows that in the 1970s and 1980s it was indicated that a major change was desired 
although more recently this has been modified to a “minor change”. Nevertheless, gov-
ernment concern to change the national population distribution has been a consistent 
element in all post-war federal governments regardless of the party in power but that 
concern has not been translated into any significant action. Four decades ago, Day 
pointed out:
“ Since around the turn of the century decentralisation has been a commendable but 
unexciting part of the conventional wisdom. No one has ever been opposed to it. A 
great deal of lip service has been paid to it.”31
This assessment remains essentially valid.
yEAr vIEW on sPATIAl DIsTrIbuTIon vIEW on PoPulATIon sIzE AnD GroWTH
1976 Major change desired Satisfactory
1986 Major change desired Satisfactory
1996 Minor change desired Satisfactory
2009 Minor change desired Satisfactory
Source: United Nations, 2010
Table 4 
vIEWs oF AusTrAlIAn GovErnMEnT rEGArDInG PoPulATIon sPATIAl DIsTrIbuTIon 
sIzE AnD GroWTH, 1976–2009
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Population dynamics influencing population 
distribution
The dynamics of population change at the regional level are the result of the combined 
impact of three demographic processes:
Natural increase – the excess of births over deaths (although fertility and mortality •	
rates differ between areas);
Net internal migration – the difference between the number of people moving into an •	
area from elsewhere in Australia and the number of residents moving to other parts 
of Australia; and
Net international migration – the difference between the numbers settling in an area •	
from overseas and the number of residents moving overseas.
Hence, attempts to exert an influence on future population distribution would require 
policies and programs which intervene to change fertility, mortality, internal or interna-
tional migration at a regional level.
While there are some differences between states and territories in fertility and mortality, 
most of the differences in population growth are a function of variations in internal and 
international migration. With respect to different rates of population growth between 
the states and territories, Table 5 indicates that there have been quite distinctive mixes 
of natural increase, with net internal and net interstate migration shaping the population 
growth in the states and territories since 1996. For New South Wales there has been a 
consistent pattern of net internal interstate migration loss. Over the period 1996–2009, 
316,185 more people left NSW for other states than moved into it. However, this was 
more than counterbalanced by the fact that 792,586 more people moved into the state 
from overseas than left to live in another country. Net international migration to the 
state is now a greater component of growth than natural increase. After NSW, which 
is overwhelmingly the major net migration loser in terms of interstate migration, South 
Australia has the second largest net loss (56,999). In South Australia the net gain by 
overseas net migration in 1996–2001 was not enough to counterbalance the net inter-
state migration loss. However, since 2001 there has been a recovery of international 
migration to that state, with a net gain of 99,387 compared with a net interstate loss of 
31,049 over that time. Hence in that state until recently, natural increase has been the 
major component in population growth (which was slow).
The pattern in Victoria is different again. After experiencing a small net interstate migra-
tion gain in 1996–2001, a small loss was recorded in 2001–06. However, international 
migration has increased substantially and has become larger than natural increase. In 
Queensland over the 1996–2006 period, net interstate migration gain was the largest 
contributor to population growth. However, more recently international migration has 
had increasing significance in Queensland’s population growth, accounting for half of 
growth in the 2006–10 period. It is interesting that since 2001 Queensland has not only 
been the fastest growing state but for the first time the numerical increase in the state’s 
population has been greater than that in NSW. Western Australia has been second only 
to Queensland in net interstate migration gains but international migration has been an 
important contributor to population growth throughout the entire post-war period in 
that state.32 
Turning to the capital cities, which house almost two thirds of the Australian population, 
Table 6 shows the estimated components of growth in the two most recent intercensal 
periods for the five largest cities. During the first two post-war decades, net migration 
gains from elsewhere in Australia were only minor elements in the massive growth 
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sTATE/TErrITory
nATurAl InCrEAsE nET ovErsEAs MIGrATIon nET InTErsTATE MIGrATIon ToTAl 
PoPulATIon 
GroWTHnuMbEr
PEr CEnT oF 
GroWTH
nuMbEr
PEr CEnT oF 
GroWTH
nuMbEr
PEr CEnT oF 
GroWTH
1996–2001
New South Wales 244,414 60.9 243,869 60.8 –86,925 –21.7 401,358
Victoria 166,298 53.6 141,572 45.6 2332 0.8 310,202
Queensland 149,510 41 88,129 24.2 126,659 34.8 364,298
South Australia 39,745 118 19,621 58.7 –25,950 –77.7 33,416
Western Australia 84,107 47.6 79,144 44.8 13,361 7.6 176,612
Tasmania 14,184 385.1 1550 42.1 –19,417 –527.2 –3683
Northern Territory 16,662 87.4 4172 21.9 –1773 –9.3 19,061
Australian Capital 
Territory
17,510 199.7 –453 –5.2 –8287 –94.5 8770
Australia* 732,649 56 576,221 44 1,308,870
2001–2006
New South Wales 191,089 79 192,582 79.6 –139,330 –56.3 241,965
Victoria 143,880 44.5 142,892 44.2 –2.197 –0.7 323,584
Queensland 132,050 28.5 129,944 28.1 164,362 35.5 462,600
South Australia 28,179 49.9 27,522 48.7 –12,639 –22.4 56,476
Western Australia 68,668 43.5 82,832 52.5 –1.399 –0.9 157,886
Tasmania 10,026 58.5 3758 21.9 3105 18.1 17,137
Northern Territory 13,862 107.4 3475 26.9 –8474 –65.7 12,906
Australian Capital 
Territory
13,531 90.8 2412 16.2 –6428 –43.1 14,908
Australia* 601,389 46.7 585,421 45.4 1,288,248
2007–11
New South Wales 224,345 46 356,188 73 –92,930 –19.1 487,603
Victoria 173,942 35 321,750 64.7 1858 0.4 497,550
Queensland 177,203 36.2 227,368 46.4 85,246 17.4 489,817
South Australia 35,658 40 71,865 80.6 –18,410 –20.7 89,113
Western Australia 90,368 31.5 173,715 60.5 22,946 8 287,029
Tasmania 12,071 58.6 8173 39.7 365 1.8 20,609
Northern Territory 14,251 72.9 6489 33.2 –1195 –6.1 19,545
Australian Capital 
Territory
16,140 51.6 13,042 41.7 2120 6.8 31,302
Australia* 744,060 38.7 1,178,614 61.3 – – 1,922,674
* Includes other Territories 
Source: ABS, 2002, 2007, 2011b
Table 5 
AusTrAlIAn sTATEs AnD TErrITorIEs: nATurAl InCrEAsE, nET ovErsEAs MIGrATIon, 
nET InTErsTATE MIGrATIon AnD ToTAl PoPulATIon GroWTH, FInAnCIAl yEArs, 
1996–2001, 2001–06 AnD 2007–11
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experienced by the nation’s two largest cities, dwarfed by the net gain of immigrants 
from overseas, which accounted for more than half of this expansion. However, during 
the 1976–96 period, a quite different pattern was evident, with a substantial net inter-
nal migration loss being recorded in both large cities, although international migration 
remained an important source of growth, especially in Sydney.
Some differences are evident in the most recent decade. In 1996–2001 there was a 
reduced net loss in Sydney, perhaps associated with the growth created by the 2000 
Olympic Games. However, since then the massive net interstate migration losses have 
resumed. In Melbourne there were small net interstate migration gains in 1996–2001 
but a net out-migration of 18,000 in 2001–06. Hence Sydney, and to a much lesser 
extent Melbourne, have been important sources of internal migrants to the rest of 
Australia while the fact that international migrants have disproportionately settled in 
Australia’s two largest cities has been the major migration driver of their growth.
Table 6 
syDnEy, MElbournE, brIsbAnE, PErTH AnD ADElAIDE: EsTIMATED CoMPonEnTs oF 














Sydney 000s 149 168 –61 107 256
Per cent 58.2 65.6 –23.8 41.8 100
Melbourne 000s 109 108 11 119 228
Per cent 47.8 47.4 4.8 52.2 100
Brisbane 000s 58 31 50 81 139
Per cent 41.7 22.3 36 58.3 100
Perth ‘000s 47 40 9 49 96
Per cent 49 41.7 9.4 51 100
Adelaide ‘000s 22 9 –4 5 27
Per cent 81.5 33.3 –14.8 18.5 100
2001–2006
sydney 000s 159 84 –121 –37 122
Per cent 130.3 68.9 –99.2 –30.3 100
Melbourne 000s 121 124 –19 105 226
Per cent 53.5 54.9 –8.4 46.5 100
Brisbane 000s 66 27 43 70 136
Per cent 48.5 19.9 31.6 51.5 100
Perth ‘000s 49 53 3 56 105
Per cent 46.7 50.5 2.9 53.3 100
Adelaide ‘000s 21 22 –10 12 33
Per cent 63.6 66.7 –30.3 36.4 100
Source: ABS unpublished data
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A number of hypotheses have been put forward relating to this relationship between 
substantial net international migration gains and large net internal migration losses in 
Sydney.33 These include a “white flight” explanation which sees internal out-migrants 
being “forced out” but there is little evidence supporting such an explanation. An alter-
native explanation relates it to the structural changes occurring in the Sydney labour 
market.
Unlike Sydney and Melbourne, the three other mainland state capitals recorded 
significant net internal migration gains in the first two post-war decades, especially 
in the case of Brisbane. International migration gains were substantially larger than 
internal gains in Adelaide and Perth but equivalent in size in Brisbane. However, in the 
1976–86 period, the impact of structural change in the economy on manufacturing 
saw Adelaide’s rate of growth fall from being much higher than that in Brisbane and 
Perth in 1947–66 to being less than half of the rate in the other two cities. However, 
during the 1986–91intercensal period, Brisbane was the most rapidly growing city and 
the major element in this growth was net internal migration gains. Perth, on the other 
hand, grew less quickly and recorded a small net loss of migrants to other parts of 
Australia, but had a major net gain of overseas-born migrants – a gain two and a half 
times larger than that of Brisbane. As a result, there was a distinctive difference in the 
net migration gains being recorded by Australia’s fastest growing capitals, with inter-
nal migrants being prominent in Brisbane and overseas-born being overwhelmingly 
dominant in Perth. In Adelaide there was a small internal migration gain between 1986 
and 1991 and a more substantial net gain of overseas migrants which accounted for a 
quarter of the modest growth recorded by the southern capital.
In the most recent intercensal period Perth and Brisbane have continued to expe-
rience growth from internal migration, especially Brisbane, which is a major sink of 
internal migration in Australia. However, Adelaide, like all of South Australia, has had a 
significant net loss due to internal migration. International migration has increased in 
significance in Brisbane and retained its importance in Perth.
The role of international migration in regional population growth is shown in Table 7, for 
2006. With few exceptions, recent migrants are a higher proportion of the population 
in large metropolitan areas than in non-metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, an interesting 
development of increasing immigrant settlement outside of major “gateway cities” has 
occurred in recent years, not only in Australia but also in North America,34 Europe,35 
and New Zealand36. While in Australia, much of this change has occurred in the last 
five years, the beginnings of change were apparent at the 2006 population census. In 
absolute numbers, the overseas-born population grew more outside the capitals than 
within the capitals during the 2001–06 intercensal period, so that there was a fall in the 
metropolitan share of the overseas born (Table 8). While this is a small difference, it rep-
resents a reversal of the trends of the previous half century which were characterised 
by consistent increases in the proportion of immigrants settling in capital cities. The 
change is a function of several factors:
The introduction of the State Specific and Regional Migration scheme that has a •	
points assessment, with bonus points for skilled migrants settling outside of the 
main gateways;
The DIAC scheme for encouraging refugee-humanitarian settlers to move initially to •	
regional areas;37 
A trend throughout OECD countries for migrants to settle outside major cities; and•	
Shortages in particular labour markets in regional Australia.•	
In three of the four largest states the recent migrant population increased faster in non-
metropolitan areas than in the capitals. It is of particular note that Sydney experienced 
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Table 7 
AusTrAlIA: ovErsEAs-born ArrIvED 2002–2006 by sTATIsTICAl DIvIsIon, 2006
sTATIsTICAl DIvIsIon ToTAl PoPulATIon 2006 no. ovErsEAs–born ArrIvED 2002–2006 PEr CEnT oF ToTAl PoPulATIon 
Sydney 4,119,191 196,212 4.8
Hunter 589240 5651 1
Illawarra 394211 5423 1.4
Richmond–Tweed 219329 2445 1.1
Mid–North Coast 284674 1907 0.7
Northern NSW 172396 1224 0.7
North Western 111231 563 0.5
Central West – NSW 170897 910 0.5
South Eastern – NSW 197942 1477 0.7
Murrumbidgee 147292 1705 1.2
Murray 110523 662 0.6
Far West 22030 117 0.5
Melbourne 3,592,593 157,194 4.4
Barwon 259012 3285 1.3
Western District 98855 825 0.8
Central Highlands 142219 1324 0.9
Wimmera 48441 338 0.7
Mallee 88601 961 1.1
Loddon 168843 1010 0.6
Goulburn 195239 2067 1.1
Ovens–Murray 92587 565 0.6
East Gippsland 80117 572 0.7
Gippsland 159483 1178 0.7
Brisbane 1,763,133 69,580 3.9
Gold Coast 482318 21104 4.4
Sunshine Coast 276263 7762 2.8
West Moreton 68630 805 1.2
Wide Bay–Burnett 254658 2474 1
Darling Downs 213756 3444 1.6
South West – QLD 24778 184 0.7
Fitzroy 188406 2639 1.4
Central West – QLD 10851 70 0.6
Mackay 150171 2686 1.8
Northern – QLD 196672 3312 1.7
Far North 231049 4663 2
North West 30938 565 1.8
Adelaide 1,105,839 34369 3.1
Outer Adelaide 123700 1030 0.8
Yorke and Lower North 43878 157 0.4
Murray Lands 66805 698 1
South East 62219 587 0.9
Eyre 33343 179 0.5
Northern SA 75927 677 0.9
Perth 1,445,077 71339 4.9
South West– WA 207343 4152 2
Lower Great Southern 52592 872 1.7
Upper Great Southern 17714 177 1
Midlands 50411 701 1.4
South Eastern – WA 51894 1808 3.5
Central 57428 743 1.3
Pilbara 41004 1376 3.4
Kimberley 29297 346 1.2
Greater Hobart 200523 3379 1.7
Southern 34927 195 0.6
Northern –TAS 133930 1682 1.3
Mersey–Lyell 106131 735 0.7
Darwin 105992 2719 2.6
Northern Territory – Bal 84910 1474 1.7
Canberra 323056 9504 2.9
Australian Capital Territory – Bal 272 23 8.5
total – Australia 19,810,781 645,825 3 .3
Source: ABS 2006 Census
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sTATE
METroPolITAn non-METroPolITAn METroPolITAn
InTrAsTATE InTErsTATE ToTAl InTrAsTATE InTErsTATE ToTAl
sHArE oF InTErsTATE 
GAIn or loss 
(PErCEnT)
New South Wales –54,504 –66,508 –121,012 54,504 –37,078 17,426 64.2
Victoria –15,996 –2713 –18,709 15,996 –5005 10,991 35.2
Queensland –1633 44,383 42,750 1663 76,575 78,208 36.7
South Australia –3359 –6252 –9611 3359 –1477 1882 80.9
Western Australia 1693 1569 3262 –1693 –1199 –2892 424.1
Tasmania 2527 –162 2365 –2527 4835 2308 –3.5
Source: Bell and Hugo, 2000, 96; ABS 2001 Census (unpublished data), 2006 ABS TableBuilder
Table 9 
nET InTErsTATE AnD InTrAsTATE MIGrATIon, CAPITAl CITy sTATIsTICAl DIvIsIons 
AnD non-METroPolITAn ArEAs, sIx sTATEs, AusTrAlIA, 2001–06
Table 8 
AusTrAlIA: DIsTrIbuTIon oF ovErsEAs-born bETWEEn CAPITAl CITIEs AnD rEsT oF 
sTATE, 2001 AnD 2006
only a relatively small increase in its most recent migrant population (13.4 per cent), 
compared with an increase of 26.8 per cent between the 1996 and 2001 censuses. 
Although Sydney remains the pre eminent destination of newly arrived migrants, with 
30.4 per cent of the total, in 2001 it secured 36.8 per cent and in 1996 38.3 per cent. 
Moreover, the proportion going to NSW fell from 41.6 per cent in 1996 to 33.8 per 
cent in 2006. By far the largest non-metropolitan numbers of recent migrants are in 
Queensland which attracted 7.5 per cent of the total intake in 2001 and 7.7 per cent 
in 2006. It is interesting that Adelaide had the fastest rate of growth in the number of 
recent migrants of all capitals, reflecting how the state’s population policy imperative to 
increase international migration was assisted by the regional bonus point system.38 
Table 9 presents data on the contribution of intrastate and interstate migration to the 
population growth in the metropolitan and non-metropolitan sectors of the Australian 
states. The data have to be interpreted carefully because of some boundary changes 
to metropolitan areas over the 35 year period depicted39, but some interesting patterns 
are shown. The table sheds useful light on the commonly held perception that there 
is a ‘drift’ to the capital cities of Australia from non-metropolitan areas. It will be noted 
that for all capital cities, with the exceptions of Perth and Hobart, more people moved 
from the capital to non-metropolitan parts of the state during the 2001–06 period, than 
2001 2006 GroWTH rATE 
2001–2006nuMbEr PEr CEnT nuMbEr PEr CEnT
Major capital cities 3,307,577 81.1 3,557,486 80.6 1.47
Rest of states 771,574 18.9 857,873 19.4 2.14
Total 4,079,151 100 4,415,359 100 1.6
Source: ABS Censuses
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vice versa. Sydney has lost population to intrastate locations during every intercensal 
period from 1966, while for Melbourne, there has been a “drift” to rural areas from 
the capital since 1971. Brisbane has oscillated between situations of rural-urban and 
urban-rural drift, while South Australia experienced urban-rural drift for the first time 
during the 2001–06 period. In WA and Tasmania, the typical situation has been rural 
to urban movement, although at levels substantially lower than the losses experienced 
by Sydney, in particular, and Melbourne. The losses to other parts of the state are 
particularly significant in Sydney, and to a lesser extent, Melbourne. It is notable in 
Sydney and Melbourne too that these patterns are consistent over much of the post 
war period, although they were especially marked in 2001–06.The metropolitan to non-
metropolitan flow in internal migration has significant implications for discussions of 
changing Australian settlement systems. 
Sydney also had a substantial net migration loss to other states as well as to other 
parts of NSW. Melbourne, Adelaide and Hobart had smaller net losses to other states 
while Brisbane, and to a lesser extent Perth, had a net gain of interstate migrants. 
It is important to note that the net migration levels in capital cities have a distinctive age 
structure. Figure 5 shows the pattern for Sydney and it will be noted that there are net 
gains in the young adult years predominantly due to the influx of international migration. 
However, from the 40s onward there are net losses. The profiles in other state capitals 
are similar in shape although the positioning of the profile may differ.
Turning to non-metropolitan areas, Table 10 shows the areas that experienced the 
most significant net internal migration gains during the 1996–09 and 2001–06 periods. 
Clearly there is a dominance of coastal areas and those areas adjoining metropoli-
tan areas. Such locations in Queensland, NSW and Victoria are especially important 
magnets for internal migrants. Again, it is relevant to examine the age-sex composition 
of net migration in regional areas. Figure 6 shows the profile of net migration for the mid 
North Coast statistical division in NSW, one of the major “sinks” of internal migration. 
Even in this area of rapid growth, there was a substantial net loss of young adults aged 
in their late teens and 20s but substantial net gains in all other age groups. Hence the 
“sinks” for internal migrants are especially attracting young working adults and early 
retirees.
Figure 5 
syDnEy sTATIsTICAl DIvIsIon: nET MIGrATIon ProFIlE, 2001–2006












Cohort age in 2006
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Table 10 









new south Wales 
Hunter 59527 51190 8337 Hunter 56227 46571 9656 Coastal/Metropolitan Periphery
Illawarra 46897 36055 10842 Illawarra 38907 38018 889 Coastal/Metropolitan Periphery
Richmond-Tweed 36057 30810 5247 Richmond-Tweed 33463 27320 6143 Coastal 
Mid-North Coast 46728 40119 6609 Mid-North Coast 44656 34402 10254 Coastal
South Eastern 33487 31071 2416 South East - NSW 34138 27637 6501 Coastal
Central West 22627 19427 3167 Adjoining coastal/inland
Murray 17419 17211 208 Adjoining coastal/inland
victoria
Barwon 27425 21975 5450 Barwon 25594 20929 4665 Metropolitan Periphery
Central Highlands 19971 17898 2073 Central Highlands 18792 19384 2408 Metropolitan Periphery
Loddon 23904 21537 2367 Loddon 23066 19457 3609 Metropolitan Periphery
Goulburn 26683 25207 1476 Metropolitan Periphery
Ovens-Murray 13378 12913 465 Inland
East Gippsland 10724 9923 801 Coastal
Gippsland 18564 16992 1572 Coastal
queensland
Moreton 138831 84634 54197 West Moreton 15916 13811 2105 Coastal/Metropolitan Periphery
Wide Bay-Burnett 40282 39286 996 Wide Bay-Burnett 49735 33937 15798 Coastal
Darling Downs 33348 32412 936 Darling Downs 33136 29960 3176 Adjoining Coastal
Northern 33188 31410 1778 Coastal
Gold Coast 80925 51613 29312 Coastal
Sunshine Coast 54049 33488 20561 Coastal
Fitzroy 28229 26347 1882 Coastal
Mackay 25784 30638 5146 Coastal
Northern - QLD 32276 27372 4904 Coastal
Far North 29403 26932 2471 Coastal
south Australia
Outer Adelaide 23593 18556 5037 Outer Adelaide 24584 17109 7475 Coastal/Metropolitan Periphery
Yorke and Lower North 7435 6858 577 Coastal
Tasmania
Southern 6821 6290 531 Coastal/Metropolitan Periphery
Northern – Tas 13325 11789 1536 Coastal
Mersey-Lyell 10267 10026 241 Coastal
northern Territory
Darwin 23900 20746 3154 Coastal North
Source: Unpublished data from 2001 and 2006 Censuses
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The New South Wales pattern of net migration has a quite distinctive spatial pattern 
which is also present in the other states. It is apparent that net international migration 
gain plays a much lesser role in the growth of population in non-metropolitan areas, 
even in those that are experiencing significant expansion. This is evident in Table 11, 
which shows for the state of New South Wales the in, out and net migration for 1996–
2006 in Sydney and three non-metropolitan zones parallel to the coast together with 
the number of immigrants who arrived between 1996 and 2001 and 2001 and 2006. 
In the growing coastal non-metropolitan areas there were 35,745 recent immigrants 
but 396,668 immigrants had moved in from elsewhere in Australia and there was a net 
internal migration gain of 64,546. The pattern of net internal migration loss increases 
with distance from the coast and the number of recent immigrants decreases. This mix 
of interstate and international migration contribution to growth is indicative of patterns 
across Australia.
Figure 6 
MID norTH CoAsT sTATIsTICAl DIvIsIon: nET MIGrATIon ProFIlE, 2001–2006
Table 11 
nEW souTH WAlEs: rEGIons, InTErnAl MIGrATIon 1996–2006 AnD IMMIGrAnTs WHo 
ArrIvED In AusTrAlIA bETWEEn 1996 AnD 2006
rEGIon
InTErnAl MIGrATIon 1996–2001 InTErnAl MIGrATIon 2001– 2006 IMMIGrAnTs ArrIvED
In ouT nET In ouT nET 1997–2001 2001–2006
Sydney 175,732 233,685 –57,953 122,179 243,191 –121,012 173,083 196,212
Coastal NSW 189,277 158,174 31,103 207,391 173,948 33,443 12,066 16,897
Central NSW 91,899 95,028 –3129 71,833 86,971 –15,138 3088 4409
Western NSW 40,489 66,292 –25,803 19,733 20,612 –879 643 771
Source: Unpublished data from 2001 Australian Census, TableBuilder 2006
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Policy issues
The configuration of the Australian settlement system and the distribution of popula-
tion must be an important part of the discourse on population policy. Moreover, for 
a number of reasons it is opportune to examine whether or not the contemporary 
Australian settlement system is the most appropriate one to achieve national goals. 
The economic and environmental imperatives of the next four decades will present a 
very different set of challenges and opportunities to those that prevailed in the three 
decades following World War II, when decentralisation and regional development poli-
cies were last seriously put forward. Is the settlement structure in part an artefact of 
earlier political economies and not optimal given climate and other potential changes 
in the economy? Where people live is important to their wellbeing. Under any realis-
tic scenario of the next four decades, most Australians will continue to live in major 
urban areas, especially the capital cities. However, in light of emerging environmental, 
economic and social trends, the question must be asked as to whether, in a climate 
change context, the current settlement system will deliver the most sustainable, effi-
cient and liveable outcomes for Australians over coming decades. Two issues are of 
particular relevance:
How can we reshape our large cities so that they deliver more of these outcomes, •	
while adapting to the realities of climate change?
Can a shift in the regional balance of development between metropolitan and non-•	
metropolitan Australia deliver for Australians, more of these outcomes of liveability, 
equity, efficiency and sustainability?
Retrofitting Australia’s cities and changing the behaviour of the residents of those cities 
in light of climate change, to achieve more sustainable outcomes, is clearly an impor-
tant national priority as most of us will continue to live in large cities. However, we also 
need to ask whether some shift in the balance of population between different parts of 
Australia is desirable.
Why should we revisit the issue of regional development and decentralisation? Some 
would argue that the decentralisation policies that were tried in the 1950s and early 
1970s had limited, if any, success. There are at least five reasons why the issue needs 
to be revisited:
Firstly, environment has been a major influence shaping Australia’s settlement system •	
since initial European settlement but climate change will add a new dimension to this 
with liveability and economic potential of some areas being considerably modified.
Secondly, the 21st century economic context is totally different to that which pre-•	
vailed a half century ago when manufacturing was a key driver of economic and 
employment growth in Australia. Mining, tourism and other sectors which have a 
strong non-metropolitan presence have become increasingly important.
Thirdly, earlier initiatives often attempted to attract people “artificially” to areas by •	
creating job opportunities where there was no existing economic potential. Today, 
in contrast, there is evidence that some specific non-metropolitan areas have 
the resource base necessary, but not sufficient, to support sustainable economic 
growth.
Fourthly, as has been shown earlier, the dynamics of internal migration and interna-•	
tional migrant settlement in Australia have changed significantly in the last decade 
as settlement outside of the capitals has become more significant.
Fifthly, in other OECD countries there are many examples where regions are more •	
economically dynamic than the major cities.
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A sixth issue relates to the potential for rapid growth in the populations of many •	
non-metropolitan coastal communities. The impending retirement of Australian baby 
boomers (who make up 27 per cent of the national population) raises a number 
of issues. The Department of Treasury’s Intergenerational Reports40 have indicated 
several of the challenges that ageing of the population will present for the national 
economy. One issue which has been given little consideration, however, is where 
will baby boomers live during their retirement? Historically, older Australians have 
been the least mobile group in the population with ageing in place being dominant, 
as older people have mostly remained in the family home during retirement. There 
are some indications, however, that in the pre-retirement and early post-retirement 
stages of the life cycle, baby boomers will move house more frequently than did 
earlier generations. Moreover, there are some indications that many of these movers 
will shift to a seaside non-metropolitan location.
One factor pointing to a substantial move of baby boomers to non-metropolitan coastal 
communities upon retirement is the second home phenomenon. A key fact about most 
coastal communities is that a significant proportion of their housing stock is made up 
of holiday homes that are occupied only on weekends or holidays and are owned 
by absentee rate payers. There is no data collected in the Census of Population and 
Housing on second homes, but Table 12 shows for South Australia the significance of 
such homes in one coastal area. Baby boomers make up the majority of the owners 
of second homes; if a substantial proportion retire to them, then significant population 
growth will result and significant multipliers will see the growth of working as well as 
retired populations.41




PEr CEnT oF 
AssEssMEnT noTICEs 
sEnT ouTsIDE lGA
Barunga West 1077 674 38.5
Copper Coast 4837 1979 29.0 35.7
Cleve 853 153 15.2
Franklin Harbour 571 198 25.7 26.5
Lower Eyre Peninsula 1651 493 23.0
Mount Remarkable 1195 313 20.8 25.5
Port Augusta 5431 785 12.6
Port Lincoln 5454 690 11.2
Port Pirie City and Districts 7020 697 9.0 8.0
Tumby Bay 1098 387 26.1 32.9
Whyalla 9010 1086 10.8 11.9
Yorke Peninsula 4866 3966 44.9 48.1
total 43,063 11,421 21 .0
Source: ABS 2006 Census
Table 12 
sPEnCEr GulF lGAs, 2006: PErCEnTAGE oF DWEllInGs unoCCuPIED, 2006
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Climate change is likely to influence where future growth will occur. Water is a key envi-
ronmental issue with an all-important population dimension, and so the development 
of water and population policy needs to be an integrated process. Climate change 
will result in changes in the availability of water in different areas. While the mismatch 
between water and population in Australia does not call for a wholesale redistribution of 
population, nonetheless there are a number of important population dimensions as we 
face a drier future for south eastern and south western Australia: Agriculture uses 50 
per cent of water in Australia42, hence regional reduction in rainfall and run-off will have 
consequences for agriculture. The implications for agriculture need to be fully worked 
through. Do we need to consider some water-intensive agriculture being phased out 
in south eastern Australia and more developed in northern Australia and Tasmania 
where there are assured sustainable water supplies? A study by Holz43 has suggested 
that the Australian dairying industry will increasingly relocate to Tasmania as the effects 
of climate change become more apparent. If the science means that a redistribution 
will become necessary, there are a number of population elements which need to be 
considered:
The agricultural workforce in Australia is the oldest of any sector.•	 44 To what extent 
can water-intensive agriculturalists be bought out so they can retire with dignity into 
local communities and hence maintain the local economies and social networks?
To what extent can the skills built up in agriculture in areas like the Murray-Darling •	
Basin be utilised to develop new specialised agriculture elsewhere? This was the 
way the agriculture frontier progressed in Australia in the 19th and 20th centuries, 
with the new frontiers being settled by farmers with experience in settled areas 
earlier. How can this process be carried out in the 21st century to compensate fully 
those displaced and facilitate the migration and settlement elsewhere of younger 
agriculturalists, so as to encourage the growth of new agricultural industries in other, 
wetter parts of Australia?
In some areas, climate change will make the current patterns of agriculture unsustain-
able. These include:
Some irrigated agriculture activities where river or groundwater sources will not be •	
available to the same extent as currently (e.g. in parts of the Murray-Darling Basin).
Wheat growing areas which are currently marginal, being near the limits of the rainfall •	
necessary for sustainable production (e.g. beyond Goyder’s Line in South Australia 
and in parts of south western Western Australia). Shifts in the amount, seasonality 
and reliability of rainfall may make sustainable wheat growing no longer possible.
There has been a discussion in the wine industry of the implications of climate change •	
for the existing grape growing regions which indicates there may be a need for some 
relocation of the industry, as well as a change in the types of grapes grown.
In major urban areas, Troy45 has argued that Australia needs to move away from tra-
ditional responses to expanding populations of seeking new sources of water, and 
achieve behavioural changes in the use of water, develop new technologies of water 
storage, capturing run-off and water re-use. The role of desalination plants is a factor 
which may change this.
Four decades ago Holmes46 produced a map of Australian water potential, reproduced 
here as Figure 7. This shows the number of people that could be supported in Australian 
regions if there were no other limiting factors other than water. Of course, there are 
many other limiting factors such as soil fertility, rainfall variability and climatic factors. 
Nevertheless, the figure does indicate where water is most abundant. It is interesting 
that the greatest densities of population that could be supported when water is the only 
limiting factor are in Tasmania. The southeast and northeast coasts are also capable 
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of supporting large populations. However, it does also show that South Australia and 
Western Australia have very low capacity.
A report by the Grattan Institute47, has demonstrated conclusively that any attempt 
artificially to stimulate the economies of regions or centres, where there is no potential 
for developing self-sustaining growth, is doomed to failure (see also chapter 4.4 of 
the current volume). “Equity” approaches to investing in regional development are 
ineffective. There is no doubt that all people living in non-metropolitan Australia have 
important, limited claims for service provision in areas such as health, education, aged 
care, transport and police, which need to be met on equity grounds and at a greater 
cost per head than for metropolitan areas. However, any targeting of investment to 
facilitate regional development must be focused where sustainable growth is occurring 
and where more is likely. Daley and Lancey argue that there is a need to support long-
term growth drivers, but only where this can accelerate economic growth that is already 
underway. These regions are generally within 150 km of large population centres, or are 
centres such as coastal towns or mining centres, with particular natural advantages. 
The report is strongly and justifiably critical of approaches to regional development 
which fly in the face of economic reality.
Figure 7 
DEnsITIEs oF MAxIMuM PErMIssIblE PoPulATIon AnD DrAInAGE DIvIsIons oF 
AusTrAlIA
Source: Holmes, 1973
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Conclusion
Any realistic scenario of the Australian population over the next two decades will see 
the majority of the population continue to live in the nation’s major cities. Agglomeration 
economies that flow from concentrations of investment, human capital, infrastructure, 
facilities and services will ensure that. However, in a context of changing economic 
structure, climate change and ageing of the population, it is important to ask whether 
future spatial patterns of population growth will simply replicate those of the last two 
decades. As Daley and Lancy (2011) have pointed out, governments have tended to 
divide recurrent and infrastructure funding between regions on the basis of the number 
of existing residents. As a result, areas of current or impending rapid growth frequently 
experience a lag in obtaining such funding.
Population issues – of size, growth, composition and distribution – are going to be 
crucially important to the Australian economy. Australia’s future population will involve 
growth in the immediate and medium term, and so where that growth occurs is an 
important matter for the nation’s economy, society and environment. Careful con-
sideration, not only of contemporary economic and environmental processes and 
imperatives but also of the likely changes over the next two decades, must be central 
to planning where the growth would be best accommodated. Australia does need a 
coherent population strategy, but it cannot be seen purely as a part of economic policy. 
Rather, it is crucial that environmental sustainability, social inclusion and liveability con-
siderations are also included in the deliberations to develop population based initiatives. 
These initiatives must involve considerations of not only “how many Australians” but 
“where they will live”.
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Introduction
The Australian society and the economy are likely to be in structural transition in 
response to several long-term forces including population ageing and climate change.1 
It is important to recognise that a certain degree of climate change and the result-
ing impacts are unavoidable. This is due to the greenhouse gases that are already in 
the atmosphere and inevitable future emissions caused by the current slow mitigation 
action.2 The interactions between changes in climate and population are complex and 
diverse. One way to explore these interactions is to assess how potential changes in 
Australia’s climate could impact:
1. Key factors of production such as land, water and energy; and 
2.  Major sectors such as agriculture, human health, infrastructure and ecosystems, 
and hence economic and societal activity and human settlement. 
It is important to recognise that there are some uncertainties associated with the scien-
tific aspects of certain climate change related impacts. However, the uncertainty in the 
science is generally associated with the rate and magnitude rather than the direction, 
of the conclusions.3 It is noteworthy that many other non-climatic factors also affect the 
risks that some of the major sectors face. For example, human health outcomes are 
influenced by the vulnerability of specific individuals and communities. This highlights 
the need to consider multiple and interacting impacts and stresses and not climate 
change in isolation.4 
This chapter focuses on the implications for Australia’s population of future climate 
change. The next section summarises the key aspects of projected climate change 
in Australia based on the analysis published recently by the CSIRO.5 Section three will 
canvass the potential effects of climate change on Australia’s key natural resources 
and economic output. The impacts of climate change on human settlement in Australia 
are discussed in section four. Section five will discuss the overall implications for a 
sustainable Australian population of future climate change. The final section will include 
some concluding remarks.
Projected climate change in Australia
The most recent climate projections by CSIRO indicate that annual average tempera-
ture in Australia will increase by around 1.0˚ C across the continent by 2030 (above 
1990 levels). By 2030, the increase in annual temperature in the coastal regions is 
projected to be 0.7–0.9˚ C and in inland areas one to 1.2˚ C relative to 1990 levels. 
By 2050, the projected average increase in temperature across Australia ranges from 
0.8 to 1.8˚ C (under low greenhouse gas emissions) and 1.5 to 2.8˚ C (under high 
emissions). Increase in average temperature by 2070 is expected to be between 2.2˚C 
(under low greenhouse gas emissions) and 5˚ C (under high emissions).6 
Rainfall is one of the most difficult climate variables to predict. According to CSIRO, 
less rainfall is likely in southern parts of Australia over the coming decades particularly 
during winter, and in southern and eastern regions during spring. The nature of summer 
tropical rainfall in northern Australia in the future remains highly uncertain. It is also 
predicted that the most intense rainfall events in most locations across Australia will 
become more extreme.7 
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The projected extreme weather events in Australia associated with the changes in 
climate over the coming decades could have important implications for the economy 
and society. It is projected that fire-weather risks are likely to increase in many parts of 
Australia with warmer temperatures and lower humidity. For example, the number of 
days with very high fire danger ratings is projected to increase by two per cent to 30 per 
cent by 2030, and by five per cent to 100 per cent by 2050. Furthermore, the number 
of days with extreme fire danger ratings is expected to rise between five per cent and 
65 per cent by 2020, and between 10 per cent and 300 per cent by 2050. Significant 
increases in flooding and the proportion of tropical cyclone activity are projected over 
the coming decades.8
The overall general projections summarised above are likely to manifest at regional levels 
influencing different parts of the Australian society, economy and the environment. An 
understanding of these regional climate impacts could help assess the implications of 
a changing climate on resource availability, economic activity and societal vulnerability 
at regional and national level. 
Effects on resources and production
Australia has a climate sensitive economy. The impacts of projected climate change 
are likely to be experienced across many sectors of the economy and in a range of 
ecosystems.9 Key natural resources such as water, land and ecosystems are highly 
vulnerable to climate variability and change in many parts of Australia. Sectors such as 
agriculture and forestry, coastal development and infrastructure are particularly sensi-
tive to extreme weather events as more gradual changes in key climate variables occur. 
It is important to recognise that not all climate changes will be adverse, particularly in 
the next few decades. Moderate warming in the absence of declines in rainfall may 
actually benefit some agricultural industries in certain regions. Hence, the distribution 
of climate change impacts across different regions is noteworthy.10 
Several recent studies in Australia have identified a number of key areas where the 
potential adverse impacts of climate change could be substantial. 11 12 13 These areas 
relate to the availability and quality of water, risks to coastal settlements and devel-
opment, loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services, risks to essential infrastructure, 
adverse impacts on agriculture and forestry, and harmful effects on human health. 
The vulnerability of these areas to climate change can potentially have a direct and/or 
indirect bearing on the sustainability of future population levels in Australia.
The nexus between water, food production and sustainable population highlights the 
significance of climate change impacts on water and food security. It is projected that 
water supply reliability in southern and eastern Australia is likely to decline. This is 
mainly a result of reduced rainfall due to climate change (though climate change also 
affects the water balance through warming and increasing CO2, in ways that are still 
being understood). It is expected to affect irrigation, domestic and industrial water 
use and environmental flows. Crop and livestock production over much of southern 
Australia is projected to decline by 2030 due to increased drought. Drought and heat 
are also expected to adversely affect the quality of grain, grapes, vegetables, fruits and 
other crops.14 A southward shift of agricultural pests and diseases due to warming in 
southern parts of the continent is likely to further exacerbate the adverse impacts on 
agricultural production.15 
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At present there is a high level of competition for limited water resources among 
alternative users including urban settlements, irrigated agriculture, industry and the 
environment. This competition is intensified by declining surface and ground water 
resources, particularly in southern Australia, increasing population and growing commu-
nity awareness of the environmental impacts of over-extraction of water in Australia.16
Impacts on human settlement 
Around 85 per cent of the Australian population currently resides in coastal regions.17 
The present rate of increase, about two per cent or 400,000 people per year, amounts 
to adding the population of a city larger than Canberra to Australia each year. A con-
tinuation of population growth combined with the potential climate change impacts 
can raise several significant issues for public policy over the coming decades. For 
example, where will the additional number of people live – in the current major cities 
and regional centres or in cities that haven’t yet been envisaged or planned? How can 
we provide public infrastructure including water and energy in a sustainable manner to 
these potentially large cities and regional centres in the medium to long term?18 These 
are key public policy questions that will require the attention of policy makers over the 
coming years.
Climate change could have potentially adverse impacts if future development and 
expansion in population centres continues to be confined to coastal regions. These 
adverse impacts would include risks from rising sea-levels and increase in the likeli-
hood of severity and frequency of coastal flooding projected to be caused by climate 
change, particularly in low lying areas exposed to cyclones and storm surges. Existing 
infrastructure is particularly sensitive to extreme weather events. The potential climate 
change risks to infrastructure include the failure of urban drainage and sewerage 
systems, more power blackouts due to heat waves, rail transport disruptions due to 
high temperature and increased building damage under excessive wind loads. It is also 
important to recognise the indirect effects such as urban heat island (UHI) effect that is 
associated with a rise in temperature caused by heat-retaining materials. For example, 
it is observed that the mean temperature for Melbourne city increased by 0.23º C per 
decade from 1950 to 2006. Of this increase in temperature, 0.12º C is estimated to 
be attributable to UHI effect.19 UHI effect in the urban environments could increase 
demand for energy for air-conditioning.20 
Climate change is also projected to have a range of direct and indirect effects on the 
wellbeing of the Australian population. The direct effects are likely to manifest through 
phenomena such as heat waves, bush fires, storms and floods. For example, potential 
heat-related deaths among those who are over 65 years old in six of Australia’s largest 
cities are projected to increase from about 1100 per year at present to around 2300–
2500 by 2030 and 4300–6300 by 2050 (after adjusting for demographic changes). The 
indirect effects of climate change on the wellbeing of the Australian population are likely 
to manifest through biological processes such as vector-borne and other infectious 
diseases (including dengue, Ross river fever and malaria) and physical processes such 
as air pollution.21 
It could be argued that Australia’s natural environment including the natural landscapes, 
national parks, wetlands, and the Great Barrier Reef contributes to the overall wellbe-
ing of the population as important destinations for tourism. A recent assessment of a 
wide range of tourism regions for prospective risk of climate change in Australia has 
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identified at least three key areas as the most threatened.22 These include key tourist 
destinations in tropical north Queensland, south west Western Australia and the top 
end of the Northern Territory. The adverse impacts of climate change on Australia’s 
natural landscape and hence on some of the popular tourist attractions could manifest 
in several forms including loss of attractions, loss of quality of attractions, costs of 
adaptation, increased cost for repair, maintenance and replacement of tourism infra-
structure, and increased costs for developing alternative attractions. 23 24 
Implications for sustainable population 
Irrespective of Australia’s future population level, it is becoming clear that attention 
needs to be focussed on coping with the climate changes that are already occurring 
and appear unavoidable over the coming decades based on the best available scientific 
evidence at present. Recent analysis of current warming trends combined with updated 
scenarios of global greenhouse gas emission growth and climate sensitivity, indicates 
only a quite small band of climate change uncertainty to about 2050.25 This highlights 
the need for major adaptation efforts across key vulnerable sectors over the next few 
decades. Hence, in the context of sustaining future levels of population in Australia, 
some of the potential changes required may be quite significant. It could be argued that 
coping with future climate changes may require far reaching changes which cut across 
key vulnerable areas that have implications for sustainable population.
In the context of energy, water and agricultural systems, there have been several 
suggestions put forward to cope with the expanding demand for the output of these 
systems, particularly in relation to a growing population in a potentially low carbon 
economy. These include the development and application of smart network technolo-
gies for electricity, gas and water supply and distribution in the urban domain and the 
uptake of smart network technology in irrigation.26 The aim of the “smart network 
technologies” concept is to improve supply, allocation, distribution and overall produc-
tivity of basic necessities for the sustainability of expanding human settlements. For 
example, it is projected that smart network technologies relating to basic infrastructure 
such as electricity in urban domains will allow for/enable better integration of intermit-
tent and distributed renewable energy sources (such as solar and wind) into existing 
grid networks. Furthermore, smart network technologies are also expected to facilitate 
behavioural changes among users through the provision of consumer information on 
usage rates and cost of water, energy and greenhouse gas emissions.27 Transparent 
and less regulated markets for energy and water are required to fully harness the 
potential benefits of smart network technologies. In the context of agricultural systems, 
it has been proposed that adapting to future climate changes in Australia may require 
the consideration of progressive relocation of agricultural industries to more favourable 
climatic regions.28 
As indicted earlier, there are competing demands for water use and ensuring water 
security for alternative water uses is crucial for a sustainable existence of a population. 
Several basic measures can help achieve this. They include, lowering demand via edu-
cation, behavioural change and efficiency programs; expanding supply via alternative 
sources such as recycling and desalination; and making better use of current water 
resources via efficient pricing and ensuring adequate environmental flows.29 
In the coming decades, Australian population centres, current major cities, regional 
towns and those cities that haven’t yet been envisaged or planned will face the 
combined challenge of resource constraints, in a potentially low carbon operating 
environment. The sustainability of such population centres will require technological 
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innovation initiatives which foster the design of resilient energy, water, transport and 
related urban systems that meet human needs and ensure acceptable quality of life with 
low environmental impacts. Such initiatives are transformational, long term in nature, 
require demonstration projects and staged implementation over a number of years.30 It 
is also important to recognise the climate change vulnerability (for example, to weather 
and climate related natural disasters) of certain locations of current and future human 
settlements. In this context, the imposition of planning controls in coastal regions to 
prevent people building in areas at risk of flooding, storm surges and shoreline erosion 
has been canvassed as a potentially important adaptive measure.31 
In order to address the potential risks to future populations from heat waves, several 
measures have been proposed including: reorganisation of health care services and 
enhancement of early warning systems to reach at-risk groups and the general popula-
tion; encouragement of behavioural changes by the general public to reduce exposure 
to heat stress; and development of emergency response plans for heat waves in all 
regions.32 
As the frequency and intensity of severe weather events increase with climate change in 
the future, the commercial insurance markets have an important role to play in helping 
manage such risks. This is particularly relevant with respect to human settlements (for 
example residential and business property and infrastructure). However, conventional 
property insurance is of limited value at present when the uncertainty mainly involves the 
timing rather than the extent of a severe weather event triggered by climate change.33 
For example, there could be uncertainty about the timing of coastal property loss as a 
result of rising sea-levels, due to the melting of the Greenland icesheet. Insuring against 
risks with such uncertainty would require the development of innovative property and 
infrastructure insurance products that share features with traditional life insurance.34 
The commercial viability of the development and operation of such innovative insur-
ance products will be influenced by at least three key factors:
The expansion and dissemination of information and knowledge from applied •	
climate science that is relevant to the development of new insurance products for 
circumstances relating to severe weather events;
Imposition of appropriate land use planning and zoning by state and local govern-•	
ment authorities based on sound knowledge from the climate science; and
Reforms to any distortions associated with insurance transaction taxes that tend to •	
increase the cost of premiums.35 
Concluding remarks
As indicated earlier, coping with the climate change impacts that are inevitable over 
the coming decades requires a certain level of forward looking or planned adaptation. 
Some of the adaptation measures required for ensuring a sustainable future population 
have been canvassed in the previous section. The implementation of such adaptation 
measures requires addressing information and communication barriers, institutional 
limitations and resource constraints. In both urban and rural locations, access to infor-
mation relating to the vulnerability of down-scaled regions to climate change impacts 
has been reportedly sparse. When specific information is available, a more robust case 
can be made for adaptation via proper planning. There is an increasing demand for 
so called “hard” information such as identifying tangible climate and weather related 
hazards and particularly vulnerable locations. For example, in the case of sea level 
rises and storm surge implications for planning, the information requirements are quite 
specific.36 
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Planned adaptation can be improved by enhancing the quantity and quality of relevant 
information through ongoing research and applications in at least two ways:
By providing more reliable information about climate change and its regional impacts; •	
and
By developing and testing improved adaptation options and technologies. •	
Providing better or enhanced insights into climate change on a decadal scale and 
into long-term regional weather patterns (including down-scaling) is essential for effi-
cient and effective adaptation. This is effective, provided that the information reaches 
the relevant audience in a timely, user friendly, understandable and reliable manner.37 
Communication and information dissemination about climate change impacts and 
adaptive solutions and their implications are essential for the adaptation process. 
The government has an important role in providing a conducive environment includ-
ing the appropriate legal, regulatory and socio-economic environment to support 
planned adaptation. Adaptation requires changes in behaviour of individuals. Changing 
behaviour may be constrained by various distortions in the operating environment. 
Governments can stimulate incentives to adapt promptly and rationally to climate 
change, for example, by removing the legal and economic distortions that individuals, 
firms and farms face.
It is important to recognise climate change adaptation as a cross-sectoral issue. 
Climate change adaptation measures are often difficult to separate from other issues 
in different sectors, including agriculture and water, particularly with respect to natural 
hazards and climate variability. There are inter-linkages between climate change and 
other environmental and socio-economic policy issues that need to be recognised 
and acted upon within a broader public policy framework. This involves mainstreaming 
public policy relating to climate change adaptation. Integration of climate change adap-
tation policies into broader sectoral and socio-economic policy making frameworks 
requires fundamental shifts in institutions, polices and incentives. This is likely to be an 
ongoing and adaptive process.
Note: Helpful comments by Michael Raupach of CSIRO are gratefully acknowledged.
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Introduction
Australia is an economically developed country with a high standard of living, a gross 
domestic product in 2010 of $890 billion (GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity, 
ranked 18 in the world), and a per capita income of $41,300. For electricity, oil and 
gas consumption Australia’s global ranking is 16, 19 and 29 respectively.1 In terms 
of human-caused greenhouse gas emissions, Australia produces 1.3 per cent of the 
world’s total2, and is the largest global coal exporter. Thus, despite a relatively modest 
population size of 22.7 million people in 2011 (just 0.32 per cent of the global popula-
tion of 7 billion)3, Australians are heavy economic and environmental hitters. 
Given this context, what would be the implications for global climate change of a “large 
Australia”? To address this question, I will use two underpinning assumptions (based on 
forecasts provided by the Australian Treasury in their 2010 Intergenerational Report):4 
1.  Net population growth rate is 1.2 per cent per annum, reaching 35.9 million people 
by 2050; and 
2.  Per capita real GDP grows at 1.5 per cent per year over the same timeframe.
The world in 2050
There is an old Arab proverb, “Those who foretell the future lies, even if he tells the 
truth”5. Even when armed with all the relevant current data and well-supported empirical 
models, much will change over the next 40 years that we cannot reasonably antici-
pate. Yet this truism does not preclude us from developing scenarios against which 
the plausibility and sustainability of “alternative futures” can be assessed objectively. 
Below I outline some “business-as-usual” (BAU) forecasts by authoritative international 
reports on the likely state of the world in 2050. This will aid in putting the Australia 2050 
situation into a global context, which is essential when discussing an issue like climate 
change, a challenge blind to socio-political borders and national jurisdictions. 
The most recent United Nations projections6 put world population at between 8.1 
and 10.6 billion people by 2050, with a median estimate of 9.3 billion. These same 
forecasts project Australia at between 27.9 and 35.1 million in 2050, with a median of 
31.3 – similar to the Treasury scenario. Taking the mid-range scenario, Australia would 
comprise 0.34 per cent of global population, almost identical to the situation today.
In 2010 global greenhouse gas emissions from burning fossil fuels were 9.14 billion 
tonnes of carbon (which is 33.5 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide gas).7 Of this total, 
Australia’s direct CO2 emissions were 365 million tonnes (this figure excludes non-
CO2gases).
7 In the reference scenario of the Australian Treasury for 20508, world 
emissions of all greenhouse gases (which includes not only fossil fuel combustion and 
cement production, but also wastes, fugitive emissions, methane, nitrous oxide and 
other trace gases) will reach 102 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e), 
constituting a 2.6-fold increase over the 2005 baseline. Under this BAU scenario, 
Australian emissions will rise 1.8-fold, from 579 million tonnes in 2005 to 1.4 billion 
tonnes in 2050. These forecasts are tied strongly to the assumptions of population and 
economic growth for Australia outlined in the introduction to this chapter, as well as an 
on-going heavy dependence on coal and gas for stationary electricity, and oil and gas 
for transport and other energy-intensive sectors.
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This substantial growth in carbon-based energy, if sustained, will mean that over the 
next 25 years, humans will emit into the atmosphere more carbon dioxide than the total 
amount emitted during the 250-year industrial period of 1750 to 2000.9 Of particular 
concern is that long-lived greenhouse gases, such as CO2, will continue to amplify 
global warming for centuries to come. For every five tonnes added during a year in 
which we dither about reducing emissions, one tonne will still be trapping heat in 1000 
years.10 It is a bleak endowment to future generations.
This BAU scenario aligns to the most emissions-intensive pathway studied by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 2007 Fourth Assessment Report, known 
as the A1FI storyline11. The results from global climate models12 suggest that such a 
future will be 2.4 to 6.4°C hotter in the decade 2090–2099 compared to the reference 
period 1980–1999, with a mid-range estimate of 2°C by 2050 and 4.5°C by 2100. A 
2011 review of the latest science and modelling is available in the paper When could 
global warming reach 4°C? 13 
An alternative global scenario, predicated on aggressive cuts in emissions over the 
coming decades and described in detail in the 2011 paper Emission pathways con-
sistent with a 2°C global temperature limit14, would require global production to fall 
from the 2010 figure of 48 billion tonnes CO2e in 2010 to 21 billion tonnes by 2050. 
Under these bold assumptions, which will require a 2.5 per cent cut in global emissions 
annually after 2020, there would be a roughly 50:50 chance of global temperatures not 
exceeding 2°C. Still not great odds, but preferable to BAU.
Australian emissions and targets in 2050
When it comes to energy and carbon-emissions reduction, the devil is always in the 
detail. So too with the Australian Government’s plans to cut its emissions by five per 
cent below year 2000 levels by 2020, with on-going large-scale cuts after that date to 
reach 80 per cent by 2050. 
The reasons for such commitments are, from a scientific basis, quite clear. The longer 
we, the present generation, delay on the move away from fossil fuel energy sources, 
the more we will “lock in” the build-up of long-lived greenhouse gases like carbon 
dioxide and the global climate change that results. Greenhouse gas emissions are a 
tragedy of the commons, and Australia has a proportional part to play. If most nations 
“wait and see”, the commons – our atmosphere and biosphere – will be degraded, to 
the detriment of all people. Should the nations of the world generally choose to take 
no effective action, we can expect increasingly severe consequences, both in Australia 
and most other inhabited regions on Earth. For instance, beyond about 2°C of further 
warming, the Great Barrier Reef will be devastated. Extreme events will become more 
frequent and severe, such as storm surges adding to rising sea levels by many metres, 
threatening coastal cities.15 Although large uncertainties on the future behaviour of 
some events remain (such as cyclones and extended drought in some regions), others, 
like increased heat waves, are already securely understood.16 There is the possibility 
that a semi-persistent or more intense El Niño will set in, leading to frequent failures of 
tropical monsoonal rains which provide the water required to feed billions of people.17 
Above 3°C, up to half of all species may be consigned to extinction because of their 
inability to cope with such rapid and extreme changes.18 
Yet without a broad international commitment to reduce and eventually eliminate CO2 
emissions, the logical pathway for a nation like Australia is to keep burning coal for its 
electricity. With an abundant and cheap supply, there is little reason to do anything 
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else. Even with a broad international commitment about CO2 emissions, it is tempting 
for a nation like Australia to “free ride” and keep burning coal for its electricity, unless 
international sanctions and Australians’ moral sense of fair play, dictate otherwise. 
To decide not to do this, there must be a social and environmental justification, tied 
to rigorous energy, economic and population policy. We can anticipate many of the 
impacts of future global warming, and we have the ability to make the key economic 
and technological choices required to substantially mitigate emissions. But will we act 
in time, and will it be with sufficient effort, to avoid dangerous climate change?
Focusing first on the short-term 2020 goal, the Australian Government’s expectation is 
that total national emissions will actually rise from the 2011 figure of 578 Mt of CO2e to 
621 Mt by 2020 – a net growth of 7.5 per cent over the next nine years.19 Yet the goal 
is five per cent below 2000 levels of 558 Mt, so the target number the government is 
seeking to reach is 530 Mt. The BAU expectation is 680 Mt, so the newly legislated 
carbon tax and other emissions reduction incentives (such as energy efficiency and 
renewable energy certificates) are expected to save about 60 Mt compared with the 
no policy approach. To fill the 91 Mt gap, Treasury modelling suggests that 15 per cent 
of the 2020 emissions reductions will come from international carbon pollution permits 
from developing countries, including clean energy projects, avoided deforestation, and 
so on.20 These are of course difficult to verify, but that is the concept.
The heavy reliance on foreign abatement credits to supplement domestic efforts will 
continue through to 2050. In July 2011 the Treasury released new modelling which 
looked at a range of energy scenarios (assuming a mix of energy efficiency and conser-
vation, renewable energy and fossil fuels, but excluding nuclear) and design features of 
a carbon pricing scheme.21 The core policy scenario assumes global action to stabilise 
CO2e at 550 ppm by the year 2100, which aligns with Australia’s current emissions 
reduction target of 80 per cent by 2050. The energy mix in 40 years is assumed to 
continue with a majority reliance on fossil fuels (black coal, oil and natural gas, about 
half of which makes use of carbon capture and storage technology), but with between 
35 and 47 per cent coming from renewables, up from an 11 per cent share today.22 
Alternatives: steady or declining Australian 
population? 
Standard policy analyses on emissions abatement involve the modelling of energy and 
economic growth pathways, and a conjecture about future population size. The default 
assumption is that population will continue to grow in the coming decades, with the 
mid-range estimate, as described above, being an increase from 22.7 million people in 
2011 to 31.3 million in 2050. Australia’s total fertility rate is currently 1.7823, which is the 
average number of children born to a woman if she were to survive through to the end 
of her reproductive life. This is below the replacement fertility rate, which for Australia 
(with a low mortality rate) is a little less than 2.124. Yet Australia’s population continues 
to grow at a rate of 1.15 per cent per year, due to our substantial net migration rate, 
recently six migrants per 1000 population. That is, without migration, Australia’s popu-
lation would now be contracting, not growing, as is already the case for many OECD 
nations with lower immigration rates, such as Germany, Italy, France, Sweden, Japan 
and Korea.26 
Because Australia’s population growth is now determined by migration policy, our 
future population trajectory is, in theory, “tuneable”, via adjustment of net migration 
rates, without any need for recourse to other forms of population control such as incen-
tives for fertility reductions. This situation allows us to pose an interesting hypothetical 
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question: can population policy be used to effectively mitigate Australia’s future green-
house gas emissions?
To put this question in a more exact form, assume that future government policy restricts 
net migration rates over the next few decades such that our population peaks at a little 
higher than today, and then declines thereafter, reaching a stable population size in 
2050 of 20 million people (ie, lower than the current size, and only 56 per cent of the 
forecast upper value of 35.9 million). Under this scenario, if projected rates of per capita 
productivity were to hold, despite the changed demographic assumptions, then, under 
BAU, Australia’s emissions would still rise to 780 Mt CO2e by 2050, an increase of 40 
per cent over 2000 levels. As a result, a transformation of energy generation systems 
towards a predominance of low-carbon technologies, improved energy efficiency and 
conservation, and/or lower economic growth, are still required for emissions cuts.
Clearly then, an ambitious population policy, operating in isolation, would prove to be 
insufficient to curb our greenhouse gas emissions. Demographic impetus means that 
human population size is slow to change, and therefore not a particularly effective 
“lever” for mitigating emissions. One reason for this sluggish momentum is that in 
Australia today, life expectancy is over 80 years, and almost 55 per cent of today’s 
population – 12.4 million people – are not yet 40 years old27. Thus, in 2050, most of 
these people will still be alive. No fertility or migration policy will alter this fact.
What matters most: technology transformation
The challenges to achieving a modern Australian society that is able to protect its 
natural environments and mitigate the worst effects of climate change are massive. 
These problems encompass substantive social, political, and economic issues. How 
can Australia – with 22.7 million people today and a likely larger population in the future 
– adapt to this changing landscape?
One idea, proposed in the early 1970s, is to adopt a “small is beautiful” philosophy 
and deploy appropriate technologies that are relatively simple and work on only local 
scales, but might eventually achieve a large bottom-up shift towards sustainability.28 
A related approach is to advocate for fundamental behavioural change in society. Yet 
this has patently not happened to date, and it remains difficult to envisage how any 
collective society would initiate such change, and then pursue it at sufficient pace and 
on a grand enough scale to make a difference, while at the same time upholding the 
democratic and liberal freedoms that Australians cherish.
The alternative is to seek shortcuts that can drive a more rapid transformation, based 
on major policy interventions on infrastructure, investment, and promotion of techno-
logical advances that result in broad-scale benefits to both human society and the 
environment.29 The concept of the “techno-fix” – the idea that social problems are 
more quickly and efficiently solved via application of technology rather than relying on 
a multitude of people to act rationally – is alien or anathema to most environmentalists, 
perhaps because it involves engagement with the neo-classical economic ideas of 
controversial environmental commentators like Simon30 and Lomborg31. 
Yet in a way, the recent analysis of Australia’s future carbon emissions abatement path-
ways by the Treasury32 can be seen as an endorsement of the pursuit of techno-fixes. In 
this case, a pathway for energy transformation was defined, and various technologies 
for low-carbon electricity generation were evaluated on the basis of their fit-for-service 
maturity, economic competitiveness and scalability. Indeed, most of the technologies 
that are postulated to be providing energy to a “large Australia” in 2050 are not yet 
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commercially viable – this includes large-scale implementation of carbon capture and 
storage for fossil fuel sources, engineered “hot dry rock” geothermal, and solar thermal 
power. This is surely a case of seeking novel technology to solve entrenched problems 
with old infrastructure.
Australia needs a bolder approach. For instance, we need to be seriously consider-
ing deploying advanced nuclear fission technologies alongside new renewables for 
stationary electricity and eventual decarbonisation of our transportation and industrial 
sectors. A recent analysis has shown, based on a meta-review of the authoritative 
international energy literature33, that inclusion of a tranche of 25 GWe of nuclear power 
within the Treasury modelling scenarios could totally obviate the need to source foreign 
carbon offsets, save up to $185 billion net in abatement costs by 2050, and result in 
Australia exceeding its emissions reduction goals.34
Modern nuclear reactor designs are efficient, with operational capacity exceeding 90 
per cent, and an extremely high degree of safety based on the inherent principles of 
physics (rather than being too reliant on over-engineered systems). In terms of costs 
and build times, standardised, modular, passive-safety designs may be key: these 
are relatively small (10 to 300 MWe), can be factory built, shipped to site, and built 
underground for security and protection from extremes. The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) 
technology developed by the US Argonne National Laboratory35 burns over 99 per 
cent of the nuclear fuel, leaves only a small amount of waste which decays to below 
background levels of radiation within 300 years, shuts itself down if the control systems 
fail or the operators walk away, and cannot be used to generate weapons-grade mate-
rial. The IFR, and other new small modular reactor designs36, seem ideally suited as a 
first entry point to nuclear for a technologically sophisticated nation like Australia. These 
offer enormous opportunities for innovation, thinking outside of the box, and building 
on our natural capital.
For instance, with an abundance of cheap, reliable and low-carbon electricity gen-
eration technologies, our future vision might include land sparing and repatriation to 
natural ecosystems, as a result of deployment of new forms of energy-intensive, tightly 
controlled and environmentally benign food production (eg, vertical farming and build-
ing-integrated agriculture)37. Similarly, the use of nuclear and solar-thermal industrial 
heat to run multi-stage flash distillation for desalination could supply ample fresh water 
to our cities38, without placing undue strain on river systems like the Murray-Darling, nor 
requiring further large water storages around our major capital cities. Science must play 
a crucial role in allowing decision makers to achieve a balance of the various priorities 
within each society, if sustainability of the Australian population is to be achieved.
Conclusion
The human population has grown enormously in recent centuries, from 650 million 
in the year 1700 AD39 to almost seven billion today. When coupled to our increasing 
economic expansion and concomitant rising demand for natural resources, this rapid 
expansion of the human enterprise has put a huge burden on the environment, fuelled 
by an accelerating depletion of fossil fuels and various high-grade ores and increasing 
environmental damage (now termed the “Anthropocene Epoch”40). Obviously, to avoid 
exhaustion of accessible natural resources, the wholesale degradation of ecosystems, 
and to counter the need to seek increasingly low-grade mineral resources, large-scale 
recycling of key materials like metals, and sustainable use of biotic systems, will need 
to be widely adopted. Of this axiom there can be little room for doubt.
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The large size of the present-day human population is clearly a major reason why we 
face mounting environmental problems and are now pushing hard against planetary 
boundaries like climate change, alteration of atmospheric chemistry, nitrogen and 
phosphorous cycles, chemical pollution, ocean acidification, biodiversity loss, and 
habitat degradation.41 But does it also follow that population control is the answer – the 
best solution – to solving these national and global problems? The conclusion that 
emerges from this essay is that while sound population policy is required, it will be too 
slow and ineffective to realise our climate and other environmental goals. We need to 
have major solutions well under way by 2050 and essentially concluded by 2100.
Figure 1.  
IMPACTs oF ClIMATE CHAnGE In AusTrAlIA by 2100 unDEr THE no-MITIGATIon 
CAsE.46 
Tasmania
Throughout the century warming has 
the beneficial effect of reducing 
annual cold-related deaths.  
Increased wind and storm events will 
reduce the number of Bass Strait 
sailings, affecting trade. 
Victoria 
The state’s wheat production will 
fall by nearly 25 per cent.
More than 50 per cent of habitat of 
Eucalypt species will be lost 
Australia-wide. 
South Australia
The state faces a 33 per cent decline in 
livestock productivity. 
By mid-century, the Australian wine industry 
will face a 40 per cent reduction in suitable 
growing area. Grape quality will also reduce. 
Northern Territory
Sea-level rises of 18-59 cm will adversely 
affect 90 per cent of the Kakadu wetland 
system.
The number of annual temperature-related 
deaths is expected to rise nearly sevenfold. 
Western Australia
About 34 per cent additional capital 
expenditure will be needed to 
provide alternative water supplies.
Over the course of the century, 
continued reductions in water 
availability will lead to increases in 
the cost of mining activity and 
temporary cutbacks in production. 
Australian Capital Territory
The number of annual temperature-
related deaths in the Australian 
Capital Territory is expected to 
decrease by 25 per cent.
About 17 per cent additional capital 
expenditure will be needed to provide 
alternative water supplies. 
Queensland
The Great Barrier Reef will no longer be 
dominated by corals or possess many of the 
organisms we recognise today.
The number of annual temperature-related 
deaths is expected to triple, from 1747 in a 
world without climate change to 5878.
Queensland’s coastal settlements are 
anticipated to suffer extreme infrastructure 
impacts from increased storm surge and 
localised flash flooding. 
New South Wales
The number of annual temperature-
related deaths is expected to decrease 
by 30 per cent.
Irrigated agricultural production in the 
Murray-Darling basin falls by 92 per 
cent. 
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A vast country like Australia, where population pressures are lower than places like 
Europe and Asia (even at 35.9 million people, Australia’s density will only be 4.7 people 
per km2), has more leeway than many nations in terms of population growth. Yet 
Australia is also the driest inhabited continent on Earth with the least fertile soils42, and 
is forecast to be heavily impacted by climate change. For instance, the Garnaut Climate 
Change Review states:
“ By mid-century, there would be major declines in agricultural production across 
much of the country. Irrigated agriculture in the Murray-Darling Basin would be likely 
to lose half of its annual output. This would lead to changes in our capacity to export 
food and a growing reliance on food imports, with associated shifts from export 
parity to import parity pricing.”43
Figure 1, also taken from the Garnaut review, summarises some of the major projected 
impacts of unmitigated global warming on Australia by 2100. Clearly, as we face a 
combination of a larger human population and severe climate change impacts, chal-
lenging times lie ahead. 
A large but sustainable Australian population will need to rely heavily on a mix of innova-
tion, efficiency, and techno-fixes. As discussed above, this should include adoption of 
advanced nuclear power systems (based on the full recycling of spent nuclear fuel), 
plasma-arch torches to treat municipal garbage (providing a syngas fuel and recovering 
metals from the waste stream)44, and efficient desalination techniques based on clean 
energy, to alleviate water stress. Obviously we must proceed with caution, but as Alvin 
Weinberg pointed out:
“ Technological fixes have unforeseen and deleterious side effects – but so do social 
fixes, especially revolutions”.45 
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3.1 Immigration and public opinion   p114 
 Andrew Markus
  This chapter provides analysis of polling of Australian attitudes toward population 
growth, size and composition as well as immigration. 
3.2  Social inclusion and multiculturalism: The impact of international  p134 
migration to Australia and its implications for public policy   
Graeme Hugo, Patricia Njuki and Sanjugta Vas Dev
  This chapter discusses the impact international migration has had in Australia and 
implications for public policy, especially policies to encourage social inclusion.
3.3 Linkages between education and productivity   p150 
 Dehne Taylor
  This chapter examines the linkages between productivity and the education  
system and the implications for an ageing Australia.
3.4  Healthcare delivery for our ageing population:  p162 
What does Australia need to do?   
Francesco Paolucci and Ian McRae
  This chapter discusses of the implications and options of caring for an ageing 
population, focusing on chronic conditions, their prevention and treatment.
Section 3.0
society and the individual
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3.1
Immigration and public opinion
Andrew Markus
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Extent of public opinion research in Australia
In Australia there has been considerable commercial polling – primarily for the print 
media – of issues related to immigration and population growth. However, there are 
problems with reliance on commercial polling. Such polls typically include three ques-
tions or fewer on immigration in the context of an omnibus survey exploring a range of 
other issues, do not utilise a consistent form of wording from one commercial agency 
to another, and the frequency is determined solely by the level of public interest. In 
some years there is no polling on immigration.1 
Academic and government surveys can provide greater depth. However, Australia 
lacks the tradition of sustained survey research that characterises work in Europe and 
North America.2 Professor Ian McAllister, past Director of the Research School of Social 
Sciences at the Australian National University, commented in 2005 that:
“ More than at any time in the past, the design of effective public policy requires 
the assistance of accurate, informed social surveys. What aspects of social policy 
concern people most? How do people view the reform of the health services? What 
level of immigration do most people regard as appropriate for Australian society? 
These and a host of other questions can only be properly addressed if we know 
what people feel about these issues and how their views are formed and have 
changed over time …Yet Australia, despite a long history of innovative policy-
making, has lagged behind other advanced societies in developing these critical 
empirical tools.”3
Leading overseas work includes the British Social Attitudes survey,4 the primary social 
research survey in Britain. It has been administered annually since 1983 to monitor 
and interpret the British public’s changing attitudes towards social, economic, political 
and moral issues. It uses a comprehensive questionnaire, is administered by trained 
interviewers and is completed by a sample of 3000 respondents. It has included a 
broad range of questions on immigration and race relations and made possible major 
research publications. In addition, wide-ranging citizenship surveys were conducted 
biennially in England and Wales between 2001 and 2006 and on a quarterly basis 
between 2007 and 2011, until halted by government economy measures. The first 
three citizenship surveys were each administered to some 15,000 respondents (includ-
ing a minority ethnic boost of 5000) in face-to-face interviews, taking approximately 60 
minutes to complete. 
The Canadian Department of Citizenship and Immigration has commissioned quar-
terly tracking surveys between 1996–2005 and annual surveys in 2006, 2007, 2009, 
and 20105. An Ethnic Diversity Survey,6 conducted in 2002 by Statistics Canada in 
conjunction with other departments, set a standard of excellence involving personal 
interviewing of 42,500 respondents, utilising a rigorous sample based on the 2001 
census. Within the EU, major surveys include the annual Eurobarometer,7 established 
in 1973, with a minimum of 1000 respondents in each member state, and the biennial 
European Social Survey,8 which reaches over 30,000 respondents. 
In Australia, while some surveying is conducted by government, the main source of 
long run or time series data is the relatively underfunded work of researchers at the 
Australian National University (ANU). 
ANU researchers conduct the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (AuSSA),9 which 
is presented as “Australia’s major academic social survey”. It has been conducted 
every two years since 2003 and contributes to the International Social Survey Program 
(ISSP)10 and the World Values Survey.11 It is a mailed, self-administered survey and 
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achieves some 4000 completions. Its value for the present study is limited as it includes 
few questions on immigration. 
The Australian Election Study (AES)12 is conducted by ANU researchers immediately 
following a federal election. The AES utilises a mailed, self-administered question-
naire and draws its sample from the computerised rolls of the Australian Electoral 
Commission. Completed responses are typically in the range of 1800–2000. The AES 
is of particular value in providing insight into the relative importance of political issues 
and for its questions on attitudes to the current level of immigration. 
The ANU Poll13 was started in 2008 and is planned to run on a quarterly basis, with 
the eleventh survey completed in September 2011. It is telephone based and reaches 
1000–1200 respondents. In addition to common questions across surveys (notably a 
question on the ranking of political issues), each survey focuses on a specific topic. 
The seventh poll, published in October 2010, covered population, immigration and 
ageing. 
A major recent development is the establishment of the Scanlon Foundation Social 
Cohesion Research program.14 To the present the program has yielded four national 
(2007, 2009, 2010, 2011) and two local surveys (2007, 2009). These surveys utilise 
random telephone sampling, reach a minimum of 2000 respondents, and employ a 
comprehensive range of questions on immigration issues. 
The following discussion presents analysis using a broad range of survey data to 
explore the nature and determinants of Australian opinion on immigration and popu-
lation issues. It is distinctive in placing Australian survey findings in an international 
perspective.
Attitudes to immigration, nations compared
There is substantial evidence to indicate that Australia and Canada rank as the devel-
oped nations most receptive to immigration. 
Comparing survey findings is an exercise beset with difficulty. The wording of questions 
differs between surveys; the context of the question within a questionnaire will almost 
always differ (raising the problem of the impact of question order); and where response 
to questions in different countries is considered, as in the following analysis, there is 
the problem of differences of meaning across cultures. A question may be identically 
worded, as in the World Values Surveys, but the meaning of words and phrases will 
differ from one country to another. Nonetheless, such an exercise can prove to be 
of value, as evidenced in the following discussion, which yields a large measure of 
consistency utilising three data sources. The objective is to consider the pattern of 
response to immigration issues within different countries. 
A key source for cross-national comparison is a survey conducted for the International 
Social Survey Program in 2003 (Table 1), which included a question on attitude to the 
level of immigration. Of 17 countries selected for analysis, Canada and Australia ranked 
at the top level, with over 60 per cent of respondents in support of the existing immigra-
tion intake or its increase. The next level of support was below 50 per cent, with the low 
points recorded in the United Kingdom (22 per cent) and Russia (18 per cent). 
A second comparative perspective is provided by the fourth wave of the World Values 
Survey, with attention to countries surveyed in 2005 and 2006. Respondents were 
presented with a list specifying characteristics of potential neighbours and were asked 
to “sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours”. The list included the 
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CoMbInED ‘InCrEAsE’  
AnD ‘rEMAIn THE sAME’
DECrEAsE
Canada 29% 39% 68% 32%
Australia 23% 38% 61% 39%
Spain 10% 39% 49% 52%
Denmark 10% 39% 49% 51%
United States 11% 32% 44% 56%
Portugal 3% 41% 44% 56%
New Zealand 16% 28% 43% 57%
Sweden 12% 30% 42% 58%
Ireland 9% 32% 41% 59%
Austria 7% 32% 39% 61%
France 8% 26% 34% 66%
Hungary 2% 29% 31% 69%
Germany – West 5% 24% 30% 70%
Netherlands 4% 26% 30% 70%
Norway 7% 22% 29% 71%
United Kingdom 6% 16% 22% 78%
Russia 4% 13% 18% 83%
Source: ISSP 2003. The Australian survey was completed by 2183 respondents and was in the field from 27 August to 24 December, 2003. The question 
employed a five point response frame: Do you think the number of immigrants to [COUNTRY] nowadays should be increased a lot; increased a little; remain 
the same; reduced a little; reduced a lot. Sub-totals may vary +/– one per cent due to rounding (ZA 2005).
Table 1 
ATTITuDE To IMMIGrATIon InTAKE, sElECTED CounTrIEs, 2003













Source: World Values Survey, online analysis
Table 2 
survEy rEsulTs – WoulD noT lIKE To HAvE An IMMIGrAnT/ 
ForEIGn WorKEr As A nEIGHbour, 2005–2006
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category immigrant/foreign worker. When responses from 12 countries were consid-
ered, only three per cent of Canadian respondents selected immigrant/foreign worker 
and only five per cent of Australian respondents, ranking the countries second and 
third. This compares with 33 per cent of Russian and 43 per cent of French respon-
dents indicating a negative view (Table 2).
A third international survey with relevance to immigration was conducted by the Ipsos 
global market research company in June 2011. It employed an online panel and was 
completed by 17,600 respondents in 23 European, North and South American, Asian, 
and the Middle Eastern countries15. Questions were asked with three options – positive, 
neither positive nor negative and negative – which produced a relatively high propor-
tion indicating the middle position. As in the preceding discussion, it is the ranking of 
countries that is of interest. 
In response to the proposition that: “Immigration has generally had a positive impact 
on [the respondent’s country]”, Canada ranked two and Australia five. The rank order 
of those indicating positive impact in the 23 countries was: India (43 per cent); Canada 
(39 per cent); Saudi Arabia (38 per cent); Sweden (37 per cent); and Australia (31 per 
cent).
In response to the proposition that: “Immigration is good for the economy of the 
[country]”, Canada ranked three and Australia five: Brazil (47 per cent); India (45 per 
cent); Canada (43 per cent); Saudi Arabia (41 per cent); and Australia (36 per cent).
In response to the proposition that: “Priority should be given to immigrants with higher 
education and qualifications who can fill shortages among certain professions”, Canada 
ranked one and Australia two: Canada (62 per cent); Australia (61 per cent); Great 
Britain (58 per cent); Saudi Arabia (58 per cent); and Russia (57 per cent).
A fourth question posed the proposition that: “Immigrants make [country] a more inter-
esting place to live”. Canada ranked two and Australia equal third: Brazil (49 per cent); 
Canada (48 per cent); Australia (46 per cent); India (46 per cent); and Sweden (44 per 
cent).
There are two important findings from these three surveys: the consistently high ranking 
of Canada and Australia, and the consistently higher ranking of Canada.16
Canada and Australia compared 
The depth of the Canadian survey data enables further exploration of attitudes to 
provide comparative insight into the trend of opinion in Australia. 
Canada maintained an annual permanent immigration intake in the range 220,000–
250,000 between 2000–2004, close to 250,000 between 2005–2009 and with a peak 
of 280,000 in 2010.17 This intake represented an annual contribution to population 
growth of between 0.7 per cent and 0.8 per cent and was maintained while unemploy-
ment peaked above 8.5 per cent in 2009 and remained above eight per cent in 2010. 
Despite this level of unemployment, there is continuing public support for immigration. 
A major trans-Atlantic survey provides additional comparative evidence of the strength 
of Canadian opinion. The Transatlantic Trends survey was conducted in eight countries 
in 2009 and 2010.18 It asked respondents if immigration was more of a problem or 
more of an opportunity for their country. Over the two surveys, an average of only 26 
per cent of Canadians responded that immigration was more of a problem, compared 
with an average of 50 per cent for the other seven countries (Table 3).
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Immigration tracking surveys indicate a steady decline in the proportion who consider 
that there are too many immigrants coming to Canada: an average of 45 per cent in 
1996, 37 per cent in 2001, 30 per cent in 2005, 27 per cent in 2009 and 23 per cent 
in 2010.19 20
Other time series data is provided by Gallup Canada and the Environics Research 
Group. Of 19 Gallup surveys conducted in Canada between 1975 and 2005, those 
who favoured a reduction in the intake was only above 50 per cent on one occasion, 
and on no occasion did it reach 60 per cent. The most recent Gallup poll, conducted 







United States 54% 52%
Spain 58% 53%
United Kingdom 66% 65%
Source: Transatlantic Trends 2010
Table 3 
survEy rEsulTs – IMMIGrATIon Is MorE oF A ProblEM THAn An oPPorTunITy
yEAr Too HIGH





1996 65% 31% 4% 5
1997 64% 28% 8% 1
1999 47% 51% 2% 1
2001 41% 54% 4% 1
2002 38% 59% 3% 2
2003 38% 57% 5% 1
2005 39% 56% 5% 1
2006 34% 63% 3% 1
2007 33% 60% 7% 2
2008 46% 53% 1% 1
2009 40% 54% 6% 2
2010 46% 50% 4% 6
2011 39% 55% 6% 1
Source: Phone and mail-out surveys, as cited by Goot 2011; Scanlon Foundation survey, 2011 (Markus 2011); AES data is derived from McAllister and 
Pietsch 2011. Where there was more than one poll in the year, results have been averaged.
Table 4 
ATTITuDEs To THE lEvEl oF IMMIGrATIon, AusTrAlIA, 1996–2011. sElECTED survEys
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The Environics Research Group polling between 1977–2010 tested opinion in response 
to a negative proposition: “Overall there is too much immigration to Canada.” Asked 
in this form, the question attracts a high negative response, but the changing pattern 
evident in the tracking and Gallup polls was replicated. From the late 1970s to the early 
1990s, there was majority agreement that immigration was too high; opinion was close 
to evenly divided in the 1990s; since 2000, majority opinion disagrees that there is too 
much immigration. The latest survey, conducted in 2010, registered a small increase 
in those of the view that there is too much immigration, up from 33 per cent to 40 per 
cent, compared with 56 per cent in disagreement.22
Australian polling, like Canada, has established increasing support for immigration, 
although there was a marginal decline after 2007. While opposition to immigration has 
decreased, the low numbers recorded in Canada are not matched: at the low point, 
33–34 per cent considered the intake to be too high, compared to 23–26 per cent 
in Canada. Further, there is greater volatility in Australian opinion. The high point of 
negative sentiment towards immigration was reached in five polls conducted between 
1991–1993, which registered an average of 73 per cent who considered the intake to 
be too high.23 In contrast, the average low point of 33 per cent was registered by two 
polls in 2007. 
Opinion since 2007 
There is evidence of an increase in negative sentiment towards immigration between 
2007–2010. While movement is within a narrow range, and does not approximate the 
negative levels of the early 1990s, there is a common pattern evident in commercial 
polling and three time series: the Australian Electoral Study, AustraliaSCAN and the 
Scanlon Foundation surveys.
The Australian Electoral Study recorded an increase in the proportion favouring a reduc-
tion in 2007–08 and 2010, from 35 per cent (in 2004) to 46 per cent to 52 per cent. 
AustraliaSCAN, conducted annually since 1996 by Quantum Market Research, includes 
several questions on immigration. In response to the proposition that “our population is 
large enough and we should stop all further immigration”, the level of strong agreement 
declined from just under 40 per cent in 1996 to close to 26 per cent in 2004. Since 
2004 there has been an increase and in 2010 the level of strong agreement was 36 per 
cent, the highest since 1996.24
The Scanlon Foundation surveys, conducted in 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2011, recorded 
statistically significant increases in the proportion indicating that the immigration intake 
was too high in 2010 (from 37 per cent to 47 per cent), and a statistically significant 
decrease between 2010 and 2011.
1996 1999 2001 2004 2007–08 2010
Increase a lot/increase a little 
and keep levels the same
36% 52% 63% 65% 54% 48%
Reduce a little/reduce a lot 63% 48% 37% 35% 46% 52%
Source: McAllister, Ian and Juliet Pietsch 2011, Trends in Australian political opinion. Results for the Australian election study, 1987–2010, The Australian 
National University. 
Table 5 
survEy rEsulTs – Do you THInK THE nuMbEr oF IMMIGrAnTs AlloWED In 
AusTrAlIA noWADAys sHoulD bE rEDuCED or InCrEAsED? 1996–2010
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Views on the value of a diverse intake, immigration 
categories and national groups
The Scanlon Foundation surveys make possible further exploration of Australian atti-
tudes. The surveys conducted between 2007–2011 asked respondents if “accepting 
immigrants from many different countries makes Australia stronger”. A large measure 
of consistency is indicated. Those who agree that immigrants from many different 
countries make Australia stronger, outnumber those who disagree by a ratio of more 
than 2:1, in 2011, 64 per cent agreed, 27 per cent disagreed. 
The 2010 and 2011 Scanlon Foundation surveys undertook detailed exploration of 
attitudes to immigrant categories and national groups. The results obtained by the two 
surveys are consistent.
Respondents were asked for their views on the main categories of permanent and 
long-stay immigrants (that is, those admitted under the Skill and Family Streams of the 
Too HIGH AbouT rIGHT Too loW rEFusED/ Don’T KnoW
2007 36% 41% 12% 11%
2009 37% 46%* 10% 7%*
2010 47%* 36% 10% 7%
2011 39%* 40% 14%* 6%
*Change statistically significant at p<.05
Source: Scanlon Foundation (Markus 2007–2011).
Table 6 
survEy rEsulTs – WHAT Do you THInK oF THE nuMbEr oF IMMIGrAnTs ACCEPTED 
InTo AusTrAlIA? 2007–2011
Table 7 
survEy rEsulTs – ACCEPTInG IMMIGrAnTs FroM MAny DIFFErEnT CounTrIEs 
MAKEs AusTrAlIA sTronGEr, 2007–2011
rEsPonsE 2007 2009 2010 2011
Strongly agree 21.9% 24.7% 19.1% 24.2%
Agree 45.1% 43.2% 43.3% 40.1%
sub-total agree 67 .0% 67 .9% 62 .4% 64 .3%
Neither agree or disagree 3.3% 3.1% 5.9% 6.4%
Disagree 18.1% 17.9% 18.6% 16.2%
Strongly disagree 7.8% 8.9% 10.9% 10.6%
sub-total disagree 25 .9% 26 .8% 29 .4% 26 .8%
Refused 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2%
None of the above/ don’t know 3.6% 1.9% 2.0% 2.4%
total 100% 100% 100% 100%
N (unweighted) 2012 2019 2021 2001
Source: Scanlon Foundation (Markus 2007–2011).
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Migration Program and overseas students), as well as their views on refugees admitted 
after selection overseas.
The most positive attitudes are towards immigrants admitted on the basis of skill, with 
78 per cent in support, 14 per cent neutral and eight per cent opposed. However, the 
views towards the other three categories were almost as favourable. In 2011, positive 
attitudes outnumber negative by a ratio close to 8:1 for refugees and family and 6:1 for 
students. More positive attitudes were indicated in 2011 towards refugees (73 per cent 
positive) and those who enter under the family stream (71 per cent).
Respondents were also asked to indicate attitudes towards specific national groups. 
In all countries of immigration there is a hierarchy of ethnic preference, which informs 
attitudes to newcomers, at times determining categories of admission and exclusion. 
For much of the twentieth century, there was a large degree of consistency in the 
status hierarchy within Australian society, with immigrants from the United Kingdom 
and other English-speaking countries ranked at the top, northern Europeans next, fol-
lowed by other Europeans. Non-Europeans were denied entry for permanent residence 
until reform between 1966 and the late 1970s brought the White Australia policy to an 
end. 
There has been little attention in Australian opinion polling to status hierarchies since 
the 1980s, and even in the 1970s and 1980s, polls asked imprecise and ambiguous 
questions. 
The 2010 and 2011 Scanlon Foundation surveys asked respondents if their feelings 
were positive, negative or neutral towards immigrants from 12 national groups, com-
prising English-speaking, European, Asian and Middle East countries. 
The results indicate low levels of negative feeling and consistency between the 2010 
and 2011 surveys. When questioned with regard to feelings towards immigrants from 
specific Middle Eastern countries, negative sentiment reached 24 per cent for immi-
grants from Iraq (26 per cent in 2010), 24 per cent (23 per cent) for Lebanon, and a 
considerably lower 14 per cent (11 per cent) for Egypt. The high reading of 24 per cent 
Figure 1 
survEy rEsulTs – Do you FEEl PosITIvE, nEGATIvE or nEuTrAl AbouT  
(CATEGory) CoMInG To lIvE In AusTrAlIA As A PErMAnEnT or lonG-TErM 
rEsIDEnT? 2010–2011



















2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011
Skilled
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is close to the indication of negative sentiment obtained in the survey towards those 
of the Muslim faith, indicating that attitudes towards Muslims in all likelihood inform 
attitudes to immigrants from Iraq and Lebanon.
In contrast, the level of negative sentiment towards immigrants from English-speaking 
countries (England, New Zealand and the United States) and European countries (Italy, 
Greece and Germany) averaged less than three per cent. Negative sentiment towards 
immigrants from Asian countries averaged 11 per cent. 
It is notable that in both the 2010 and 2011 surveys more than 95 per cent of respon-
dents are positive or neutral towards immigrants from Italy and Greece, more than 90 
per cent towards Vietnamese and more than 85 per cent towards Chinese. 
These findings point to a substantial change in Australian attitudes in a relatively short 
period of time. Continental Europeans, who were the target of hostility in the 1950s and 
1960s, and immigrants from Asia whose entry to Australia was much questioned in 
the 1980s, are now seen in a positive or neutral light by a large majority of Australians. 
While one in four admit to negative feelings towards immigrants from Lebanon and 
Iraq, those with positive and neutral attitudes are the clear majority.
Future population targets
A number of polls in 2010 asked questions with regard to future population. There are 
indications that such questions are too abstract to obtain reliable readings of public 
opinion. 
The Third Intergenerational Report was released by the Treasury in February 2010. 
It projected a population of 35.9 million by 2050. This projection sparked extensive 
and polarised public debate, which was waged between what came to be termed 
advocates for a “Big Australia” and “Small Australia”, with little understanding that the 
Intergenerational Report’s projection was relatively conservative and based on the con-
tinuation of trends of the last 40 years.
Figure 2 
survEy rEsulTs – WoulD you sAy your FEElInGs ArE PosITIvE, nEGATIvE or 
nEuTrAl ToWArDs IMMIGrAnTs FroM [CounTry]? 2010–2011
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A number of surveys sought to establish attitudes to the projected population of 35.9 
million. One approach provided a set of numbers (25, 30, 35, 40 million) and asked 
which represented the best population target. 
Such questions make little sense to those polled. Respondents lack the knowledge to 
make an informed judgment and, as to be expected in such a context, responses are 
ranged along a normal curve – that is, the most common response is at the mid-point 
of the range of options presented to respondents, then either side of the mid-point, 
with a small proportion selecting the extreme or outer positions. The results obtained 
by Lowy and Morgan polls conducted in March 2010 are presented in Figure 3.25 26
This pattern of response and its meaning seemingly escaped the media, which chose 
to interpret the findings as indicating lack of support for a “Big Australia”. Thus the find-
ings of the Lowy survey were presented by ABC News under the headline: “Australians 
wary of 36m population target” and by The Australian as: “Two-thirds of population are 
opposed to Big Australia”.
The 2010 Scanlon Foundation survey took a different approach. Respondents were 
asked for views on the much discussed 36 million projection, not a range of possible 
numerical targets. The question employed a five-point scale, ranging from much too 
large to much too small. Fifty-one per cent of respondents indicated that 36 million was 
too large, 37 per cent that it was about right and five per cent that it was too small. 
This result is only marginally different from the view on the current level of immigra-
tion and points to the likelihood that questions on future population are linked in the 
minds of respondents to the current level of immigration: that is, those respondents 
who consider the current intake to be too high are likely to view targets indicating 
substantial population growth as too high, with a similar distribution pattern in response 
to the about right and too low options. The correlated pattern of response is indicated 
in Figure 4. On the basis of this finding, it is argued that questions concerning the 
current immigration intake provide the best indicator of receptivity to future population 
growth.
Figure 3 















50/+; 35/+  million40/30; 35 million30/25; 30 millionCurrentReduce
Morgan
Source: Hanson 2010: 18; Roy Morgan Research, Finding number 4482, March 2010.
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The relative importance of immigration issues 
Most surveys simply establish levels of positive and negative response. Contrary to 
such an approach, it is argued that it is also necessary to establish the importance of 
a specific issue. We need to know, for example, not only that a certain proportion of 
respondents are of a specific view, but also the importance of the issue and the way 
that it changes over time. Three sets of time series data are utilised in the following 
discussion. 
The best long-run data is provided by Newspoll surveys conducted for The Australian. 
Newspoll presents respondents with a number of specified issues (typically 15 in 
number) and asks for an indication of the importance of each issue. 
From 2000 to 2006, immigration was included as one of the specified issues; the 
finding obtained ranked immigration near the bottom in most surveys. In the context 
of the 2010 election, Newspoll included the asylum issue, but not immigration. Asylum 
ranked sixth of 10 specified issues. While it was well below the top ranked issue, it was 
above interest rates, inflation, climate change, and industrial relations. 
A second time-series is provided by the Australian Election Study. The AES survey typi-
cally specifies 13–14 issues and asks “which of these issues has been most important 
to you” (1993), or “most important to you during the election campaign” (1998–2010). 
Immigration was specified in five surveys between 1996 and 2007–08, with the highest 
registration of 4.5 per cent in 2001. Refugees/asylum seekers was specified in three 
surveys, 2001, 2004 and 2010. During the so-called “Tampa election” of 2001, in which 
asylum and border control was much discussed, 13 per cent of respondents indicated 
that the issue was “most important” to them, markedly higher than the ranking of 
immigration, but still in fourth place (Table 9).
The ANU Poll provides the most frequent soundings for the years 2008–2011 (Table 
10). It employs an open-ended question and codes responses within generic categories 
Figure 4 










Refused/ Don't knowToo small/ too lowAbout rightToo large/ too high
What do you think of the number of immigrants 
accepted into Australia at present?
In your view, would an Australian 
population of 36 million by 2050 be ….?
Source: Scanlon Foundation (Markus 2010).
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
126
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
127
S E C T I O N  3 . 1
for the question: “What do you think is the most important problem facing Australia?” 
Immigration, population and asylum issues are all coded within the category immigra-
tion. The poll charts the growing significance of immigration and asylum. The proportion 
nominating immigration as the first ranked issue averaged under five per cent in 2008, 
in the range of five per cent – 10 per cent in 2009 and in the range 10 per cent – 15 per 
cent in 2010. In April–May 2011 immigration was ranked as the top issue, selected by 
20 per cent of respondents. This finding was interpreted as possibly reflecting media 
attention to unrest in the Villawood Detention Centre during the period of survey admin-
istration. Immigration declined to third place in September 2011, nominated by 16 per 
cent of respondents. 
The broad pattern that holds across the surveys, irrespective of the different method-
ologies, is that in most years immigration and asylum are ranked low in significance; in 




















Health & Medicare 74% 77% 74% 77% 82% 83% 79% 82% 79%
Education 78% 79% 79% 77% 80% 79% 78% 77% 72%
Economy 67% 72% 74% 70%
Water planning 74% 66%
Welfare and social issues 60% 61% 58% 60% 59% 59% 61% 59%
Family issues 63% 61% 63% 59% 61% 59%
National security 66% 60% 49% 57% 54%
Environment 64% 61% 63% 60% 60% 60% 63% 57%
Leadership 61% 62% 59% 57% 65% 55% 57% 56% 62%
Climate change 55% 40% 43%
Defence 44% 50% 46% 54% 51%
Industrial relations 38% 37% 35% 32% 31% 53% 38% 35% 42%
Unemployment 65% 63% 61% 60% 55%
Taxation 57% 58% 56% 51% 57% 54%
Interest rates 53% 43% 46% 44% 50% 51% 45%
Inflation 52% 40% 41% 41% 40% 45% 43%
Women’s issues 38% 41% 37% 43% 46% 41%
Immigration 36% 50% 49% 43% 35% 43%
Asylum 50%
Aboriginal issues 34% 28% 25% 27% 26% 27%
Source: Newspoll for the Australian
Table 8 
PErCEnTAGE WHo AnsWErED vEry IMPorTAnT or FAIrly IMPorTAnT In rEsPonsE To THE quEsTIon: 
WoulD you sAy EACH oF THE FolloWInG IssuEs Is vEry IMPorTAnT, FAIrly IMPorTAnT or noT 
IMPorTAnT on HoW you PErsonAlly WoulD voTE In A FEDErAl ElECTIon? 2000–2010
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is raised to the mid-level. But even at such times, a large proportion of respondents 
do not select immigration/asylum as their top issue. Its peak in the ANU Poll is 20 per 
cent, compared to a peak in the same poll of 53 per cent for the economy in March 
2009. Similarly, the Australian Electoral Study recorded a peak of 42 per cent for the 
GST issue in 1998 and 30 per cent for health issues in 2004, but a peak of only 13 per 
cent for asylum and five per cent for immigration.
1993 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007–08 2010
Unemployment 27.2% 13.4% 8.8% 3.8% 1.9% 2.2% 3.3%
Interest rates 6.0% 9.8% 1.5% 9.4% 7.0% 7.2%
Education 6.5% 11.2% 5.8% 17.0% 15.0% 10.5% 12.6%
Environment 4.0% 5.1% 2.9% 3.7% 5.5% 7.7% 4.6%
Taxation 18.3% 23.2% 16.3% 16.4% 11.0% 7.3%
GST 22.6% 42.0% 12.8%
Health and Medicare 6.4% 25.5% 9.9% 16.1% 30.2% 20.5% 23.0%
Immigration 4.0% 2.8% 4.5% 1.8% 2.9%
Refugees, asylum seekers 13.0% 2.7% 5.6%
Population policy 1.0%



























Economy/ jobs 17.6% 26.3% 21.6% 52.6% 41.7% 32.4% 16.7% 16.9% 18.5% 18.2% 22.1%
Interest rates 6.7% 4.3% 2.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.5% 1.0%
Housing affordability 6.9% 3.6% 3.0% 0.2% 0.6% 1.3% 1.6% 1.5% 1.0%
Environment/ global 
warming
19.1% 22.7% 17.9% 12.0% 10.1% 13.6% 12.2% 15.3% 12.4% 10.8% 9.8%
Water management 8.4% 5.2% 5.7% 2.4% 3.7% 3.5% 2.9% 2.5% 0.6%
Better government 3.2% 3.8% 3.2% 3.8% 3.3% 4.7% 9.9% 9.0% 17.6%
Immigration 5.8% 3.0% 3.2% 6.0% 9.3% 6.6% 12.8% 13.8% 11.6% 20.1% 15.8%
Increasing/ ageing 
population
0.2% 1.0% 0.7% 3.6% 2.6% 3.2% 1.8%
Health care 4.5% 5.4% 7.1% 2.6% 4.8% 6.8% 13.1% 6.3% 6.9% 4.2% 2.7%
Law and order/ crime/ 
justice system
1.5% 2.6% 2.5% 2.1% 3.6% 5.4% 2.5% 2.9% 1.6%
Source: ANU Poll
Table 9 
survEy rEsulTs – WHICH oF THEsE IssuEs HAs bEEn MosT IMPorTAnT To you 
(1993), or MosT IMPorTAnT To you DurInG THE ElECTIon CAMPAIGn (1998–2010)
Table 10 
survEy rEsulTs – WHAT Do you THInK Is THE MosT IMPorTAnT ProblEM FACInG 
AusTrAlIA ToDAy? sElECTED IssuEs, 2008–2011
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A more precise indication of relative significance of issues is provided by the 2010 and 
2011 Scanlon Foundation surveys (Table 11). Respondents were asked in an open-
ended question: “What do you think are the most important problems facing Australia 
today?” There was a large measure of consistency with the ANU Poll findings. The 
economy ranked first (22 per cent in 2010, 26 per cent in 2011), followed by the envi-
ronment (15 per cent, 18 per cent) and quality of government/politicians (11 per cent, 
13 per cent); immigration and population issues ranked close to fourth (seven per cent, 
seven per cent) and a similar proportion (six per cent, seven per cent) of respondents 
selected asylum issues. If immigration and asylum issues are combined (as in the ANU 
Poll), the issue is ranked third, but at a relatively low level – selected by little more than 
one in eight respondents as the “most important problem”.
The Scanlon Foundation surveys add a dimension not available in other polling: they 
record whether respondents are indicating positive or negative sentiment. Without 
such detail, it may wrongly be assumed that those selecting immigration are concerned 
that the level of intake is too high, and that those selecting asylum have negative views. 
Attention to direction of response indicates that with immigration and asylum combined 
9.2 per cent of respondents are negative and 4.3 per cent sympathetic, with a sharper 
division on the asylum issue – four per cent of respondents are negative but close to 
three per cent are concerned by poor treatment and indicate sympathy.
Explaining public opinion 
When sections of the population more and less likely to support immigration are con-
sidered, there is a large degree of commonality in results obtained in Canada, Australia, 
and the United Kingdom.27 
Reitz’s Canadian research yields the conclusion that “education is the most impor-
tant personal characteristic related to support for current levels of immigration”. Other 
sectors of the population more likely to support immigration are younger age groups, 
those in full-time employment and men.28
Australian statistical modelling undertaken by Goot and Watson indicates that:
Men are more likely to support immigration than women; •	
Immigrants of non-English speaking background more than immigrants of English •	
speaking background, and both more than Australian-born; 
University educated more than those with a trade qualification or no post-school •	
qualification; 
High income earners more than those on low and middle incomes; •	
Residents of metropolitan areas more than residents in country towns; and•	
Supporters of the Greens more than Labor, and both more than Liberal and •	
National. 
In one respect their analysis differs from other analyses, in that they found age not to 
be a significant variable.29
Statistical analysis of the 2009 Scanlon Foundation survey indicates that positive views 
are most likely to be held by those under the age of 34, and the linked demographics of 
those who have never married and are students; those of non-English-speaking back-
ground; those who indicate that their financial circumstances are “prosperous” or that 
they are “living very comfortably”; those who hold a university level qualification and the 
linked demographic of those who are employed in a professional capacity; those who 
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1 Economy/ unemployment/ poverty 22.2% 25.5%





Environment – overreaction to climate 
change/ carbon tax (sceptical)
6.3%
3 Quality of government/ politicians 11.2% 12.7%




Immigration/population – too low/ need 
more people (supportive)
1.7%
5 Asylum seekers – too many/ refugees/ 





Asylum seekers – poor treatment, sympathy 
towards refugees/ boat people/ illegal 
immigrants
2.6%
6 Social issues – (family, child care, drug 
use, family breakdown, lack of personal 
direction, etc)
6.4% 6.0%
7 Health/ medical/ hospitals 5.6% 4.2%
8
Housing shortage/ affordability/ interest 
rates
2.1% 3.1%
9 Crime/ law and order 3.8% 1.7%
10 Racism 1.1% 1.6%
10 Education/ schools 2.2% 1.4%
12 Indigenous issues 0.1% 0.8%
13 Industrial relations/ trade unions na 0.6%
14 Defence/ national security/ terrorism na 0.5%
15 Other/ nothing/ don’t know 16.1% 10.8%
Total 100% 100%
N (unweighted) 2021 2001
Source: Scanlon Foundation (Markus 2010–2011)
Table 11 
survEy rEsulTs – WHAT Do you THInK ArE THE MosT IMPorTAnT ProblEMs FACInG 
AusTrAlIA ToDAy? 2010, 2011
participate in a religious service at least once a month; and those who indicate that they 
are likely to vote Greens).30
Explaining change over time in national opinion is a more challenging undertaking than 
considering demographic variables. 
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
130
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
131
S E C T I O N  3 . 1
The strongest predictor of change is the economic environment. Negative views of 
immigration peak at times of increasing and high unemployment. In the early 1990s, for 
example, as the level of unemployment in Australia increased from 5.8 per cent to 10.7 
per cent, those who considered that immigration was too high formed a large majority, 
as has been discussed.
An important secondary factor is the extent to which immigration becomes a contro-
versial issue in national politics. Negative sentiment increases when a political party 
criticises government handling of immigration and campaigns for a change in policy, 
evident, for example, during debates over Asian immigration (1980s) and the period of 
prominence of Pauline Hanson (1998). 
The increasing support for the immigration policies of the Howard Government was 
linked to its success in establishing its border control credentials, conveying the 
surety that its policies on immigration and asylum were serving the national interest, 
not sectional groups. The perception of subservience to sectional interests bedevilled 
the Hawke and Keating Governments. Also of major importance for the success of 
the Howard Government was the decline in unemployment and sustained economic 
growth.31 
What, then, happened to explain the moderate fall in support for immigration between 
2007–2010?
Economic concerns seem not to have been a key factor. The Global Financial Crisis 
had unexpected limited impact on the Australian labour market, with unemployment 
increasing from 4.2 per cent in July 2008 to a peak of 5.8 per cent in December 
2009. Scanlon Foundation surveying of the sense of economic security indicated no 
significant change between 2007 and 2010.
Three factors seem to have been the key contributors to the limited shift in opinion.
First, the issue of asylum seekers arriving by boat gained increasing attention from 
2008 onwards. Boat arrivals brought the issue of immigration to national prominence. 
Factor analysis of the 2011 Scanlon Foundation survey establishes a strong associa-
tion between views on asylum and immigration. Negative views of boat arrivals are 
correlated with negative views on the value of a diverse immigrant intake, government 
handling of the asylum issue, Muslims, the current immigration intake and government 
support to ethnic minorities to maintain their customs and traditions.
Second, consideration of future population levels sparked by government planning, 
following the release of the Third Intergenerational Report, also brought discussion 
of immigration into the public realm. In the 2010 election campaign the Opposition 
under the leadership of Tony Abbott campaigned for a reduction in immigration, with 
government ministers on the defensive as they sought to explain that changes already 
implemented would result in a reduction. 
Third, the asylum and “Big Australia” controversies developed in the context of the gov-
ernment’s weakening electoral legitimacy, and contributed to that process. A key issue 
for acceptance or opposition to immigration policy is the extent to which government 
is seen to be in control of the program. Between June 2009 and June 2010 confidence 
in the Federal Government fell sharply; those of the view that government would “do 
the right thing for the Australian people” “almost always” or “most of the time” fell from 
48 per cent to 31 per cent.
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Conclusion
We have an understanding of the extent to which support for immigration may be 
eroded. Surveys in the United Kingdom in 2003 and 2009–11 indicate a level of support 
for current levels of immigration in the range 22–25 per cent.
This low level of support occurred in a context in which the perception of race relations/ 
immigration as the “most important issue today” increased 13-fold between 1997 and 
2006, from three per cent to 40 per cent.32
The pattern of international polling considered above indicates that of first world 
countries, public support for immigration was highest in Canada and Australia, rivalled 
at times only by Sweden. Where the level of support for immigration in the United 
Kingdom is in the range 22–25 per cent, in Canada and Australia it has been supported 
by majority opinion over the last decade.
Australian surveys indicate that the significance of the immigration issue increased in 
the period 2008–2010, but even at its peak (registered in one survey) it was selected 
as the top ranked issue by only 20 per cent of respondents. The Scanlon Foundation 
surveys in 2010 and 2011 found that it was ranked first by 14 per cent, of whom 
one-third were concerned not by the level of immigration, but by harsh government 
policies.
Opinion on immigration has been shown to be volatile in Australia. But the high level 
of support for a non-discriminatory immigration program has been maintained, along 
with positive valuation of immigration. In the 2011 Scanlon Foundation survey over 65 
per cent agreed or strongly agreed that: “Accepting immigrants from different countries 
makes Australia stronger”. 
The major challenges in 2012 concern policy to be adopted towards asylum seekers 
arriving by boat and an issue linked in the minds of many Australians, the integration of 
Muslim immigrants in Australian society.
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InCrEAsE rEMAIn THE sAME
(InCrEAsE & rEMAIn  
THE sAME)
DECrEAsE
2003 6% 16% 22% 78%
2009–10 3% 19% 22% 78%
2011 6% 20% 25% 73%
Source: World Values survey 2003; Citizenship Survey 2009–10; Migration Observatory/ Ipsos MORI 2011
Table 12 
survEy rEsulTs – ATTITuDEs To THE lEvEl oF IMMIGrATIon, unITED KInGDoM
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Introduction
Population initiatives should be integrated with, and facilitate, economic, social and 
environmental policies which seek to achieve important national goals. One such 
national goal is to achieve a socially inclusive society “in which all Australians feel valued 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the life of society”.1 Since migrants, 
permanent and temporary, and their Australia-born children make up almost half of 
the national population they must loom large in any consideration of disadvantage 
in Australia. While migrants vary greatly in their human and material capital they have 
been identified as one of the groups most at risk of social exclusion.2 
In the 1970s, Australia adopted a policy of multiculturalism following the recommenda-
tions of the Galbally (1978) Report.3 The report enunciated a set of principles which 
have formed the basis of that policy over the subsequent period in which multicultural-
ism has survived a number of challenges.4 These included:
All members of our society must have equal opportunity to realise their full potential •	
and must have equal access to programs and services; 
Every person should be able to maintain his or her culture without prejudice or dis-•	
advantage and should be encouraged to understand and embrace other cultures; 
Needs of migrants should, in general, be met by programs and services available to •	
the whole community but special services and programs are necessary at present 
to ensure equality of access and provision; and
Services and programs should be designed and operated in full consultation with •	
clients, and self-help should be encouraged as much as possible with a view to 
helping migrants to become self-reliant quickly.
These principles have a strong social inclusion basis and have been important in facili-
tating most migrants settling successfully in Australia. The most recent enunciation of 
Australia’s Multicultural Policy5 continues this focus. Nevertheless despite what has in 
many respects been a successful policy, not all migrants have fared well in Australia. 
This is especially so for recent groups of humanitarian migrants who have been strug-
gling to find employment and have been identified at great risk of poverty and social 
exclusion6 Some migrants experience multiple barriers to inclusion in Australian society 
and this paper seeks to adopt a social inclusion approach to examining disadvantage 
among migrant communities. One advantage of such an approach is that it comprises 
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a broader definition of disadvantage than focusing only on poverty.7 Silver (2010) 
suggests this framework is especially appropriate in considering migrant settlement 
because it accommodates social, cultural, or national “differences” in plural or multicul-
tural societies like Australia more readily than one-dimensional redistributive frameworks 
as it acknowledges and accommodates specific needs and rights of groups.
This paper examines social inclusion in four areas of migrant settlement in Australia:
Improving employment outcomes for migrants especially recent humanitarian •	
migrants;
Interventions for migrant children and youth who are at risk;•	
Dealing with racism and discrimination; and•	
Locational disadvantage and regional migrant settlement.•	
It also identifies some other key critical areas that need more attention in the area of 
international migrant settlement in Australia.
What is social inclusion?
A socially inclusive society is defined as one where all people feel valued, their differ-
ences are respected, and their basic needs are met so they can live in dignity. At the 
core of the social inclusion philosophy is the understanding that, although ultimately 
citizens are responsible for their own lives and everyone has a duty to work hard and 
make a go of it; not everyone starts with the same advantages and some people face 
setbacks or crises in their lives that can result in them being left behind. The concept 
of social inclusion is the process of being included in social, economic, political and 
cultural systems which contribute to the integration of a person in the community.8 
An important dimension of social inclusion is that it includes dimensions of disadvan-
tage beyond poverty and lack of financial capital.9 Also central to social inclusion is the 
recognition that social problems are interrelated and any response to ameliorate these 
social problems also must be interrelated.10 For example, close to five per cent of the 
Australian population experiences multiple disadvantage which includes low income 
and assets, low skills, difficulties keeping a job, housing stress, poor health, lack of 
access to services, substance abuse, mental illness, disability, family violence or a 
combination of these problems.11 In Australia, members of the Aboriginal community, 
the homeless, people with disability or those struck by family breakdowns and the long 
term unemployed have all be identified at risk of disadvantage. Humanitarian migrants 
have also been identified as persons at risk of disadvantage.12 
The development of social inclusion as a policy 
framework in Australia
Social inclusion as a policy framework has its origins in France in the 1970s where 
there was recognition that some social groups were excluded from employment and 
therefore social support. The proponents of the policy advocated for vulnerable social 
groups, through social inclusion, to gain assistance in employment, volunteering, study 
and family reunification, so that they could be productive members of the society. Social 
inclusion as a policy framework was later adopted by the European Union as a policy 
that promotes the involvement of all people in the labour force, access to basic rights 
and improving policy efficiency.13 In the United Kingdom, the social inclusion policy 
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framework has focussed on increased educational attainment and health, increased 
employment, reduction of poverty and the enhancement of services.14 
In 2002, the Labor Government in South Australia drew upon the experience of the UK 
Government which had created a Social Exclusion Department that reported directly 
to the prime minister and was mandated to assist the disadvantaged but they were 
also pioneering work on a “joined up” government. “Joined up” government was a 
revolutionary new way of ensuring that government departments came together in 
a creative and innovative way to deliver results to social problems among the most 
vulnerable members of society. Whereas under traditional models of service delivery, 
access to services were fragmented, for example, a youth at risk would be catered for 
under different government departments such as educational services, child protection 
services, employment services, the juvenile court system, drug and alcohol services 
and housing services, many times without any real assistance. This “third way of gov-
ernment” differed from the traditional models of service delivery as the services all came 
under one umbrella to serve the individual as opposed to the individuals navigating 
through a maze of services and programs in order to get assistance. This model also 
eliminates the duplication of services and it offers a more targeted approach to assist-
ing the vulnerable and was adopted by the South Australian Government.15 
In 2008, social inclusion as a policy framework was adopted nationally and since then 
the Australian Government has had a vision to ensure that it creates a socially inclusive 
society. The core aims of the Australian Social Inclusion Agenda are to reduce disad-
vantage by ensuring that there is funding and service delivery that promotes equitable 
access to universal benefits and services for all Australians. This includes making sure 
that investments are made more intensively for those at risk of experiencing disadvan-
tage. The Social Inclusion Agenda also aims to increase the social, civic and economic 
participation of all, by ensuring that everyone has the skills and support they need 
to participate actively in the labour market and their communities. A third aim of the 
Social Inclusion Agenda is to promote the active involvement of the entire community 
in identifying the needs and shaping services of the community.16 
Migrants and poverty
More than three decades ago a landmark Commission of Inquiry into Poverty in 
Australia17 identified recently arrived migrants from non-English-speaking countries as 
being one of the sub-groups with an above-average incidence of poverty. It found that 
in 1973, among non-English-speaking origin immigrants who had arrived in Australia 
after 1966, some 12.3 per cent were below the poverty line whereas this applied to 6.7 
per cent of all income units in Australia. Subsequently, Johnson18 estimated the extent 
of poverty among immigrants and found that the overall gap between Australian-
born and immigrant income units below the poverty line was relatively small in 1982 
but increased by 1986. An analysis in 200119 found that migrant households were 
over-represented in households living in poverty, especially those from Culturally and 
Linguistically Diverse (CALD) backgrounds. The work of Lloyd, Harding and Payne20 
was also based on the 2001 census and is shown in Figure 1. It indicates that CALD 
groups have a higher incidence of poverty than the Australia-born while those from 
English-speaking backgrounds have a lower incidence.
While we are lacking recent specific data on the proportions of recent immigrants 
living in poverty, we can make the following observations on immigrants and poverty 
in Australia:
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
138
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
139
S E C T I O N  3 . 2
There is evidence that throughout much of the post-war period in Australia, recent •	
immigrants have had a greater incidence of poverty than the Australia-born and 
immigrants of longer standing;
The incidence of poverty is greater among some immigrant policy categories (refu-•	
gees, family migrants) than others (economic, skill migrants);
With an increasing emphasis on skill in the immigration program the incidence of •	
poverty among recently arrived migrants has decreased;
The incidence of poverty among immigrant groups declines with their length of •	
settlement in Australia;
The incidence of poverty in Australia among both immigrant and non-immigrant •	
populations is closely related to their ability to enter the labour market; and
There is a significant spatial dimension with migrants living in poverty being concen-•	
trated in particular ecological niches.
Turning to the 2006 population census, Table 1 presents data on the income levels of 
the Australia-born population and compares them to several migrant groups.
Those born in countries where the dominant language is English;•	
Those born in culturally and linguistically diverse countries;•	
Those born in countries which are the major sources of refugee-humanitarian set-•	
tlers; and
Those from countries other than those which are the main sources of refugee-•	
humanitarian settlers.
A clear pattern is in evidence with immigrants from mainly English speaking coun-
tries having higher average incomes not only than migrants from other countries but 
also the Australia-born. The census does not include a question which differentiates 
the type of visa under which migrants enter Australia. However, it has been shown21 
that there is almost total separation of the countries of origin of refugee-humanitarian 
migrants and those who came under economic migration programs. Hence it is pos-
sible to designate a number of birthplace groups as being predominantly made up 
of Refugee-Humanitarian migrants. Accordingly, Table 1 shows that this group has a 
higher proportion in lower income categories than other migrant groups. 
It is important to note that in Australia’s intake of permanent settlers the balance 
between visa categories has changed substantially over the last two decades. This is 
evident in Figure 2 which shows the numbers of settlers each year who have arrived 
in Australia with skill, family and refugee-humanitarian visas. There is a clear pattern 
Figure 1 
EsTIMATED PovErTy rATEs by CounTry oF bIrTH oF HEAD oF FAMIly, 2001







Source: Lloyd, Harding and Payne, 2004
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
138
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
139
S E C T I O N  3 . 2
of both the numbers and proportion made up by skilled migrants is increasing. While 
most standard data sources don’t differentiate the overseas born by the visa category 
under which they entered Australia, recent work linking census and DIAC data for 
immigrants arriving between 2001 and 2006 has provided important insights into the 
significance of the visa category in the settlement experience of recent immigrants. 
Table 2 shows the individual income of recently arrived migrants at the 2006 census.22 
It is notable that humanitarian settlers had the smallest percentage of all groups who 
had zero or negative incomes.
This was partly because, unlike other visa categories of settlers, they have immediate 
access to unemployment benefits. However, it is noticeable in Table 2 that almost 
half (49.7 per cent) of humanitarian settlers were earning less than $250 per week 
compared with 19 per cent of all recent arrivals. There can be no doubt, as Collins 
points out:
Figure 2 
AusTrAlIA: sETTlEr ArrIvAls AnD onsHorE PErMAnEnT ADDITIons by ElIGIbIlITy 













Negative/Nil 7.9 7.1 6.3 11.6 9.7 9.7
$1–$249 22.9 22.1 19.0 27.9 33.0 23.6
$250–$599 29.2 29.7 28.2 27.9 27.8 28.1
$600–$999 20.3 21.0 20.9 17.6 17.0 19.1
$1000–$1999 15.9 16.4 19.4 12.1 10.4 15.3
$2000+ 3.8 3.7 6.2 2.8 2.1 4.3
total 100 100 100 100 100 100
n 14,501,166 10,138,465 1,512,917 2,849,784 591,771 3,770,930
Source: ABS 2006 Census
Table 1 
AusTrAlIA: bIrTHPlACE by InDIvIDuAl InCoME, 2006 (PEr CEnT)
Note: Excludes onshore prior to 2000–01
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“ The greatest disadvantaged group of immigrants is those who arrive under the 
humanitarian program as refugees. They experience the highest rates of unemploy-
ment and earn the lowest incomes. They are more likely to be in poverty than other 
immigrants.”23
Employment
Gaining access to the labour market is fundamental to social inclusion. The OECD24 
found that Australia’s immigrants experience better labour market outcomes than 
immigrants to other countries, with the lowest unemployment rates and lowest relative 
to the native born population. However, Table 3 drawn from the 2006 census shows 
that recently arrived migrants and CALD groups have higher unemployment and lower 
participation rates than the Australia-born. DIAC (2010, 101) note three trends with 
respect to unemployment among immigrants:
Migrant unemployment can be very high initially – up to 25 per cent early in the •	
settlement process;
It takes four to five years before migrant unemployment becomes comparable with •	
that of the Australia-born; and
Recent migrants are more affected by economic downturns than other groups.•	
Particular difficulty has been experienced by refugee-humanitarian settlers in enter-
ing the labour market. This has been strikingly evident in the Longitudinal Survey of 
Immigration to Australia, and other surveys.25  The DIAC Settlement Outcomes of New 
Arrivals Study of 2009 found, as Table 3 shows, that only 24.1 per cent of humanitarian 
arrivals interviewed were employed compared with 43.5 per cent of family migrants and 
77.2 per cent of skill migrants. Unemployment levels were also considerably higher.
Refugee-humanitarian settlers by virtue of the sudden, unplanned and often traumatic 
circumstances surrounding their migration face greater barriers than other migrants in 
Table 2 
vIsA TyPE oF sETTlEr ArrIvAls, 2001-06 by InDIvIDuAl InCoME (WEEKly) In 2006: 
ProPorTIon (PErCEnT) oF All MIGrAnTs AGED ovEr 15 yEArs
FAMIly HuMAnITArIAn sKIllED oTHEr ToTAl
Negative or nil income 22.8 8.4 19.3 11.9 19.9
$1–$149 9.6 16.5 7.8 11 9.2
$150–$249 10.7 33.2 5.4 16.4 9.8
$250–$399 9.5 12.9 7.4 14.2 8.8
$400–$599 14.8 15.4 11.9 26.5 13.5
$600–$799 11.4 7 12.7 11.9 11.7
$800–$999 7.5 2.8 9.7 8.2 8.3
$1000–$1,299 6.3 2.1 10.3 0 7.9
$1,300 or more 7.4 1.7 15.6 0 11
total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: ABS/DIAC Data Linkage Project
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Exposure to violence, instability and 
persecution
Mental health issues due to pre- and post-migration experiences
Physical disability/health problems
Lack of /limited education
Disrupted education due to long periods 
in camps/exposure to violence and 
instability
Illiteracy/low levels of literacy
Low English proficiency/communication and language barriers
Limited qualifications/skills (particularly amongst older age 
groups)
Lack of knowledge about the Australian 
labour market
Lack of opportunities/finances to have skills recognised
Lack of knowledge/awareness about skills recognition processes
Lack of a driver’s licence/difficulty accessing transport
No opportunity to scope/research the 
Australian labour market
Lack of established networks
Limited capacity/capability of job network providers
Lack of work experience in Australia
Experiences of racism and discrimination
Lack of documentation prior to migration Lack of/limited knowledge about Australian workplace culture
Lack of documentation on arrival
Misinformation about employment 
opportunities
Difficulty accessing/sustaining employment and training 
opportunities
Unrealistic expectations around employment opportunities
Source: DIAC, 2011b, p23
Table 4 
bArrIErs To EMPloyMEnT For rEFuGEEs IDEnTIFIED In InTEnsIvE InTErvIEWs
S E C T I O N  3 . 2
WorK sTATus FAMIly (%) HuMAnITArIAn (%) sKIllED (%)
Work for wage or salary 43.5 24.1 77.2
Run my own business 4.9 1.6 7.4
Study and work 6.3 10.1 5.3
Study full-time 3.9 20.4 1.9
Study and look after my family 6.6 16.2 1.8
Unemployed and looking for work 8.4 11.3 5.1
Unemployed and NOT looking for work .6 3.3 .2
Setting up a business but not yet 
making money
1.2 .7 1.5
Look after my family 24.8 18.1 5.5
Retired, no longer working 5.4 4.4 .3
Voluntary or other unpaid work 1.5 1.9 .8
n 1889 5336 1309
Source: DIAC
Table 3 
DIAC sETTlEMEnT ouTCoMEs oF nEW ArrIvAls sTuDy (sonA) WorK sTATus by vIsA 
CATEGory, 2009
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entering and succeeding in the labour market. Table 4 indicates the nature of these 
barriers prior to migration and upon arrival in Australia as expressed in in-depth inter-
views carried out with settlers. Language barriers are especially important with 36.5 per 
cent of first generation refugee-humanitarian settlers rating themselves as not speak-
ing English well or at all at the 2006 census. Table 5 shows the unemployment rate 
decreases and labour force participation increases as proficiency in English increases.
Recent cohorts of refugees to Australia have faced additional barriers. Many come 
from countries in Africa, the Middle East, as well as South East Asia, which are not only 
under developed but where there has been protracted war and infrastructure has failed 
for many decades, resulting in citizens being unable to access education or training. 
Unlike previous cohorts of refugees they have also been warehoused in refugee camps 
for protracted periods in many instances over 10 years, and this has an enormous 
effect on their settlement outcomes. Many refugees arrive in Australia with low human 
capital endowments that would make them competitive in an industrialised society.26 
Studies such as Njuki27 show that poor education and language skills and illiteracy 
even in the refugees own native languages makes it difficult for them to attain the basic 
language skills required for them either to enter the labour market or to successfully 
participate in education or training. Accordingly some refugees are completely shut out 
of the job market. This applies even to the jobs such as cleaning or process work which 
were filled by earlier cohorts of refugees with little or no education but now require 
some level of literacy due to stringent occupational and health standards in Australia.
Youth issues
One of the key features of Australia’s refugee-humanitarian immigrant stream is its 
youthfulness. Their average age is 21.8 compared with 27.3 for the total settler intake 
and 36.7 for the Australian population at the 2006 census. Some 40 per cent of refu-
gees are aged less than 15 and over 30 per cent are aged 15–29 on arrival. They are 
strongly concentrated in the dependent child and early workforce years where they 
are vulnerable to exclusion. Research on educational outcomes of young humanitarian 
migrants in Australia28 show that there are significant problems in how young refugee 
migrants are fareing in the Australian education system. Scholars such as Jupp29 have 
shown that while earlier groups of young refugees migrated to Australia with limited 
education, they were able to find employment in the then booming manufacturing 
sector where literacy was not required. Refugee parents were then able to concentrate 
on making sure that their children received a quality education and results are clearly 
ProFICIEnCy In EnGlIsH ToTAl PErCEnT unEMPloyED PArTICIPATIon rATE
Very Well 195,477 7.7 70.2
Well 181,384 10.8 57.0
Not Well 121,520 20.0 36.3
Not At All 26,229 31.5 12.1
total 524,610 11 .0 54 .9
Australia-Born 10,416,233 4 .9 67 .1
Source: ABS 2006
Table 5 
FIrsT GEnErATIon HuMAnITArIAn EnTrAnTs: ProFICIEnCy In sPoKEn EnGlIsH by 
lAbour ForCE sTATus, 2006
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manifested in the high achievement in education in second generation refugee cohorts 
in Australia.30 
However, research carried out by Oliff31 show multiple dimensions of disadvantage for 
today’s refugee children. Many refugee children may have experienced war and have 
had to deal with the psychological burden of this past experience. In many cases they 
have received very little education if they got any at all prior to migration. This places 
them at a significant disadvantage when they enter the Australian education system. 
For example a refugee child who is 10 years old is placed in a year five classroom 
but their literacy ability could be that of a year one so they are unable to cope with 
the year five curriculum. Even in cases where the children receive language support 
for two years, this may not be sufficient to make up for the learning that the child has 
missed. Young refugee children are often left behind because they do not have any 
assistance in navigating the education system at home. The young refugee children are 
also juggling settlement problems and because they are visibly different they may have 
self esteem problems and are more likely than other children to be victims of bullying 
and racism. These students then find it extremely difficult to cope and compete in the 
classroom with other students and they become discouraged in the education system. 
As a result, some young refugee children have been involved in truancy and other anti-
social behaviour, perpetuating the cycle of disadvantage. Their parents, battling with 
poverty due to lack of employment, cannot make the investments required for success 
in today’s education system.
Racism and discrimination
A major factor contributing to migrant disadvantage for some immigrants, especially 
refugees, is their visible difference. While most of the immigrants to early post war 
Australia were predominantly from the UK and Europe, there have been significant 
changes in the composition of migrants to Australia, with a sharp increase in migrants 
coming from Asia, Oceania and Africa since the 1990s.32 This dramatic change in com-
position of migrants has also brought some challenges in regards to the acceptance of 
new migrants by a very small minority of the Australian society. Studies on refugees in 
Australia show that migrants from Africa and the Middle East who are visibly different 
in race, religion and culture find it difficult to find employment even when they have the 
requisite educational and language attributes that would make them an asset to the 
Australian employers.33 In recent years immigrants of Muslim background and African 
immigrants have been targeted in racial attacks.34 
Discrimination is especially evident in the labour market. Table 6 shows the proportion 
of different migrant groups in lower skill, low status, low pay occupations in different 
post-school education categories. A striking pattern is evident with the proportion of 
the first generation refugee-humanitarian settlers with a bachelor degree in unskilled 
work being quadruple that for the Australia-born. Similar differences are evident in 
other education categories. The difference is not as great when compared with the 
total overseas-born population but is still significant. Intergenerational mobility is appar-
ent with second generation refugee-humanitarian birthplace workers with post-school 
education having lower proportions in low skill occupations than not only their first 
generation but also the Australia-born population. It must however, be remembered 
that the second generation are overwhelmingly people of European or Indo Chinese 
background whose parents arrived in Australia before the mid 1990s. It remains to be 
seen if the children of more recent refugees from Africa and the Middle East will be as 
successful.
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Social inclusion work in Australia has identified entrenched racist attitudes in service 
delivery as being responsible for failures in reducing poverty around the Aboriginal 
community who have experienced deep social exclusion in Australia.35 It is imperative 
that racism is tackled at an individual level by stricter legislation but also on a societal 
and institutional level so as not to create further social exclusion among newly arriving 
migrant groups. 
Socially disadvantaged localities and settlement of 
migrants
There is an increasing understanding that one of the key dimensions of disadvantage 
is locational. Disadvantage can be exacerbated by the situation in which some groups 
live.36 Collins37 has argued that immigrant unemployment rates especially those from 
refugee – humanitarian settler backgrounds have been sensitive to the place where the 
immigrants settle, citing examples of the Western suburbs of Sydney and Melbourne 
where there are high unemployment rates among immigrant neighbourhoods. Poor 
immigrants, especially refugees, are restricted in the types of areas where they can 
afford housing.
Understanding the localisation of disadvantage is important especially as Australia 
looks into settling of new migrant groups into regional Australia38. In order to be suc-
cessful, the settlement of migrants to particular locations and regional areas must be 
met with equal investment in services that will allow for better settlement outcomes. 
There is also a need for strong community engagement around the settling of new 
communities in regional areas. Community engagement is crucial so that all people feel 
that they trust and feel safe in their communities, within their neighbourhood, family and 
friends, irrespective of people’s cultural background.39 
Key agenda items of the Australian National Social Inclusion Board which apply to 
recent immigrants are to ensure employment services for the most disadvantaged job 














3.4 4.9 7.4 16.5 23.4
First generation  
refugee-humanitarian 
birthplace groups
0.4 0.9 1.8 5.0 12.2
Australia born 0.5 1.0 1.7 4.8 14.7
Overseas born 3.7 2.9 6.1 9.5 16.9
total population 2 .1 1 .5 3 .2 6 .2 15 .2
Source: ABS 2006 Census unpublished tabulations
Table 6 
AusTrAlIA: FIrsT AnD sEConD GEnErATIon rEFuGEE-HuMAnITArIAn bIrTHPlACE 
GrouPs, AusTrAlIA-born AnD ovErsEAs-born PEr CEnT In lAbourEr AnD 
MACHInEry oPErATor oCCuPATIons by PosT-sCHool EDuCATIon, 2006
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seekers, to improve the outcomes for vulnerable children with a focus on children 
from jobless families and addressing racism, discrimination and stigma barriers.40 The 
Gillard Government has identified key principles to underpin Australia’s social inclusion 
approach in Australia. They include:
Taking a strength-based, rather than a deficit-based, approach which means •	
respecting, supporting and building on the strengths of individuals, families, com-
munities and cultures;
Building effective partnerships to tackle shared priorities; •	
Developing intensive interventions tailored at an individual, family or community level •	
in order to support those experiencing deep and complex social exclusion; 
Building joined-up services and whole of government solutions so that there is •	
“integration, transparency and collaboration between Commonwealth, State and 
Territory Governments”; and
Lessening the “separate silos of funding, policy-making and service delivery” that •	
characterise many areas of social policy design in Australia.41
The following sections showcase specific policies and programs already adopted by 
Social Inclusion Boards at Federal, State and Local Government level to illustrate social 
inclusion policy frameworks that to meet the needs of the disadvantaged in Australia. 
The use of specific program and policy examples in this paper are deliberate as they 
illustrate practically how social inclusion has been adopted and is working in Australia. 
Improving employment outcomes 
One of the key social inclusion priorities for Australia is matching marginalised groups 
with jobs. At a Federal level, the National Social Inclusion Board in 2011 made strong 
policy recommendations to the Office of Employment and Child Care on how Australia’s 
National Job Services Australia and other employment services programs can be 
enhanced in order to reach those who are disadvantaged in the job market such as ref-
ugees. Some of the key recommendations included, rejuvenating the work experience 
and training culture within Job Services Australia to ensure that long term unemployed 
get adequate training for the work force. This would be achieved by improving the 
contracts of employment service providers coupled with stricter performance indica-
tors to ensure that the employment services are working harder to ensure that their 
clients not only get employment but are getting jobs requisite to their skills. Other key 
recommendations include a joined up approach in which business are given incentives 
to employ the long-term unemployed, for example by using welfare payments as wage 
subsidies to incentivise employers to transition job seekers from the work experience 
phase to full-time employment, thus cushioning employers of the costs they incur in 
employing the long-term unemployed.42 
At a state level, in 2009, the South Australia State Inclusion Board made policy recom-
mendations that were implemented in the states major infrastructure projects to ensure 
that at least 10 per cent of all total hours worked on any state funded projects, were to 
be undertaken by the long-term unemployed.43 
A pilot project – the Family Centred Employment Project – was initiated in three Australian 
suburbs to assist 59 families who were long-time unemployed, showcasing how social 
inclusion can be employed at a local government level. Under the project, providers 
developed service models that met all the needs of the family such as assistance in 
the areas of child care, housing, financial management, parenting support, domestic 
violence, conflict resolution, mental illness and education participation to ensure that 
these families were able to undertake work.44 
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Improving outcomes for vulnerable children
In regard to young people and children, a Social Inclusion Board report Breaking the 
Cycle of Disadvantage through the Life Course maps disadvantage of persons in 
Australia through their life course and has specific joined up recommendations and 
reforms to be implemented by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG).45 The 
reforms which meet the needs of children and young people include various partner-
ships and charters which have been signed by the Federal and State Governments 
with specific budgetary allocations to ensure that national goals are met in protection 
of children and youth. One of their key goals is to ensure that Australia meets a 90 
per cent attainment of secondary education for its youth by 2015. A specific policy 
measure that will directly affect migrant children is a $2.6 billion package to assist 
disadvantaged schools.46 
At a state level: South Australia has a program for school retention under a project 
named Innovative Community Action Networks (ICAN). The ICAN targets at risk youth 
aged 12–19 years, their parents, schools, community networks, business and govern-
ment agencies in areas such as education, health, justice and community services, 
who work together to reshape learning and employment pathways for young people at 
risk. Through the ICAN program, case by case innovative programs are designed and 
monitored by case managers to ensure that no young people are left behind. School 
retention has been one of the major successes within South Australia since the intro-
duction of a social inclusion approach in 2002, the school retention rate has increased 
from a low of 67.2 per cent in 1999 to over 84.2 per cent in 2010.47 
At a local government level: Specific ICAN initiatives have been undertaken, for 
example, the Gawler 15 initiative is a program in outer metropolitan South Australia to 
give locally based accredited hospitality training to young people who have disengaged 
from learning or earning. The initiative, which is in partnership with local businesses, 
ensures that the young students get hands-on hospitality training in an ICAN facility 
adjacent to a secondary school and part of their training counts for high school credit. 
Out of the 82 young people who have attended the program, 44 have gained employ-
ment, 30 returned to school, three went to apprenticeships and four to traineeships. 
The individual one to one case management has seen the tremendous success of this 
youth program.48 
The future of social inclusion, immigrant settlement 
and public policy 
The major justification for Australia’s refugee intake should also be based on humanitar-
ian concern and being caring and responsible global and regional citizens. Yet it must 
not be overlooked that refugee-humanitarian settlers can and do make a significant 
economic contribution. Table 7 shows the net impact of various visa categories on the 
Australian Government budget according to a period of settlement in Australia. This 
shows that skill stream migrants immediately have a positive impact but for humanitar-
ian migrants this takes longer than 10 years. Elsewhere49, however, it has been shown 
that for humanitarian migrants significant costs are incurred in the early years of settle-
ment. The circumstances of their move mean that refugees will not be able to adjust 
economically and socially as readily as other migrants who have planned their move, 
been able to bring resources with them and have not been exposed to violence and 
trauma. Yet this study showed that over time refugee economic participation converges 
toward that of the non-migrant population and by the second generation exceeds 
it. Moreover, the contribution is in many ways a distinct one which means that the 
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1 2 3 10 20
Family stream
Partner and other –$17.90 $81.90 $51.30 $259.80 $257.90
Parent –$14.80 –$10.70 –$11.60 –$14.80 –$18.10
Contributing Parent 228.1 –$11 $0.80 –$34.30 –$83.40
Family stream total $195 .40 $60 .10 $40 .40 $210 .80 $156 .40
skill stream
Employer Sponsored $417.40 $429 $435.20 $442 $475.70
Skilled Independent $171.60 $235.10 $238.70 $404.50 $462.70
State/Territory Sponsored $51.90 $60.90 $65.80 $79.50 $104.90
Skilled Family Sponsored $5.50 $12.40 $13.20 $17.60 $21.40
Business Skills $37.70 $37.20 $38.80 $27.90 $20.30
skill stream total $684 .10 $774 .60 $851 .70 $971 .60 $1085
Humanitarian Stream –$238.70 –$67 –$59.90 –$11.90 $46.80
Fiscal impact of permanent migration $640.90 $767.70 $832.20 $1170.50 $1288.10
Temporary Business subclass 457 $670.90 $720.20 $289.10 $332.70 $442.10
Source: DIAC, 2011c, p. 146
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refugee-humanitarian inflow into Australia brings a different and important economic 
element into the mix of skills, attributes, abilities and aptitudes that the immigration 
program brings to the Australian economy. Of course, there are important social and 
cultural capital contributions as well but it is too often overlooked that there is also a 
significant economic contribution as well. However, the existence of “brain waste” and 
the refugee gap have diluted this economic contribution. From the perspectives of both 
the migrants themselves and the Australian economy it is crucial to break down the 
influence of discrimination, structural disadvantage, lack of recognition of qualifications, 
language barriers and other impediments to refugee settlers being able to fulfil their 
potential.
In the last decade, there has been an unprecedented negative discourse around 
refugee and asylum seeker issues in Australia that do not reflect Australia’s values of 
giving everyone a fair go as well as meeting its obligations as a global citizen. There is 
need for a change in the public debate especially in the political arena and the media, 
who drive public opinion in Australia, if social inclusion of refugees and migrants in 
Australian society is to be reduced. Leadership in the public debate around refugees 
and migrants is needed to reduce the racism and discrimination which has been identi-
fied as a key factor in exclusion of migrants in Australia. 
More resources need to be invested in better community engagement to build bridges 
between incoming groups and the Australian community. More work still needs to be 
done to better engage the Australian community on the benefits of its migrants and the 
Table 7 
MIGrAnTs’ nET IMPACT on THE AusTrAlIAn GovErnMEnT buDGET by vIsA CATEGory 
($ MIllIon 2009–10)
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increasing diversity of its people. There is also a need for resources to be used for the 
encouragement for all Australians irrespective of background or length of their settle-
ment in Australia, to be more involved in neighbourhood and community life.50 
Social inclusion ensures that Australia matches up to its values which include the free-
doms and dignity of each individual, a spirit of egalitarianism, mutual respect, tolerance, 
fair play, compassion for those in need and equal opportunity for individuals regardless 
of their race, religion and ethnic background.
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Linkages between education and productivity
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Introduction
Due to the size of the baby-boom generation, Australia will experience a significant 
ageing of the population over the next third of a century. Increases in Australian fertility 
rates and in migration cannot prevent this ageing of the Australian population profile. 
During this period, maintaining the rate of past growth in living standards will be a formi-
dable challenge. Living standards are conventionally measured as real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita, which arithmetically is the product of three variables: the 
proportion of the population of working age (aged 15 or more); average hours worked 
by people of working age; and average output per hour worked. This means the three 
parameters that drive growth in GDP are working age population, workforce participa-
tion and productivity.
The Treasury1 notes that over the past 40 years real GDP per capita averaged a 1.9 per 
cent annual growth rate, but estimates that over the next 40 years real GDP per capita 
will fall to an average annual growth rate of 1.5 per cent. At least half of this fall in living 
standards will be due to population ageing and its knock on effect upon workforce 
participation.
Consequently, if Australia wishes to continue to enjoy the rate of improvement in 
living standards that it has enjoyed since microeconomic reform started in the 1980s, 
increased productivity will need to be a major contributor to economic growth over the 
next 30 – 40 years. 
Productivity
Productivity is a measure of how efficiently resources are being used to produce goods 
and services. At the economy wide level, productivity is typically measured in the form 
of GDP divided by inputs used in production. In this context, labour and capital are the 
most important inputs.
One common measure is labour productivity, calculated as real GDP per hour worked. 
However, this measure can be influenced not only by improvements in the way labour is 
used, but also by the employment of additional capital. The same applies when capital 
productivity is measured as GDP per unit of capital. These are both partial measures, 
based on one or other input. 
A more comprehensive indicator, more widely used, is multifactor productivity (MFP), 
which measures the amount of real value added output obtained from a combined unit 
of capital and labour. 
The term capital deepening is often used to describe an increase in capital investment; 
and the term human capital is often used to describe the stock of competencies, 
knowledge and personality attributes of those in the labour market. Both are important 
drivers of productivity.
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Education and productivity
Economic studies confirm that in Australia higher levels of education are associated 
with higher wages. Some of these studies show that wages can be more than a third 
higher for people holding a degree or higher qualification compared to people with 
otherwise similar characteristics who did not complete Year 12.2 
Economic studies also show that improving literacy and numeracy skills make getting 
a job more likely and that they are key components of human capital, which, in turn, is 
an important driver of economic growth.3 
Economists have also found that a country’s institutions matter for productivity. These 
include the openness of the economy to international trade, the security of property 
rights and the quality of regulation of credit, labour and business.4 
Nonetheless, our understanding of the transmission mechanism from education to 
human capital formation and then to productivity is far from cut and dried. The former 
US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, was certainly not referring to the links 
between education and productivity when he said: 
“ There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known 
unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we don’t know. But there 
are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don’t know we don’t know.”
However, it is a fitting description of the difficulties encountered when endeavouring to 
measure these complex relationships. 
Human capital framework
Human capital is usually defined as the stock of competencies (skills and expertise 
developed from on-the-job training); knowledge (qualifications acquired through formal 
education); and personality attributes (ability and attitudes, whether acquired or innate) 
of those in the labour market.5 
The human capital framework is based on the proposition that education and train-
ing directly increases an individual’s productivity, therefore allowing them to command 
higher earnings. In obtaining further education and training, the individual often tem-
porarily forgoes employment earnings in the expectation that he or she will be able to 
offer more skilled labour services in the future that, in turn, will deliver higher lifetime 
earnings. Human capital, like physical capital, involves an upfront cost (forgone earn-
ings while undergoing education and training), but delivers future benefits.
There is, however, an important difference. Physical capital is owned by the firm and 
can be utilised in whatever manner delivers the highest profits – including on selling of 
those assets. Hence, well functioning markets allow reallocation of physical capital to 
maximise returns. In contrast, it is illegal to own, buy or sell people, or to force them to 
supply labour services.
Employers can invest in human capital through activities such as training, but the return 
on that investment is lost to the employer if the employee takes a job with another firm 
or withdraws from the workforce. Moreover, the employer may not have effective own-
ership of any useful ideas and knowledge generated by the employee. For example, 
an employee who develops a more efficient production technique can disseminate that 
technique by publishing on the Internet. The potential arbitrary loss of labour services 
and knowledge acts as a disincentive for employers to invest in training. 
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The counterpart is that, for the individual concerned, human capital is highly illiquid, 
and cannot be used as collateral for loans. In addition, an individual’s investment in 
skills is risky, because skills can depreciate or be made redundant by technological 
change, or rendered unusable by illness.
Human capital and productivity
Acquisition of human capital commences in early childhood at home or at day-care 
and continues at primary and secondary school. Sound literacy and numeracy skills 
are the basis of a good education. It is therefore worrying that literacy and numeracy 
scores for Australian children appear to have been gradually declining over the past 30 
years or so.6 
One possible reason is that teachers themselves have declining literacy and numeracy 
skills: the share of teachers who scored in the top fifth of their class halved from the 
early-1980s to the early-2000s, while the share in the bottom half of their class approxi-
mately doubled.7 
Another reason put forward for this decline is the removal of gender pay discrimination, 
so that female university graduates have a much greater career choice than just the 
teaching profession. 
Currently, there are a number of reform processes around early childhood and primary 
and secondary schools designed to improve the efficacy and efficiency of existing 
processes, and, presumably enhance human capital. To no-one’s surprise, some of 
the proposed reforms put forward by the Federal Government are being met with sus-
picion by State Governments and teachers’ unions. Until these processes are finalised, 
little purpose is served canvassing additional reforms that may have no relevance to the 
final outcomes.8 Consequently, further discussions focus on post secondary schooling 
education and training. 
In addition, focussing on post secondary education and training is more likely to identify 
possible reforms that can deliver the skills appropriate to the structure and dynamics of 
the modern Australian economy.9
Post secondary education and training can also lift productivity indirectly, by increasing 
innovation and the take-up of new technology, processes and products. In turn, high 
levels of education and training are seen as facilitating the diffusion of new techniques 
and technology across the economy. 
Nevertheless, empirical economic studies have not always fully supported the human 
capital framework.10 For example, it was suggested that Australia’s high productivity 
growth experienced over the 1990s was largely due to the rapid take-up of information 
and communication technology (ICT) by the (up-skilled) Australian workforce. However, 
while subsequent studies proved the existence of ICT spill-overs in Australia11, they 
attributed a higher proportion of the growth in productivity to structural economic 
reforms.
As the Productivity Commission noted: 
The 1990s productivity surge could not be attributed to international trends, normal 
recovery from domestic recession, improved labour force skills, or greater work 
intensity. There was rapid uptake of new technologies (including ICTs) in this period 
but their contribution to MFP growth was small. More fundamental and far reaching 
in influencing productivity were the microeconomic reforms of the late 1980s and 
1990s.12 
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In the past decade, productivity growth has been disappointing, despite steady 
increases in human capital per head. As the current Secretary to the Treasury stated:
“ The time lags between action and results are often long and variable, meaning that 
the root causes of Australia’s present productivity performance are embedded in 
the decisions of the last decade.”13 
He went on to observe that without further economic reforms, including in new areas, 
these poor outcomes would continue. 
The Chairman of the Productivity Commission has expressed concern over the use of 
the term economic reform noting that it is often applied to any government announce-
ment rather than one that leads to productivity gain. He went on to note that labour 
market reform is crucial, and that measures to promote fairness should not detract 
unduly from productivity.14 
In this respect, the present government’s decision to re-regulate parts of the labour 
market has attracted criticisms from industry and employer groups (and some indepen-
dent economists). The irony is that this legislation (The Fair Work Act) was ostensibly 
introduced to combat de-regulation of the labour market by the previous government 
(WorkChoices). In practice, most labour market de-regulation in Australia had occurred 
between 1992 and 1996. The only notable de-regulation of industrial relations under 
WorkChoices was to exempt businesses with 100 employees or less from unfair dis-
missal laws.15 
Eslake16 suggests that the increase in the terms of trade and, until recently, faster 
population growth have obscured Australia’s poor productivity performance over the 
past decade. He nominates, as being ripe for economic reform, international avia-
tion, agricultural marketing (other than grains), pharmacies, newsagents, private sector 
service professions (such as law, medicine, and architecture), and services sectors 
dominated by public sector agencies (such as health and aged care, education, public 
transport and law enforcement).
A potential reform agenda of this scope, means that, while education and training 
cannot be claimed to be the primary driver of productivity, the accumulated evidence 
from analyses of economic outcomes is that the quality of education – measured on an 
outcome basis of cognitive skills – has powerful economic effects. That is, economic 
growth is significantly affected by the skills of workers. What people know, matters.17 
The major benefits from an individual’s education accrue to the economy via 
externalities.
Productivity level and growth rates
Economists are also concerned about whether institutional and policy reforms that 
increase productivity affect the level of economic activity, or the rate of growth.18 Where 
productivity growth rates are concerned, it is the rates of increase of capital and work-
force quality that matter, rather than their current levels. That is, the level of productivity 
depends on supplies of human and physical capital and the state of technology. But the 
growth rate of productivity depends on the rates of increase of these three factors.
For example, prima facie, a significant increase to the number of tertiary graduates 
would be expected to cause the productivity growth rate to be lower, on the basis 
that the new addition to this cohort would, on average, be less adept than the existing 
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group. If the skills base of the economy was static this would be likely to be true. 
In practice, the economy is dynamic as institutional and policy reforms are ongoing 
processes; so it would be possible for the skills gained by the new cohort to more than 
offset the skills atrophy of existing graduates. 
Such dynamism makes it very difficult to isolate and measure the impact on productiv-
ity of a single measure. 
Externalities
An externality occurs when one person’s actions impose uncompensated costs or 
unpaid-for benefits on another person. Externalities can be both negative and positive 
– education is usually regarded as a positive externality – for example, the spread of 
knowledge by an individual to other individuals. Without intervention, the existence of 
a positive externality may result in market output being lower than is socially optimal. 
In contrast, the existence of a negative externality (such as pollution from a factory) 
may result in a market producing more output than is socially optimal. It is generally 
accepted that government intervention is warranted in circumstances where market 
failure arises from externalities, and where the benefit of intervention is greater than 
the cost. 
Because they are not mediated through markets, the measurement of externalities is 
problematic. Measuring the value of externalities arising from education further compli-
cates the government intervention processes. Some benefits appear readily calculable, 
such as increased taxation revenue from higher productivity of university graduates. 
Under a simple theoretical human capital framework, increases in the stock of human 
capital arise from education and training, which, in turn, delivers higher productivity. 
Higher productivity leads to higher wages and thus to fiscal externalities generated from 
taxation revenue over the person’s lifetime of earnings following completion of educa-
tion qualifications. However, higher wages are not all attributable to higher productivity; 
and higher productivity not all attributable to additional education: there are differences 
in innate abilities to earn income; and, as is discussed below, education may act as a 
sorting mechanism, as well as an avenue for the acquisition of skills.19 
Sorting and human capital frameworks
A rival to the human capital framework is the sorting framework: that education and 
training qualifications signal or screen the (possibly innate) productivity of individuals. 
Put simply, the sorting hypothesis is that high levels of education and training are 
associated with higher earnings because they act as a signalling device to potential 
employers and not because they increase productivity. That is, people with higher 
levels of education have shown the ability and motivation to be successful at education 
and, therefore, are very likely to have the ability and motivation to be successful at 
work. Such people are less likely to be absent or resign from the workplace and are 
likely to lead more healthy lifestyles. For employers, these qualities are desirable but 
not readily observable so they screen employees by educational attainment; those with 
greater educational attainments are likely to have more of these desirable qualities. 
On the other side, potential employees observe this behaviour and may choose those 
educational and training courses favoured by employers in order to signal that they 
possess the sought after attributes; but those without these attributes will less likely 
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
156
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
157
S E C T I O N  3 . 3
succeed in education or training. Through this screening and signalling, education and 
training is used to sort individuals for desired characteristics.
In the extreme case, the sorting hypothesis suggests that the stock of human capital 
in the economy could remain fixed but employers would still compete to employ those 
with the highest educational and training qualifications. More realistically, if education 
did not increase people’s productivity then over time this would be apparent to employ-
ers who would therefore not be prepared to pay a wage premium to tertiary educated 
employees.
Numerous studies demonstrate that sorting does occur.20 Therefore, the actual value 
of the financial benefits associated with education and training will be less than those 
calculated under a pure human capital framework. 
Measuring externalities 
Chapman and Lounkaew21 recently estimated that, above and beyond the private 
benefits accruing to the graduates themselves, the discounted or present value to 
the Australian economy of an additional year of higher education in Australia for each 
individual was in the range $6000 and $10,000.
In undertaking this exercise, they noted that it was: 
“ A highly complicated area of economic analysis, in conceptual, theoretical and 
measurement terms. Estimating the value of the externalities associated with higher 
education is arguably the most complicated area in the economics of education 
literature, yet it is also a critical component for public policy in this area.” 
Internationally, there have been a number of empirical studies of educational externali-
ties, suggesting the present value of externalities (both financial and non-financial) from 
higher education is around 25 per cent of the private benefits22 (which is somewhat 
higher than implied by Chapman and Lounkaew). 
Due to the complexity of the linkages and current measurement limitations, the precise 
amounts of benefit accruing to society and the economy from education and training 
externalities are unlikely to be settled any time soon. However, the important point is that 
these externalities are positive and therefore unambiguously improve productivity.23 
Increasing productivity through further education and 
training opportunities
The contribution to productivity from increasing human capital formation through 
education and training is not necessarily decided in isolation. An individual’s decision 
making will be influenced by the role of governments in the provision of education and 
training services; the impact of other government policies, such as taxation and income 
support; and training policies available through industries and individual firms. 
The role of government
There are some clear roles for government. In Australia, the taxpayer funds a significant 
amount of education and training. For example, governments offer primary and sec-
ondary schooling without monetary cost (and impose mandatory schooling). 
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In recognition of the significant private benefits, government charges university student 
fees. For almost all Australian students, these charges do not cover, nor are they 
designed to cover, the full cost to tertiary education institutions of providing the course. 
Governments provide funding to most of Australian universities, directly, and indirectly, 
through research grants.
The government also offers income contingent loans to students to assist in payment 
of higher education fees, to be repaid (through the personal income tax system) when 
income is above a certain income threshold. Importantly, a zero real interest rate is 
charged as the loan is indexed to the Consumer Price Index.24 
Income contingent loans are superior to loans from a financial institution because they 
provide insurance to the borrower: no payment is required and no default action is 
taken, if the borrower’s income falls below a threshold. Income contingent loans are 
not without challenges. Offering a loan whereby repayment is dependent on financial 
success can also attract applications from those expecting to do poorly. Debtors can 
also try to avoid repayment by falsely adjusting their income, through tax evasion for 
example. Scheme design can successfully address these issues. 
The tax and income support systems are also used by government to provide incen-
tives for individuals to undertake education and training. 
Improving productivity by reforming government education and training 
arrangements
Education and training programs must necessarily compete for scarce budgetary 
funding. Hence to fund new and/or augment existing programs, governments either 
need to increase taxes or transfer funding from existing programs. The latter option has 
been more popular across governments in recent years.
There is no good reason why the income contingent loan system cannot be extended 
and adapted to promote a higher uptake of education and training opportunities with 
a view to delivering higher productivity outcomes. For example, to address current 
skills shortages, the scheme would need to be limited to fast-track courses (because 
demand for skills can change significantly over relatively short periods of time – often 
faster than the three years required to complete a degree course). 
Income contingent loans could also be used as a form of income support for individuals 
who wish to undertake a fast track qualification to complement their existing skill base. 
For example, a qualified mathematician might undertake a fast track six-12 month 
course in order to attain formal engineering qualifications. 
Income contingent loans could be made available to Australia’s public vocational 
education and training (VET) system, where students now are largely required to pay 
up-front fees without access to loan assistance.25 
Both these examples have already been modelled and found to be viable.26 
It is relatively straightforward to limit these types of loans to specific skill areas and 
tailor access to the payment in order to match contemporary labour market conditions. 
Income contingent loans can also be designed to be revenue neutral if that is judged 
as appropriate. 
Governments could also encourage universities to more flexible in offering intensive 
courses over short periods of time, thereby allowing individuals to enhance their skills 
without having to absent themselves from the workforce for long periods. Governments 
could achieve this by providing additional funds to universities or provide additional 
funds direct to academics prepared to take on an additional workload. In the latter 
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case, funding also could be offered to international experts in their fields thereby pro-
viding high quality teaching as well as offering knowledge exchange opportunities to 
Australian faculty members. 
The current system of tax deductibility for self education expenses could benefit from 
reform. Currently it offers no assistance should an employed individual wish to develop 
skills in another industry or profession. Moreover, it is an open ended deduction so 
that attendance at an overseas venue can attract a greater deduction than that at 
an Australian venue, even though the learning experience could be identical: govern-
ment should consider capping the benefit by providing it as a tax offset rather than a 
deduction. 
A role for industry to promote productivity 
At the industry level, contributions to increased productivity will arise from such things 
as the ability of a firm to adopt and adapt to new technology and achieve economies 
of scale and scope and offer training opportunities to its workforce.
For the reasons spelled out earlier – no slavery and insecure intellectual property rights,– 
firms may underinvest in on-the-job training; and employees underinvest in their own 
education and training. Therefore, there is a case for public assistance.
There is no obvious answer to the question of how much training a firm should provide; 
and how the cost burden should be shared among individuals, firms and government. 
However, firms could (particularly through their respective industry bodies) work with 
universities and other VET organisations and partially fund, or provide endowments to 
those institutions that are willing to offer courses relevant to that industry.
A note of caution
Economy wide reforms aimed at increasing productivity will inevitably have unintended 
consequences on particular sectors of the economy. For example, productivity growth 
is both positively and negatively correlated with unemployment in the long run. This is 
because gross job creation in the economy is comprised of a significant proportion 
of job destruction in any given period. As such, low substitutability across sectors 
may result in a reversal, within those sectors, of the creative destruction effect in the 
aggregate labour market. 
Conclusion
Education and training play an important role in improving Australia’s productivity per-
formance. While that role is likely to be subservient to the role played by institutional 
and policy reform in improving productivity, the economic and fiscal consequences of 
Australia’s ageing population strongly infer that governments in Australia should have a 
productivity focus with the provision of education and training. The available Australian 
estimate suggests that an additional year of higher education could increase productiv-
ity significantly. 
Governments could benefit from adopting more flexible policies. 
When the economy is growing at a sustainable rate and structural unemployment is 
low, then the cost of education, in terms of wages foregone, is high and therefore skills 
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upgrading will trend towards on-the-job training. An effective education and training 
structure is one that complements that demand by channelling additional resources to 
those areas before skills shortages act as a brake on economic growth. 
When the economy is weak and unemployment high, the focus of education and 
training policies tend to be more obvious. As the opportunity cost of education is 
significantly less (because it does not necessarily result in wages foregone), funding 
for additional places for post-secondary education is a primary focus of policy. That 
is, policy flexibility and versatility are relatively unimportant when the economy is in a 
cyclical downturn. From the early 1970s to the early 1990s, cyclical downturns were 
common – and the current inertia within Australia’s institutional arrangements in relation 
to education and training is likely to be a reflection of that time. 
In contrast, when the economy is near, or at, full employment, policy flexibility and 
versatility has the potential to improve productivity. 
Some programs to increase productivity that could be considered include:
Extending availability of income contingent loans: •	
– To the VET sector;
–  To mature age students to partially finance their living costs when they undertake 
fast track skills transfer courses; and
– On a temporary basis, to address skill shortages. 
Providing additional funding to universities and VET organisations who are offering •	
intensive, fast-track skilling courses;
Introducing a tax offset to replace the current deduction for self education, and limit •	
availability of the offset to a regular reviewed and prescribed set of skill attainments; 
and 
Taking a leadership role when negotiating with educational institutions and industry •	
groups an appropriate mixture of public and private funding that could be provided 
to those institutions willing to rapidly shift resources in order to implement fast track 
qualifications.
 
The author would like to thank Professor Bruce Chapman, Crawford School of 
Economics and Government, ANU for valuable guidance and comments. However, all 
responsibility for the contents rests with the author. 
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1.Introduction
In the last few decades the proportion of GDP devoted to health care has increased 
in most OECD countries.1 This trend is expected to continue in coming decades. In 
Australia it is predicted that outlays on health and aged care will increase from 9.3 per 
cent of GDP in 2003 to 12.4 per cent of GDP by 2033.2
The underlying drivers of this growth3 include the rising cost of medical innovation4, 
the ageing of the world population and, specifically, changes in the burden of disease, 
especially of chronic disease5.
In Australia, over 70 per cent of the burden of disease is attributable to chronic con-
ditions6, and 87.5 per cent of total recurrent health expenditure can be attributed 
to the 12 major chronic disease groups.7 On the other hand Australia’s health care 
system, similarly to other OECD countries, is mainly organised around an acute, reac-
tive and episodic model of care, inadequate to meet the needs and preferences of 
those who have, or are at risk of developing, chronic conditions and multiple patholo-
gies.8 Therefore, a redesign of health care systems towards integrated care models 
with a focus on chronic-disease management seems to be a promising direction to 
increase responsiveness to consumers’ needs and preferences and thereby increase 
efficiency.9 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the main features of the 
Australian National Healthcare System. Section 3 discusses the challenges of chronic-
ity and multi-morbidity focusing on Australia, and also presents the main chronic care 
models reported in the literature. Section 4 presents a framework proposed by Ham 
(2010) that identifies and analyses 10 key pre-conditions for a population-based model 
healthcare system. In section 5 Ham’s framework is applied to the current decentra-
lised Australian healthcare system, to assess its stage of development, and pathways 
towards the implementation of chronic care-focused healthcare are proposed. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn in section 6. 
2. Australian National Healthcare System 
For many users, the Australian healthcare system is quite straightforward and often 
very low cost. For those with serious or multiple chronic conditions, it can be very 
complex and have high costs both in monetary terms and in terms of time to obtain 
necessary care. 
The complexity of the Australian healthcare system is overlaid by funding arrange-
ments with multiple funders (for example the Commonwealth and State Governments, 
private health insurers, individual patients and some third party payers such as acci-
dent insurers and workers’ compensation funds). These funding arrangements are 
further overlaid with complex governance structures whereby Commonwealth/state 
and private arrangements interact.10. 
The Australian publicly funded healthcare system Medicare, which was implemented in 
198411 incorporates the following:
Public hospitals, which provide free services to all Australians on the basis •	
of need are managed and funded by the states, with funding support from the 
Commonwealth;
Public community health services, managed and funded by the states;•	
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Private medical services, which receive no direct government funding but all •	
Australians are supported by the Commonwealth funded public insurer Medicare 
Australia, which refunds patients a defined amount for each medical service 
covered;
Doctors who are not restricted in what they can charge, and patients pay out-of-•	
pocket gap charges;
–  If doctors choose to bill at the level of the Medicare rebate, they can directly bill 
Medicare Australia;
–  Private insurers are forbidden to insure gap payments for out of hospital services, 
but can insure up to a prescribed limit for in hospital services;
Private hospital services, which are funded privately, although Medicare and private •	
health insurance payments at least partially cover doctors’ costs, with private health 
insurers able to insure for hospital costs;
Other health services – in particular allied health (most notably dental services) – •	
these are privately funded with many of the services able to be covered by private 
health insurance; and
The Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme funded by the Commonwealth under which •	
prescription drugs are available with a fixed co-payment (which depends on whether 
the patient is a concession card holder). 
3.  The challenges of chronicity and multi-morbidity, 
and chronic care models
3.1 Chronicity and multi-morbidity
Chronic conditions have a multiple impact on individuals, health systems and societ-
ies as a whole. They represent a restraint on the quality of life, functional status and 
productivity of people who suffer from them12. Further, they are the main burden of 
disease and mortality in most countries across the world and they compromise the 
sustainability of health systems.
It has been estimated that before 2030 chronic diseases will account for 70 per cent 
of the global disease burden and will be responsible for 80 per cent of deaths across 
the world.13 14
The prevalence of a range of chronic conditions in the US from 1987 to 2002 including 
cancer, mental disorders, pulmonary disorders, as well as diabetes, will increase.15 The 
number of individuals with multiple chronic conditions will increase dramatically in the 
coming years16. A similar evolution is observed in most common chronic conditions, 
such as diabetes mellitus and the recognised pandemic of obesity.17 The World Health 
Organisation estimates that the number of patients with diabetes worldwide will double 
from 2005 to 2030, including in the US, Europe, Canada and Australia. 
With an ageing population, Australia follows the international trend of an increase in 
patients with chronic conditions. Comparisons with other countries, 1987–2006, can 
be found in the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare’s, Australia’s Health 2010.18 
Around 75 per cent of Australians currently suffer chronic illnesses19, representing 
87.5 per cent20 of healthcare expenditure. For example, the prevalence of diabetes in 
Australia by one estimate will have increased by 207 per cent by 203321. Table 1 shows 
the prevalence of the main chronic conditions other than diabetes in Australia. 
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As most of healthcare provision and expenditure is taken up by patients with chronic 
conditions and more specifically individuals with multiple chronic conditions, it is neces-
sary to orientate and integrate health systems in such a way that provision for this type 
of patient is efficient. 
Policy-makers on analysis are increasingly aware of these issues. 22
3.2 The chronic care models
There are two outstanding international reference models for the care of patients with 
chronic conditions. The first one is the Chronic Care Model developed by Ed Wagner 
and associates at the MacColl Institute for Healthcare Innovation in Seattle, USA.23 The 
second is Kaiser Permanente’s Pyramid model, USA. They share a common objective: 
reducing the exponential increase in costs associated with chronic diseases by shifting 
health services towards coordinated and proactive interventions.24
The Chronic Care Model (CCM) aims to obtain high quality care, high levels of satisfac-
tion and improved outcomes through productive interactions between active, informed 
patients and prepared, proactive practice teams. The CCM emphasises the importance 
of rethinking and redesigning clinical practice at the primary care level. One important 
feature of this model is the integration of care in contrast to the traditional fragmented 
care. It has a clear separation between primary and specialist care that characterise the 
current health systems. The second is the need to intervene with structured and simul-
taneous measures at the primary care level. In the transition to chronic care models 
often different essential elements are carried forward in an isolated manner.25 
Subsequent extensions and adaptations of the CCM, include the WHO’s Innovative 
Care for Chronic Conditions (ICCC) Framework26 and the Expanded Chronic Care 
Model.27 There is some evidence of the efficiency of the CCM in terms of reducing 
health expenditure and improving the quality of healthcare provision especially in 
the prevention of complex procedures.28 However, its implementation is not free of 
difficulties.29 
The population health management approach represented by Kaiser Permanente’s 
Pyramid model makes it possible to understand the needs of different strata of a 
population and to target interventions from health promotion to end-of-life care across 
ConDITIon
nuMbEr oF PErsons WITH  
THE ConDITIon (’000)
nuMbEr PEr  
1,000 oF PoPulATIon
Cancer 368.3 17
Total mental and behavioural 
problems
2309.8 108
Total heart, stroke and vascular 
diseases
1079.1 51




Source: ABS National Health Survey – Summary of Results, 4364.0 2007-08 (Selected conditions from the Table ”Long Term Conditions”)
Table 1 
PrEvAlEnCE oF lonG TErM ConDITIons In AusTrAlIA 
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the whole spectrum of interventions. The main goal is to identify patients with differ-
ent types and levels of risk, classifying individuals into categories according to their 
level of complexity. At the lowest level of risk, the development of chronic conditions 
should be prevented in the general healthy population through individuals adopting 
healthy lifestyles and public policy actions. At the other extreme, the highest level of the 
pyramid, the fourth strata consists of highly complex patients with chronic conditions 
(about three to five per cent of all patients with chronic conditions), and these consume 
the highest share of resources. In between, there are various possible approaches to 
care management. Healthcare provision for these highly complex patients has to be 
carefully managed by formal health providers, to reduce unnecessary use of specialist 
resources and avoid hospital admissions. 
4.  Key pre-conditions for a chronic care-focused 
healthcare system
Ham (2009)30 examined five years of reform in the English health system addressing 
chronic care, and concluded, “…it is the cumulative effect of different interventions 
that is likely to have the greatest impact.” Looking more widely the following year, 
Ham (2010) provided an analysis of the key elements for a population-based model of 
care with primary care as the cornerstone of the provision of integrated chronic care. 
His analysis identifies the characteristics of high performing systems for dealing with 
chronic disease. He also provides a roadmap for transformation where National Health 
Insurance models (such as Medicare in Australia) provide a positive start point for such 
a transition given that some of the elements are already guaranteed.
Ham (2010) identifies the following as the 10 characteristics of high-performing chronic 
care systems:
1.  There should be universal coverage, which is provided by equal access to basic 
healthcare services according to need. This is crucial as there is evidence of better 
health outcomes among populations who have health cover31, to a positive change 
being noted in the health status of previously uninsured individuals once insured. 
The improvement in health status was found to be particularly significant for those 
patients with cardiovascular disease and diabetes.
2.  The health system should provide care free at the point of use. If healthcare provision 
is costly at the point of use, sick patients may avoid seeking care, even when they 
need it, for financial reasons. Evidence of the impact of demand-side cost sharing 
is provided by Manning et al. (1986) through the RAND Experiment and data from 
various different countries which currently require some level of co-payment at the 
point of use. More recently Schoen et al (2010)32 estimated that 22 per cent of 
Australians went without recommended care because of costs.
3.  The health system has to be focused on the prevention of illnesses, and not only 
the treatment of sickness. In developed countries, the burden of chronic diseases is 
increasing at the same time as growing expectations in society of quality of life and 
longevity meaning preventive care is becoming even more important33 and should 
target improving lifestyles. Various measures have been implemented in a range of 
countries; most address issues such as the use of tobacco in terms of consumption 
and of the places where smoking is permitted. 
4.  The health system should reinforce the role of patients with chronic conditions to 
self-manage their conditions with support from carers and families. This is related 
to the idea of prevention, given that the first step in the provision of healthcare is 
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patients themselves taking steps to look after their own health. Evidence of the 
importance of self-management support is provided by Sobel (1995)34, who shows 
how a small reduction in the propensity of patients to self-manage their conditions 
results in a significant increase in the demand for formal healthcare. 
5.  The health system has to give priority to primary healthcare. The importance of 
this characteristic is based on the positive evidence of the contribution of primary 
care to the performance of health systems. In addition, most health care provision 
to patients with chronic conditions is delivered through primary care centres35. It 
has been argued by Willison et al. (2007) that healthcare systems have historically 
devoted more resources to hospital inpatient care, while investing more in primary 
care would reduce the demand for and pressure on hospital care. 
6.  Population management should be emphasised by the stratification of patients by 
risk and providing support accordingly. This is important due to the need to predict 
the type of health services that will be required by each type of patient. Kaiser 
Permanente’s Risk Pyramid is an example of a risk stratification approach, already 
applied in European countries such as England with patients receiving support 
according to their need. 
7.  Healthcare provision has to become integrated, with interactions between primary 
care teams and specialists. This is especially important in the case of patients with 
multiple chronic conditions, who require advice from several different specialists 
and continue to be in contact with the primary care team. Kaiser Permanente, for 
example, has been considered to be one of the best integrated systems.36 
8.  Improving information technology for chronic care is fundamental for improving 
provision for patients with chronic conditions. In particular, this would ease the 
stratification process and the communication between patients and healthcare 
professionals, as well as the process of reviewing the performance of providers. In 
this regard, tele-health care provided remotely using information and communication 
technology (ICT), is seen as a useful support for patients with chronic conditions. 
This has started to be implemented in the UK NHS, but to date has only benefited 
individuals participating in pilot studies. 
9.  Healthcare should be effectively coordinated. This is closely related to the integra-
tion of health services as, especially in the case of patients with multiple chronic 
conditions, it is very important that primary care is coordinated with specialist care.37 
Given that patients with chronic conditions need to access a wide range of support 
services, this also underlines the role of public policy in favouring coordination 
between access to the health system and to social care.
10.  All of the earlier nine characteristics must be linked to form a coherent whole. Hence, 
a strategy has to be designed to address all the characteristics listed earlier at the 
same time, involving health financing reforms (such as universal coverage), priority 
for prevention activities, self-management and primary healthcare, a commitment 
to achieving an integrated model of care and more effective care coordination, and 
the greater use of tools such as population management and IT devices. 
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5.  Experiences, pathways and barriers to the 
transition in Australia
5.1 Current policy debate in managing chronic diseases in Australia
The most recent report by government on progress in health reform38 identifies con-
cerns similar to those outlined in this paper. Many of the recommendations of the 
National Health and Hospital Reform Commission (NHHRC) in the final report (2010)39 
are in a similar vein.
NHHRC recommended that, to better integrate and strengthen primary healthcare, 
the commonwealth should assume responsibility for all primary health care policy and 
funding. The Commonwealth accepted this view and obtained initial agreement from 
the states and territories, but on reflection the states were not inclined to relinquish 
control over these activities. 
The NHHRC further recommended that the Commonwealth should encourage and 
actively foster the widespread establishment of Comprehensive Primary Health Care 
Centres and Services. This has been pursued in the context of the GP Super Clinics. 
While development of these clinics was started prior to these recommendations, and 
they do not fully meet the intention of the recommendation, they do move in the direc-
tion of facilitating better access to and coordination of care.40 
NHHRC suggested that groups such as young families, Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people, and people with chronic and complex conditions should have the 
option of enrolling with a single primary healthcare service which would be their prin-
cipal “health care home”. This would be funded by grants to support multidisciplinary 
services and care coordination tied to levels of enrolment with a practice. It would 
also include pay-for-performance arrangements to reward good performance in terms 
of health outcomes. The Commonwealth response to this recommendation was to 
propose a similar program which targeted people with diabetes. Following negotiation 
with the medical profession41 it was agreed to undertake a pilot program known as 
“Coordinated Care for Diabetes”.42 While the pilot has not yet started and details of its 
structure are not known, it is expected to have: 
Minimal fundholding by doctors (with most of the funds held by Medicare Locals for •	
purchase of coordination of allied health services); 
Minimal impact on enrolment as, outside of diabetes treatment, patients will not be •	
required to use the same practice for all their services; and
The population stratified according to levels of clinical risk. •	
The NHHRC recommended creation of primary health care organisations, which have 
evolved into Medicare Locals which, when fully operational, have the potential to be 
close to the recommendations. 
Medicare Locals (MLs) are intended to facilitate comprehensive primary healthcare 
service provision. MLs are expected to help arrange access to necessary allied health-
care services and other support services for chroni¬cally ill patients (Ham condition 
nine) and will be designed to ensure that services are integrated and patients can 
easily access the services needed (Ham conditions one and seven), and that face-to-
face after hours services are available (Ham condition one). Also MLs are expected 
to identify groups of people missing primary healthcare, services in the local area and 
responding to those gaps by better targeting services (Ham condition one), and work 
with Local Hospital Networks to assist with patients’ transition out of hospital (Ham 
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condition seven) and delivering health promotion and preventive health programs to 
communities with identified risk factors (Ham condition six).43
State Governments have implemented many programs to address issues of access 
and coordination. The HealthOne program in Mt Druitt in Western Sydney for example, 
operates the “hub and spoke” model to virtually integrate care providers and services 
to achieve better health outcomes for its clients.44 The HARP program in Victoria45 
is based on the Kaiser Permanente model of care and the Wagner chronic disease 
model. It has a primary focus of reducing the demand of clients with chronic disease 
and complex needs on the acute hospital system. This is achieved by targeting high 
risk patients who are either already presenting frequently to hospital or at imminent risk 
of doing so, and require a holistic, integrated, person-centred approach. Many divi-
sions of general practice (soon to be replaced by Medicare Locals) also run programs 
which can assist in coordinating care and provide relevant services to patients with 
chronic diseases (see for example McRae et al [2008]). 46
5.2  Pathways towards the optimal model – how do we align with Ham’s 
criteria
Following the 10 characteristics of a high-performing chronic care system identified by 
Ham (2010), it is possible to assess the readiness of the Australian health system to 
provide appropriate care for patients with chronic conditions.
Universal coverage is guaranteed in health systems for most developed economies 
including in Australia, aiming to provide equal access to basic healthcare services 
according to need. At the point of use, under the Australian system there is no co-
payment for public hospital specialist care or public hospital inpatient care, but there 
are increasing co-payments for primary care and for private hospital care.
Australia has undertaken a range of reforms focusing on the prevention of illness, 
including the recent passage of legislation for plain packaging of cigarettes and restric-
tion of social marketing targeted towards young children to prevent obesity. Further 
the Commonwealth and states have agreed to a National Partnership Agreement on 
Preventive Health (NPAPH)47 which seeks to address the rising prevalence of lifestyle 
related chronic disease. 
Ham (2010) suggests that the healthcare system must give priority to primary care. 
This is difficult to assess. In Australia, around half of all doctors are GPs which is 
higher than in many other countries, suggesting there is such a focus already. Recent 
reforms emphasise the role of practice nurses in general practice and under certain 
conditions permit patients of nurse practitioners to have access to Medicare rebates 
which will expand their role in provision of primary care. While these reforms and those 
discussed above are all intended to assist in the coordination and management of 
chronic disease, and to assist patients in the community rather than in hospital, it is 
not clear that they involve a “priority to primary care”. It is worth noting that the reform 
funding applied to primary care is one third that applied to hospitals.
The role of primary care teams in the private sector is complex due to the fee for service 
arrangements under which they operate. Medicare Locals may provide the coordina-
tion and integration needed to assist patients with chronic conditions, but they are not 
yet mature organisations, and their actual roles in this domain are not clear. Further, it 
is far from clear how Medicare Locals will interact with the public sector primary care 
arrangements (for example in some areas a high proportion of diabetes educators are 
in the public system).
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Stratification of patients by risk with appropriate design of interventions is a role played 
on an ongoing basis by GPs. The current reforms have not attempted such stratification 
on a broad basis (although it is done in the HARP program in Victoria, and no doubt in 
other specific programs). The degree to which a more generalised stratification can or 
should be implemented under current arrangements is not clear. 
Along with the coordination of the care of individuals within the primary care sector, Ham 
(2010) argues it is necessary to have healthcare provision integrated with interactions 
between primary care teams and specialists. There have been numerous endeavours 
with varying degrees of success at the state and Commonwealth level to improve the 
use (and timeliness) of discharge summaries from patients leaving hospitals. However, 
the actual levels of communication between private GPs and specialists who do not 
have formal linkages can be less than desirable, and there is little that can be done 
outside ongoing efforts by professional bodies. This lack of communication is a poten-
tial reason for duplicate pathology and diagnostic imaging testing when practitioners 
do not communicate fully and in a timely manner. 
Under the rubric of the National Health Reform, the Commonwealth is pursuing the 
implementation of a personally controlled electronic health record. International experi-
ence suggests that this will not be easy to achieve48, and it will be optional for patients 
to choose to register for the record. The Commonwealth is also expanding the use of 
telehealth particularly for patients in rural areas, with video consultations now able to 
be claimed under the Medicare system, and an array of other measures to improve 
the use of telehealth technologies. The vast majority of clinicians in Australia are now 
computerised and can communicate electronically. Pathology and diagnostic imaging 
reports are routinely provided electronically. While there is of course more progress to 
be made in this field (particularly with respect to the electronic health record) movement 
is clearly in the direction suggested by Ham.
5.3 Our problems and solutions
With the exception of an explicit drive for more self management and the availability of 
services free at the point of care, the Australian system is “nudging” in the direction sug-
gested by Ham and being tested in the United States. Nudging49 is probably preferable 
to grand reform within the Australian framework. The experience of the Rudd reforms 
which were not really “grand” with many either dropped or watered down under pres-
sure from the states, the medical profession or the political situation, suggest grand 
reform must wait for another day, or a more propitious political alignment. It should be 
remembered that the current leader of the opposition, when the Minister for Health, 
frequently discussed bringing the public hospital system under a single funder, but 
argued that it was constitutionally intractable50.
The degree to which Medicare Locals will nudge the system to provide care for the 
chronically ill is unclear but is central to the success of this approach. Given the history 
of divisions of general practice it is likely some will be highly innovative and effec-
tive and will achieve a great deal, while others will be less successful. Alternatives to 
further enhance coordination and integration of care are therefore needed to support 
the Medicare Local approach. 
The other matter noted in this discussion, but not by Ham, is the potential benefit of 
patient enrolment. While in Australia around 89 per cent of the population say that 
they always or usually go to the same GP51 there is no formal linkage, nor obligation of 
either the patient to attend that practice to obtain continuity of care nor the practice to 
provide continuous care. The NHHRC recommendation of at least optional enrolment 
of patients with GP practices associated with capitation payments (in lieu of Medicare 
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Benefits Schedule payments) provides an opportunity for GPs to use funding to provide 
a range of care to patients with chronic illness in a more flexible way. Such payments 
would incorporate complexity as per the Ham notion of stratification. This approach is 
argued by APHCRI (2008)52, and the published literature on the importance of continu-
ity of care (see for example Heggarty et al [2003]).53 The notion of enrolment is being 
tested in a very narrow field in the pilot tests of care coordination in diabetes. The 
scope for broadening this structural reform which would be purely within Medicare and 
the Commonwealth’s ambit, and which would address chronic disease more broadly, 
is viable.
6. Conclusions 
This discussion shows some of the difficulties in implementing reform strategies in 
the Australian healthcare system. Although many changes may be most appropriately 
undertaken nationally, the Commonwealth has difficulty in generating change outside 
those parts of the system under its control. Sometimes it can persuade the profession 
or the states to participate in reforms, sometimes it is appropriate to provide funding 
for reforms at a level which encourages participation by these players, but frequently 
reform is difficult. 
This does not mean that progress cannot be made in improving the Australian health-
care system, nor that it is not being made. Australia has implemented programs in 
general practice to encourage care planning and case conferencing, to encourage 
implementation of the full cycle of care of patients with diabetes, to encourage appro-
priate levels of cervical smear testing and in other areas. Programs are in place to 
encourage use of the skills of the nursing workforce within general practices and these 
have led to large increases in the number of practice nurses. The recent addition to the 
Medicare Benefits Schedule of some of the services provided by nurse practitioners 
opens considerable opportunities in the longer term for increasing the availability of 
primary healthcare. 
A strong case can be made that, to improve the care for those with chronic conditions 
who require care from a range of different providers, that the healthcare system should 
be rearranged to have a single funder model, or at least a model where each patient is 
covered by a single funder. There are numerous models internationally from the British 
NHS to the Medicare Select model proposed by the NHHRC which is similar to the 
managed competition arrangement in the Netherlands. However, the recent experi-
ence of attempting health reform suggests this is impractical and small scale reform is 
more likely to succeed. The main focus of targeted reform is that it should be directed 
to a long-term goal to prevent even further fragmentation in the system.
One long-term approach of improving care for the chronically ill is to follow the multi-
faceted structure outlined by Ham (2010). The questions for Australia are: Where are 
we failing on this approach? What should be done? What can be done in a world where 
politics and our constitution restrict activity to those things which a Commonwealth 
Government can control, and those “nudges” which can be implemented?
A first possible step would be to move towards voluntary patient enrolment for those 
with chronic conditions to improve continuity of care – this could be arranged through 
Medicare type payments as being trialled in the Coordinated Care for Diabetes pilot 
study, as this does not involve other funders and could be implemented by the 
Commonwealth. Continuity of care is essential to coordination, but also improves the 
scope for the clinician to assist the patient in their self management and to focus on 
preventive activities.
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Other steps include improving information flows for people needing multiple clinical sup-
ports. The Commonwealth has applied large amounts of funding to the development of 
an electronic health record. However, the current planning which permits doctors and 
patients to choose to participate, and patients to choose to include/exclude segments 
of information in their electronic record, runs the risk of heading for the same problems 
as the £6.4 billion outlaid in the United Kingdom.54 
The development of Medicare Locals as bodies with a responsibility to coordinate care 
across primary healthcare and to identify gaps and target care to meet those gaps, 
has the potential to address a number of the Ham characteristics of high performing 
systems. These bodies must be given sufficient resources and be monitored closely to 
ensure that they are high performing to ensure equity across the country. One related 
area to be addressed is the funding of the allied healthcare needed by people with 
chronic conditions – while some of this is presently covered by State Government 
publicly funded services, some by limited Medicare arrangements, and some may be 
covered by Medicare Local funding, a more complete and coherent coverage of these 
services is required. 
While there are no doubt many other ways to nudge the health system towards better 
care for the chronically ill, the main issue remains that we need to coordinate the frag-
mented systems and move the existing systems towards a well defined endpoint.55 
references
Allotey P, Reidpath DD, Yasin S, Chan CK, de-Graft Aikins A. (2011) Rethinking health-care systems: a focus on chronicity. Lancet; 
377(9764):450–1.
American Cancer Society (2005) Cancer Facts and Figures. The American Cancer Society (Eds.), Atlanta.
American Cancer Society (2011) Cancer Facts and Figures. The American Cancer Society (Eds.), Atlanta.
Borkan J, Eaton CB, Novillo-Ortiz D, Rivero Corte P, Jadad AR. Renewing Primary Care: Lessons Learned From The Spanish Health Care 
System. Health Affairs. 2010; 29(8): 1432–41.
Boyd CM, Fortin M. (2010) Future of Multimorbidity Research: How Should Understanding of Multimorbidity Inform Health System Design? 
Public Health Reviews; 32:451–74.
Department of Health and Consumer Affairs of the Basque Government, 2010 A Strategy to Tackle the Challenge of Chronicity in the Basque 
Country (http://cronicidad.blog.euskadi.net/descargas/plan/ChronicityBasqueCountry.pdf) 
Glasgow, R., T. Orleans, E. Wagner, S. Curry and L. Solberg (2001) Does the Chronic Care Model serve also as a template for improving 
prevention?, The Milbank Quarterly 79(4): 579–612.
Grumbach, K and T Bodenheimer (2004) Can health care teams improve primary care practice?. Journal of the American Medical 
Association, 291: 1246–1251
Ham C. (2010) The ten characteristics of the high-performing chronic care system. Health Econ Policy Law. 5(Pt 1):71–90.
Manning, W.G., J.P. Newhouse, N. Duan, et al. (1987) Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized 
Experiment. American Economic Review, 77(3), 251–277.
OECD (2009). Health at a glance. Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
OECD (2011). OECD Health Data [online database]. Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, accessed July, 
2011.
Vogeli C, Shields AE, Lee TA, Gibson TB, Marder WD, Weiss KB, Blumenthal D. (2007) Multiple chronic conditions: prevalence, health 
consequences, and implications for quality, care management, and costs. J Gen Intern Me. ; 22Suppl3:391–5.
WHO Regional Office for Europe (2011) European health for All database (HFA-DB). Copenhagen, WHO Regional Office for Europe. Accessed 
July 2011
Anderson G, Horvath J. (2002) Chronic conditions: Making the case for ongoing care. Baltimore (MD): Partnership for Solutions
World Health Organisation (2002). Innovative care for chronic conditions: building blocks for action. Global report WHO/NMC/CCH. 
Geneva.
Willison K., Williamsb P., Andrewsc G. (2007). Enhancing chronic disease management: A review of key issues and strategies. Complementary 
Therapies in Clinical Practice, 13, 232–239.
Jadad AR, Cabrera A, Martos F, Smith R, Lyons RF (2010). When people live with multiple chronic diseases: a collaborative approach to an 
emerging global challenge. Granada: Andalusian school of Public Health. Available at http://www.opimec.org/equipos/when-people-live-
with-multiple-chronic-diseases/
Bengoa, R. (2008). Curar y cuidar. Chapter 2. In R Bengoa and R Nuño Solinís (Eds.): Curar y cuidar. Innovación en la gestión de 
enfermedades crónicas: una guía práctica para avanzar. In the serie of books: Economía de la Salud y Gestión Sanitaria, by V. Ortún. 
Elsevier Masson, Barcelona.
Lohr, S (2004). Is Kaiser the future of American health care? New York Times, 31 October
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
172
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
173
SECT ION 3 .4
endnotes
1  Source: OECD Health Data 2011 http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SHA. A version of this chapter, with more tables and 
figures, is available at A CEDA URL WHICH NATHAN WILL INSERT.
2  Goss J 2008. Projection of Australian health care expenditure by disease, 2003 to 2033. Cat. no. HWE 43.Canberra: AIHW
3  Newhouse, J. P. (1992) Medicare Care Cost: How Much Welfare Loss?, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6 (3): 3–21.
4  Barbash, G.I., and Glied, S.A. (2010) New Technology and Health Care Costs – The Case of Robot-Assisted Surgery. The New England 
Journal of Medicine 363:8.
5  Mathers CD, Loncar D. (2006) Projections of global mortality and burden of disease from 2002 to 2030. PLoS Med. 3(11):e442; Samb 
B, Desai N, Nishtar S, Mendis S, Wright A, Hsu J, Martiniuk A, Celletti F, Patel K, Adshead F, Mckee M, Evans T, Alwan A, Etienne C. 
(2010) Prevention and management of chronic disease: a litmus test for health-systems strengthening in low-income and middle-
income countries. Lancet; 376: 1785–97
6  Jadad et al. 2010
7  Australia’s Health 2010, AIHW Canberra 2011, p133
8  Chronic disease and associated risk factors (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2006) 
9  Margolius, D.; Bodenheimer, T. (2010) Transforming Primary Care: From Past Practice To The Practice Of The Future. Health Affairs 
29(5):779–784
10  National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission 2009, Figure 1.7; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2010, Figure 1.3. For a 
more complete description of the Australian healthcare system see Duckett and Willcox in The Australian Health Care System (4th ed, 
2011 Oxford University Press)
11  Medicare was the successor to Medibank which was commenced in 1976 based on the work of Deeble and Scotton (see discussion in 
Scotton, RB, Medibank: from conception to delivery and beyond, MJA 2000; 173: 9–11) 
12  Canadian Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (2007): Preventing and Managing Chronic Disease: Ontario’s Framework. Available at: 
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/providers/program/cdpm/pdf/framework_full.pdf
13  Mathers CD, Loncar D. 2006 op. cit.; Samb B, Desai N, Nishtar S, Mendis S, Wright A, Hsu J, Martiniuk A, Celletti F, Patel K, Adshead F, 
Mckee M, Evans T, Alwan A, Etienne C. 2010 op. cit.
14  Jadad et al., 2010 op. cit. The typical patient has changed: it is now common that patients suffering from two or three chronic conditions 
are living longer
15  Thorpe, K.E., and Howard, D.H. (2006) The Rise In Spending Among Medicare Beneficiaries: The Role Of Chronic Disease Prevalence 
And Changes In Treatment Intensity. Health Affairs, 25(5):w378-w388 (published online August 22, 2006; 10.1377/hlthaff.25.w378).
16  Anderson and Horvath (2002)
17  World Health Organisation (2000). Obesity: preventing and managing the global epidemic. Report of a WHO consultation. Technical 
report series 894. Geneva; World Health Organisation (2003) Diet, nutrition and the prevention of chronic diseases. Report of a Joint 
FAO/WHO Expert consultation. WHO Technical report series 916. Geneva; World Health Organisation (2006) Overweight and obesity. 
Geneve, Switzerland.
18  World Health Organisation 2006, ibid.
19  Australia’s Health 2010, AIHW Canberra 2011, p43. Also, ABS 4364,0 National Health Survey 2007–08 (“Long Term Conditions”).
20  Chronic disease and associated risk factors (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2006) 
21  Goss J 2008. Projection of Australian health care expenditure by disease, 2003 to 2033. Cat. no. HWE 43.Canberra: AIHW.p8 accessed at 
http://www.yourhealth.gov.au/internet/yourhealth/publishing.nsf/Content/nhr-progress-delivery/$File/National%20Health%20
Reform%20Progress%20and%20Delivery.pdf”
22  National Health Reform, Progress and Delivery, September 2011 “Chronic demand squeezing the life out of our medical system” by 
Adam Cresswell in the Weekend Australian, July 30–31 2011, Inquirer p 4–5)
23  Wagner, EH, Austin BT, Von Korff M. (1996) Organizing care for patients with chronic illness. Milbank Quarterly, 74(4): 511–544
24  Jadad et al, 2010 op. cit.
25 Bengoa, 2008
26  World Health Organisation (2002). Innovative care for chronic conditions: building blocks for action. Global report WHO/NMC/CCH. 
Geneva.
27  Barr VJ, Robinson S, Marin-Link B, Underhill L, Dotts A, Ravensdale D, Salivaras S (2003) The expanded Chronic Care Model: an 
integration of concepts and strategies from population health promotion and the Chronic Care Model. Hosp Q. 7(1):73–82.)
28  Bodenheimer, T, E Wagner and K Grumbach (2002) Improving primary care for patients with chronic illness. The Chronic Care Model, 
part 2. Journal of the American Medical Association, 288: 1909–1914
29  Nuño, R. and Piñera, K. (2010) Strategy for tackling the challenge of chronicity. Health Policy Monitor. Available at: http://hpm.org/
survey/es/a16/1 (accessed on August 14, 2011).
30  Ham, C (2009) Chronic Care in the English National Health Service: Progress and Challenges, Health Affairs; 28 (1), p190–201
31  McWilliams, J. M., E. Meara, A. M. Zaslavsky and J. Z. Ayanian (2007) Health of pre- viously uninsured adults after acquiring Medicare 
coverage. Journal of the American Medical Association, 298(24): 2886–2894.
32  Schoen, C, Osborn R et a;. How Heath Insurance Design Affects Access to Care and Costs, by Income, in Eleven Countries, Health 
Affairs, Web First, November 18, 2010
33  Sassi F. and Hurst J. (2008) The prevention of lifestyle-related chronic diseases: an economic framework. OECD Health Working Paper 
#38.
34  Sobel, D. (1995) Rethinking medicine: improving health outcomes with cost-effective psychosocial interventions. Psychosomatic 
Medicine, 57: 234–244.
35  Starfield, B., L. Shi and J. Mackino (2005) Contribution of primary care to health Systems and health. The Milbank Quarterly, 83: 
457–502.
36  Lohr, 2004
37  Starfield, B, K Lemke, T Bernhardr, S Foldes, C Forrest and J Weiner (2003) Comorbidity: implications for the importance of primary care 
in “case” management. Annals of Family Medicine, 1: 8–14
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
174
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
175
SECT ION 3 .4
38 National Health Reform, Progress and Delivery, September 2011 op cit.
39 NHHRC A Healthier Future for all Australians – Final Report June 2009, Canberra 2009
40  Department of Health and Ageing website at http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/pacd-gpsuperclinic-about
41  Pritchard D, (2011) Prepaid coordinated care for patients with diabetes: practices and patients bear the risks, MJA 194(11): 
599–601
42 Department of Health and Ageing website: http://www.yourhealth.gov.au/internet/yourhealth/publishing.nsf/Content/factsheet-gp-02
43  Department of Health and Ageing – http://www.yourhealth.gov.au/internet/yourhealth/publishing.nsf/Content/factsheet-gp-01 <http://
www.yourhealth.gov.au/internet/yourhealth/publishing.nsf/Content/factsheet-gp-01> (accessed 17 October 2011)
44  http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/Initiatives/HealthOneNSW/sl_mt_druitt.asp
45  http://www.health.vic.gov.au/harp/about.htm#modelofcare
46  McRae IS, Butler JRG, Sibthorpe BM, Ruscoe W, Snow J, Rubiano D and Gardner K. A cost-effectiveness study of integrated care in 
health services: a diabetes program in Australia, BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:205 
47  http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/phd-prevention-np
48  Department of Health (2011) Dismantling of the NHS national program for IT, DoH Media Centre September 22 2011
49  Thaler R, Sunstein C, Nudge , Yale University Press 2008
50  See for example: Tony Abbott: Speech notes for Australian Financial Review conference, The federal agenda for healthcare reform, 
Sydney Marriott Hotel, 21 February 2007
51  McRae I, Yen L, Gillespie J, Douglas K, Patient affiliation with GPs in Australia – Who is and who is not and does it matter, Health 
Policy,103:16–23
52  Australian Primary Health Care Research Institute, Submission ot the National Health and Hospital Reform Commission, Primary Health 
Care Workforce, December 2008
53  Haggerty JL, Reid RJ, Freeman GK, Starfield BH, Adair CE, McKendry R, Continuity of care: a multidisciplinary review, BMJ 327:1219
54  Department of Health (2011) Dismantling of the NHS national program for IT, DoH Media Centre September 22 2011
55   In the special 2011 issue of Agenda on health economics, the present author and others have analyzed important aspects of Australia’s 
excellent health system and have made suggestions of how to improve it: http://epress.anu.edu.au/?p=151621
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
174
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
175
4.1  The economic effects of population growth and migration  p176 
Jonathan Pincus and Judith Sloan
  This chapter analyses the role population plays in economic growth and the 
implications of alternative population scenarios.
4.2 Urban infrastructure and land use  p186 
 Henry Ergas
  This chapter examines public and private planning for growth of cities including 
options for financing and the provision of community infrastructure. 
4.3 Water security: Water for the farm and the city   p202 
 John Langford and Nathan Taylor
  This chapter describes how the Murray-Darling Basin could become more significant 
for global food security. 
4.4 Critiquing government regional development policies  p212 
 John Daley




A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
176
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
177
4.1
The economic effects of  
population growth and migration
Jonathan Pincus and Judith sloan
Jonathan Pincus is a member of the Policy and Research Council of CEDA. Jonathan is 
Visiting Professor of Economics at the University of Adelaide, and an independent economic 
researcher and consultant. Previously, he was principal adviser, research at the Productivity 
Commission; Professor of Economics at Adelaide University; Professor of Economic History at 
Flinders University; and a researcher at the Centre for the Study of Public Choice (Virginia, 
USA). He is president of the SA Branch of the Economic Society of Australia, and Fellow of the 
Academy of Social Science in Australia. 
Judith sloan is a non-executive director of Westfield Holdings Limited and is a board member 
of the Lowy Institute. She is also an Honorary Professorial Fellow at the Melbourne Institute of 
Applied Economic and Social Research at the University of Melbourne. Judith holds a first 
class Honours degree in Economics from the University of Melbourne; a Master of Arts degree 
in Economics, specialising in Industrial Relations, also from the University of Melbourne; and 
a Master of Science degree in Economics from the London School of Economics.
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
176
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
177
S E C T I O N  4 . 1
Introduction
This chapter deals with the economic effects of population and the related issue of 
migration. The growth in population comprises natural increase and net overseas 
migration. While governments can affect the latter, and especially the immigration com-
ponent, it is not clear that much can be done to alter the course of natural increase. 
Moreover, in recent times, migration has accounted for most of the increase in popula-
tion. As noted by the Productivity Commission: 
“ The population debate is essentially a debate about the size and composition of 
migration flows, and about the best policies to manage these and the consequent 
domestic impact.”1
The two main questions considered here are as follows: 
What is the economic impact of changes to a country’s population size? and •	
What is the economic impact of the net flow of migrants to a country? •	
Before we seek to answer these questions, two further issues need to be made clear.
The first is that when considering the economic impact of population growth and 
migration, we must consider the effect on per capita output and income – both proxies 
for living standards. Simply to point out that higher population growth is associated 
with higher absolute output and income – the impact on “extensive” growth – is facile; 
our concern must be with the impact on per capita output and income – the impact on 
“intensive” growth.2 
The second issue is related – on whom should we judge the economic impact? To 
the extent that immigration is the only real lever that the government has to control 
population growth, it is reasonable in assessing the economic impact of immigration to 
give a dominant weight to the effects on the existing residents at the time the policy is 
implemented. This is certainly the case when it comes to the economic categories of 
migrant entry, although it may be appropriate to de-emphasise it or set it aside for the 
family and humanitarian categories.3
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The next section deals with the impact of 
population growth and migration on per capita output and income. The link between 
migration and demography is also canvassed. Then follows a discussion of the labour 
market effects of migration, including the issue of whether or not resident workers 
benefit from the inflow of migrant workers. The next two sections sketch some new 
theories about the relationship between the economy and population growth and 
migration; in particular, the impetus for technological change and the benefits of cities 
in producing innovation. A conclusion completes the chapter.
The effect of population growth and migration on the 
economy
Economies with small populations and economies with large populations both enjoy 
high per capita incomes. Take the cases of Norway, with its small population, and the 
US, with its very large population: both enjoy high per capita incomes by international 
standards. By the same token, countries with small and with large populations record 
low per capita incomes.4 It is clearly not size per se that determines economic wellbe-
ing. By a similar logic, countries with slow population growth and countries with rapid 
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population growth can experience similar paths of economic performance, although 
the demographic influence of different rates of population growth can play some role.
None of this is to deny that the size of the population, its rate of increase or the compo-
sition of immigration can influence living standards. The relevant question, however, is 
whether the Australian experience in recent decades (or the experience of comparable 
countries) suggests that these influences are likely to be large or small.
In our judgment, the consensus of the Australian research on the economic impact 
of population growth and migration is that it is small, benign and long term. There are 
however, vigorous dissenters from this viewpoint, who point to the absence in the 
modelling, of mechanisms through which sheer size can be an economic advantage. 
This is via economies of scale or scope and via induced technological change.
Population growth, be it based on natural increase or through the intake of migrants, 
has both supply and demand effects. These effects have been summed up by the 
Productivity Commission in the following way:
“In broad terms, additional people of working age increase the supply of labour and 
some forms of capital, contribute to government fiscal balances, and may contribute 
some domestic, community or broader social services in the non-market sector. They 
and their dependants are also consumers of various goods and services, including 
those delivered outside of markets…Thus, population growth has implications for 
wages, capital returns, and the prices of and/or access to goods and services in the 
market and non-market sectors.”5
The Productivity Commission’s 2006 Research Report modelled the case of population 
growth resulting from a 50 per cent increase in the annual intake of skilled migrants 
from 2004–05.6 Over the long term (by 2024–25), income per capita was projected to 
rise modestly, in consequence; and the average number of hours worked per capita 
to rise slightly (migrants work longer hours on average than Australian-born workers). 
Because the growth of capital lags the growth of the labour force, there is a short-run 
reduction in the capital-labour ratio which, in turn, lowers productivity. However, after 
several years, income per capita would be higher than the base case. The report also 
found that the average incomes of the existing population fell slightly;7 essentially, the 
gains were captured by the migrants.
Kirchner makes the point – and it applies to the Productivity Commission’s work just 
cited – that many of the Australian studies on the economic impact of population 
growth and migration rely on neo-classical models and standard growth accounting.8 
They do not consider the possible impact of economies of scale nor do they treat 
technological change as potentially endogenous to population size or growth. These 
limitations should be borne in mind when interpreting the results of the studies; and 
the reservations would apply even more pointedly if the question concerned the likely 
effects of immigration inflows many times larger than those recently experienced in 
Australia.
For various reasons, quantitative estimates of the effects of population size on living 
standards, using multi-country data sets, have yielded results that are neither con-
sistent nor especially convincing. Of more interest are the empirical estimates of the 
effects of immigration on the recipient labour markets.
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Migration and demography
While the issue of demography is considered in more detail elsewhere in this volume, 
it is important here to mention the interaction between demography and economic 
outcomes. Over 10 million Australian residents were either born abroad or have at 
least one parent who was born abroad; in contrast, about one million Australians live 
abroad. So undoubtedly net migration since WWII has greatly increased the size of the 
Australian population; the economic effects of this presumably permanent increase 
in scale were considered earlier. Because the characteristics of immigrants and emi-
grants do not match those of the resident population, net migration also changes the 
composition of the Australian population. Although these compositional changes are 
more modest and more temporary, they can nonetheless have significant transitional 
effects.
It is clear that an ageing population will lead to a higher dependency ratio, which in 
turn has economic and fiscal consequences9. Some commentators attribute part of 
the post-World War II economic prosperity enjoyed by many developed economies 
to a golden period of demography associated with the Baby Boom. But whether the 
ageing of the population can be much affected by deliberate population policy, includ-
ing changes to migration levels, is debatable.
The figures quoted in the Productivity Commission submission point to a very marginal 
impact10. Should the long-run fertility rate be raised from 1.85 to 2.10 births per woman, 
the proportion of the population aged over 65 years in 2015 would be a mere 1.1 
percentage point lower. Moreover, doubling in the annual net migration from 150,000 
to 300,000 per year would reduce the proportion of the population aged over 65 years 
by less than three percentage points by 2044–45.
So when considering the economic impact of population growth and migration, there 
seems to be little to be gained from consideration being given to the demographic 
consequences of different plausible scenarios of future population growth and net 
overseas migration. Having said this, McDonald and Temple, using a demographic 
rather than economic model, argue that the optimal Net Overseas Migration (NOM) is 
in the range of 160,000 to 200,000 per year, which can offset the impact of ageing to 
optimise the rate of growth of GDP per capita.11 Their results hinge mainly on the higher 
average number of hours worked by migrant workers.
The labour market effects of migration
One robust conclusion in respect of the economic impact of migration relates to the 
effect of the entry category of the migrant. Those entering on skilled visas have higher 
participation rates than those in other categories. For migrants who entered Australia 
between 2000 and 2004, for example, the participation of skilled migrants was 82 per 
cent in 2004, 58 per cent for family migrants and 40 per cent for humanitarian visa 
holders.12 As the migration program has become more slanted towards the holders of 
skilled visas, the proportion of migrants securing jobs within six months of arrival has 
increased significantly.13
A key question when considering the impact of migration on the labour market is the 
effect on the wages of incumbents.14 There has been a great deal of research on 
this topic both overseas and in Australia. However, neither theoretical nor quantitative 
research gives definitive answers. 
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In theory, the answer partly turns on whether migrants are complements to or substi-
tutes for local workers. At the micro level, it may seem obvious that the immigration of, 
say, fitters and turners must reduce the demand for Australian fitters and turners, and 
worsen their labour market outcomes (and benefit the users of their labour services). 
However, the reverse can occur. For example, a large project may not go ahead unless 
the supply of fitters and turners is augmented quickly, and immigration is the only 
source of those extra workers; in this instance, immigrant fitter and turner workers are 
complements to their Australian counterparts, and not substitutes for them. Moreover, 
even if immigrant and Australian fitters and turners are substitutes, and even if increased 
immigration results in lower wages for fitters and turners, the effect may be an increase 
in the demand for complementary Australian workers, say, truck drivers. 
These may of course be short-run effects. For example, the lifetime wage prospects 
of Australian fitters and turners may weaken if immigration frequently fills short-run and 
potentially damaging labour shortages. The expectation is that wages for occupations 
in short supply would be bid up, which in turn would attract workers to apply for 
the vacant positions and/or train to meet the requirements of the occupations experi-
encing shortages. However, if migrants fill vacancies – particularly through temporary 
skilled visas such 457 Visas – then the price signal is blurred and the domestic supply 
response is blunted. By truncating the increase in the relative wages of occupations in 
short supply, the losses are borne by local workers who might otherwise be attracted 
to the jobs.
Richardson has outlined various types of skill shortages and the appropriate solutions 
to each.15 She makes a distinction between occupations requiring training that take 
a short time and those that require lengthy training. In addition, she highlights the 
adequacy, or otherwise, of the pool of relevantly trained workers, some of whom may 
not be working in the occupations with skill shortages. The case of inferior quality 
workers is also described.
In terms of constraints on economic growth, the main concern is the case of occupa-
tions requiring lengthy training periods and where there are few local workers with 
those skills not currently employed in the occupations. By contrast, support for higher 
migration on the grounds of skill shortages is generally much more broadly-based, 
covering Richardson’s other categories of skill shortages. The downside of a policy 
based on such broad advocacy, is that it potentially undermines the workings of the 
labour market that would otherwise self-correct many of these skill shortages.
Immigrants add to demand generally within the economy; and maybe add more to 
demand than to the supply of labour. So, even if some immigrants are close substitutes 
for specific types of Australian workers, it is possible that, at the macro or national 
levels, immigrant workers and their families will raise real wages generally in Australia. 
Pope and Withers report this was the case for Australia, from 1861 to 1991.16 Most 
quantitative research, however, focuses on data for more recent periods, with mixed 
results.
For example, Harris and Robertson obtain a negative wage effect for skilled local 
workers arising from the entry of skilled migrants.17 But other Australian studies18 
have found zero or slightly positive wage effects on incumbents. In a multi-country 
study, Docquier, Ozden and Peri find, for Australia, a negative relationship for high-skill 
workers, a positive relationship for low-skill workers and a small positive effect overall 
on average wages of local workers.19 
A query is raised by Pincus as to why the effects found by Docquier et al are so large for 
Australia (and Singapore), hypothesising that the mining boom may have contributed 
to this result.20 The higher relative earnings of workers in mining have been associated 
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with a surge in net overseas migration: “It is possible that Australian real wages would 
have risen even more, if immigration had been more controlled.”21
Bond and Gaston use data for 2001–2004 from the survey of Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia, HILDA, to model the effects of immigration on national 
labour markets for four educational groups: high school drop-outs, high school gradu-
ates, diploma and certificate holders, and university graduates.22 What they find are 
small positive effects for most educational categories of workers, but (as in Harris and 
Robertson 2007) negative effects for certificate and diploma holders. This suggests 
that immigrants are complements to resident drop-outs, and to high school and univer-
sity graduates. (Bond and Gaston do not test for complementarities across educational 
categories; and venture no estimate of the overall effect on wages.)
A new perspective: hands, mouths and minds
Kirchner has outlined a new way of thinking about the impact of population growth 
on per capita income.23 According to Kirchner, three perspectives can be taken. The 
“hands” perspective emphasises the role of increased labour supply offset by greater 
demand; the “mouths” perspective takes a Malthusian view based on the more rapid 
depletion of limited resources; and the “minds” perspective stresses the role of new 
ideas and innovation associated with population growth.
According to this last perspective, population growth will contribute to productivity 
growth and living standards – indeed, it is the most important source of productivity. 
Simon expresses the idea in the following way:
“ In the long-run, the most important economic effect of population size and growth 
is the contribution of additional people to our stock of useful knowledge. And this 
contribution is large enough in the long run to overcome all the costs of population 
growth…The source of these improvements in productivity is the human mind…”
A similar argument is made in Ridley.25 Kirchner emphasises the importance of new 
ideas, which are essentially non-rivalrous in generating positive spill-overs, enabling the 
exploitation of economies of scale. Population growth, migration and density can drive 
this process of “endogenous technical change”. While the relative prices of scarce 
resources may increase in the short-term, innovative responses to price signals will 
moderate many of these price rises, and generally stimulate productivity improvements 
over the longer term. So rapid population growth caused, for example, by a large 
migration intake can bring about short-term pain – higher land and house prices – but 
will lead to higher living standards over time.
An obvious first response to this line of argument is: how many resident minds are 
needed to create the optimal supply of new ideas? Wilkie and McDonald present evi-
dence that proximity to large and rich markets tends to raise productivity levels; and 
it does not matter much if the markets are domestic or foreign.26 Moreover, there are 
many published studies of when and how fast the living standards and productivity 
of lagging countries “converge” or “catch-up” with those of leading countries. One of 
the mechanisms involved seems to be through the transfer of ideas, whether directly 
or embodied in traded goods. Why could these new ideas not simply be imported, by 
means of trade in goods and services, or directly? Through international exchange, a 
“small Australia” may have access to almost as many good ideas as would a “large 
Australia”. With trade in goods, the short-run costs of population growth are avoided. 
However, the importation of ideas and techniques often involves at least some tempo-
rary migration. 
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Kirchner concedes that trade can play a role but asserts that is not a perfect substitute 
for a larger home market. Citing the work of Keller27, he notes that technological dif-
fusion tends to be geographically localised, with more intra-country than inter-country 
take-up. The implication is that a larger population can have advantages for produc-
tivity, via the generation of productivity-improving ideas that are country specific and 
home-grown.
The benefits of agglomeration
Related to the “minds” perspective of migration are the benefits of agglomeration – of 
a large number of people living in metropolises. These ideas are particularly associ-
ated with Edward Glaeser28 29 who sees multiple advantages to large conurbations. 
These benefits range from “thick” labour markets generating multiple job opportunities; 
granular division of labour; a wide choice of goods and services; and spill-over of ideas 
between closely located firms.
Ciccone and Hall found that population density was important in explaining productivity 
differences between US states – a doubling of population density was associated with 
an increase of six per cent in average labour productivity.30
Of course, there are several debatable issues associated with the benefits of agglom-
eration, relevant to Australia. As Kirchner notes, Australia is already a highly urbanised 
country – 87 per cent of the population live in the capital cities. However, the author 
also notes that Australia’s largest city, Sydney, is only the 67th largest in the world. The 
argument boils down to the need for a much bigger population that will be concen-
trated in a few large cities.
There is also the possibility of a reverse causation being observed: successful cities 
attract more inhabitants, rather than that the presence of more inhabitants causes 
cities to be more productive.
And there are well-recognised downsides to large cities, including traffic congestion 
and loss of social amenity. The claim that these costs can be offset by the use of judicial 
policy measures is only partially correct. As Pincus argues:
“ It is important to note that optimal policy adaptation to a larger population – for 
example, the use of congestion charges, greater reliance on medium-density 
housing or pollution permits and taxes – do not completely remove the disadvan-
tages of bigness. What these policies can do is to make the best of a bad lot, that 
is, constrain the negative externalities to their optimal sizes – they do not guarantee 
that the existing population will not suffer a disadvantage.” 31
In fact, Docquier et al conclude that there is very little evidence that the benefits of 
agglomeration are larger than the diseconomies associated with crowding and 
congestion.32
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Conclusion
This chapter has considered the economic impact of population growth and migration. 
Not only should attention be focused on the “intensive” margin – that is the impact 
on per capita income and output – but consideration should also be given to the dis-
tribution of the benefits and costs between the resident population and the migrants 
themselves. 
While population growth is the result of natural increase and net overseas migration, 
the government’s potential policy levers really affect only the second flow. It is therefore 
fitting to emphasise the role of migration in driving population growth and affecting the 
composition of the population and the labour force.
It is absolutely clear that countries with large populations and countries with small 
populations can be equally prosperous. And more rapid population growth is not nec-
essarily associated with higher per capita income growth. There are other important 
factors at play.
For studies that use models with the assumption of constant returns-to-scale and the 
standard national accounting framework, a typical result is that the impact of popula-
tion growth via an increased migration intake is small, lagged and positive. Moreover, 
the gains largely accrue to the migrants, although the research of Docquier et al (2010) 
points to an increase in average wages across-the-board for Australia. In addition, 
some segments of the existing population can gain from immigration-driven population 
growth (for example land owners and developers, employers facing labour shortages 
and consumers of labour-intensive services).
Interpreting the economic research on the impact of migration is made difficult because 
the nature of models, and the assumptions contained in them, can significantly affect 
the answer to the question. As a consequence, there are reasons to rely on the research 
about the labour market impacts of migration that is subject to fewer qualifications. We 
note the importance of the distinction between migrant workers being either substitutes 
of or complements for local workers. The research in this area cannot be regarded as 
settled; however, the evidence suggests that migrant workers are complements for a 
number of categories of local workers. Taking into account demand at a macro level, 
real wages overall appear to rise with an increased migration intake.
New theories about the economic impact of population growth and migration highlight 
the importance of new ideas, the diffusion of those ideas and the benefits of large cities. 
By the same token, there are clearly offsetting costs associated with rapid population 
growth and larger cities. Optimal policies to deal with this scenario are useful, but do 
not entirely remove the costs for incumbents. Many of these new theories are not highly 
amenable to empirical research; they are interesting nonetheless.
Overall, there is an argument, albeit not an overwhelmingly strong one, that a country 
can be well-served by implementing a measured migration program focused on skills. 
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4.2
Urban infrastructure and land use 
Henry ergas
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Concerns about urban infrastructure are central to Australia’s population debate. 
A survey undertaken for the Productivity Commission in 2011 found 51 per cent of 
respondents “would not like increased population” compared to only 11 per cent who 
“would like it”, with the proportions rising to 64 per cent and nine per cent respectively 
in Sydney. When asked why a greater population was undesirable, the overwhelm-
ing response was increased traffic congestion, with other major factors cited being 
increased noise, loss of street appeal and other amenities, and more crowded public 
transport.1 Rightly or wrongly, Australians seem to feel the urban boat is full, if not 
already perilously overcrowded.
Those perceptions have important policy implications. Although the current resource 
boom has attracted some recent arrivals to remote mining communities, the long term 
experience is that 90 per cent of new migrants settle in the major cities. If the urban 
infrastructure struggles to cope with current population, a sustained increase in migra-
tion would likely prove as socially costly as it would be politically contentious. 
This essay examines those strains and current and possible policy responses. In doing 
so, I start by summarising some important characteristics of our urban system as land 
use patterns and urban infrastructure requirements are intimately linked. I then examine 
how policies have developed in recent years, with a focus on land use and on the 
provision of public utility services and transport infrastructure. Having assessed the 
efficiency and effectiveness of those policies, I conclude by reviewing some elements 
of possible reform. 
Major findings
First, Australia has long had a settlement pattern characterised by high levels of urbani-
sation in cities that by international standards have low population densities. This reflects 
relatively high and equally distributed incomes combined with the abundant availability 
of land. However, a low density settlement pattern has implied substantial infrastructure 
needs as population expands. Financing those infrastructure needs has largely been a 
matter for State Governments (albeit with assistance from the Commonwealth), which 
have also exercised primary control over the timing and location of development.
Second, in recent years, State Governments have sought to control those infrastructure 
costs both by increasing efficiency in infrastructure provision and by promoting denser 
settlement patterns (a goal usually referred to as “densification”). 
Third, there is some evidence that at least initially, these efforts at controlling infrastruc-
ture costs succeeded, as output growth in infrastructure services accelerated relative 
to input growth. However, that trend appears to have hit significant limits and since the 
mid-2000s, has reversed. 
Fourth, governments have also succeeded in promoting denser settlement patterns, 
largely by constraining land availability at the city fringe and rezoning land to in-fill 
development, where necessary over-riding local residents’ objections to densification. 
However, there are substantial reasons to doubt those policies are effective in dealing 
with issues such as congestion, and even stronger reasons to think they are likely to 
be inefficient and inequitable. 
Fifth, a better policy approach to urban infrastructure would involve a greater role for 
prices, rather than command and control instruments. Instruments such as congestion 
charging are obvious candidates in this respect. However, it is not clear that the costs 
of congestion in any Australian city are near the levels at which it would be worthwhile 
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bearing the fixed costs congestion charging involves. Moreover, it is a mistake to think 
congestion charging would resolve the concerns existing residents could properly have 
about increased population: unless the income from the charges was recycled to those 
existing users, they would still likely be worse off, and almost certainly so as a group.
Sixth, better price signals also have an important role to play in land use decisions. 
It makes little sense to prevent fringe development if potential residents are willing to 
bear the full costs it involves. But for informed decisions to be made in that respect, 
decision-makers must face those costs. Equally, it does not make sense to force local 
communities to accept densification when the costs it imposes exceed the benefits. 
However, at the moment local communities bear a far larger share of the costs densi-
fication imposes, than they garner of the benefits, giving them incentives to be unduly 
restrictive. This, in turn, provides an excuse for State Governments to limit the role local 
communities play in land use decisions. A better response would be to decentralise 
local taxing, spending and settlement decisions to local councils, as that would improve 
the incentives local residents faced, encouraging them to approve development where 
its benefits exceed its costs, and oppose it otherwise. 
The Australian settlement system
To understand the pressures on Australia’s urban infrastructure, it is useful to start with 
eight salient features of our population geography. 
First, from the earliest days of European settlement, Australia was a highly urbanised 
society and that urban focus has persisted to the present day. By 1911, the capital 
cities accounted for nearly 40 per cent of the population, with that proportion rising to 
over 60 per cent in 1961 and to around 65 per cent since then. 
Second, although secondary cities have long been important in New South Wales 
and Queensland, the capital city has been dominant in all states and that dominance 
has become more pronounced, thanks partly to the decline in specialised centres of 
heavy industry such as Wollongong, Whyalla and the Latrobe Valley. Thus, areas of 
rapid urban growth in recent years, for instance, the Gold Coast in Queensland and 
the Hunter in New South Wales, have been, or have tended to become, part of greater 
conurbations centred on the capital city. 
Third, the other side of this metropolitan dominance is the stability of the urban hierar-
chy, so that while the relativities between the capitals have changed, there has not been 
significant entry or exit into the hierarchy of larger cities since the formation of Canberra 
(which was a political decision, rather than the result of economic processes). To that 
extent, the barriers to the emergence of competing urban centres seem high, at least 
compared to the United States, despite relatively high population mobility. Competition 
has therefore been largely between incumbent cities. 
Fourth, a consequence of the dominance of the capital city is that from the outset, gov-
ernance of the major urban areas has been fairly tightly controlled by State Governments 
rather than vested in genuinely independent local bodies. All states delegate a range 
of taxing and spending functions to local governments, but even those functions are 
typically subject to substantial oversight and control by State Governments, especially 
as they bear on the capital city. As well as tending to entrench the capital city’s domi-
nance, this results in a complex structure of metropolitan governance, with blurred, 
frequently changing and often overlapping responsibilities between and within state 
and local bodies.2 
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Fifth, population concentration in a small number of capital cities has been accom-
panied by substantial population dispersion within those cities. Sydney had relatively 
high levels of population density in the 19th century, but even its 1891 average density 
of 54 people per hectare in the central areas hardly compared to the 675 per hectare 
of Chicago’s then most populated district. And while topography hindered Sydney’s 
expansion and to a degree Brisbane’s, the other capital cities grew by spreading out: 
Melbourne, for example, covered a land mass twice Sydney’s in 1891, despite having 
a population that was only 20 per cent larger. Moreover, once transport improvements 
were made in Sydney as of 1900, it too spread out rapidly, with a building boom in 
the 1920s establishing or expanding new suburbs to the west (such as Granville and 
Bankstown), the south (Rockdale) and the north (Willoughby and Lane Cove). A similar 
process occurred somewhat later in Brisbane, where it continues to the present day. 
Sixth, this extensive form of suburban development has also been associated with 
relatively large lot sizes, so the distance between residences is high. This makes effec-
tive population density all the lower, even compared to the United States. While such 
comparisons are always difficult, Table 1 and Figure 1 present a relatively careful com-
parison for the 1990s, from which two conclusions emerge: at all levels in the urban 
hierarchy but the smallest, densities are lower in Australia than in the United States, 
Table 1 














Population 8,460,170 9,434,161 10,261,295 11,066,917 11,602,493 
Dwellings 3,321,312 3,734,284 4,080,120 4,414,006 4,627,008 
Area (sq km) 5596 6320 7049 7804 8464 
Population density  
per sq km
1512 1493 1456 1418 1371 
Dwelling density  
per sq km
594 591 579 566 547 
Dwelling spacing  
(random pattern)
21 21 21 21 21 
% of total population 48 53 58 62 65 
United States
Population 19,952,631 30,059,815 44,644,821 64,347,655 88,375,100 
Dwellings 8,133,674 12,347,953 18,699,547 26,808,387 36,561,577 
Area (sq km) 6330 13,220 25,358 42,428 63,940 
Population density  
per sq km
3152 2274 1761 1517 1382 
Dwelling density per 
sq km
1285 934 737 632 570 
Dwelling spacing 
(random pattern)
14 16 18 20 21 
% of total population 8 12 18 26 36 
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1996 Census, unpublished data.
United States Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population and Housing: Population and Housing Unit Counts, United States. 1990 CPH-2-1
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and especially so for the largest (million plus) cities; and the indicative average distance 
between dwellings (or more strictly between the centre of each dwelling) in Australian 
million plus cities is 21 metres, compared with 14 metres in the United States. This 
imposes relatively high capital costs on reticulation networks, such as those for elec-
tricity, telecommunications and water and sewerage. 
Seventh, while Australian suburbs initially developed as a sprinkling of houses close to 
railway or tram lines with new lots being taken up over a period of several decades, 
access to petroleum-fuelled buses and to affordable motor cars gave population disper-
sion renewed impetus as of the 1920s. But since employment remained concentrated 
in the central business districts, the result was a settlement pattern extremely reliant on 
urban transport, with the annual distance travelled, in passenger kilometres per capita, 
rising from 5.8 thousand in 1945 to around 13.5 thousand today. 
Initially, that burden fell on public transport: already by 1900, the public transport 
systems in the capital cities handled some 200 trips per annum per head of population, 
with that number more than doubling in the period to the end of the second world war. 
Increases in car ownership, however, dramatically reduced public transport’s share of 
travel in the 1950s, with car travel first exceeding half of all metropolitan passenger 
kilometres in the late 1950s before rising to 80 per cent in 1975. Since then, the car 
share of metropolitan passenger kilometres has stabilised at between 80 and 85 per 
cent, while the number of annual public transport trips per capita fell from a peak of 
442 in 1945 to 105 in 2010. 
Eighth and last, the process of suburbanisation − which as well as abundant land 
and low construction and transport costs reflected high, relatively equally distributed, 
incomes − was accompanied by very high levels of home ownership, with owner-
occupiers accounting for some 50 per cent of residential dwellings in 1901, compared 
to less than 10 per cent in the UK. Today, homeowners (including those who own their 
home outright and those in the process of acquiring it) account for around 85 per cent 
of houses (which themselves account for 80 per cent of metropolitan dwellings) and 
for about 45 per cent of flats. Reflecting widespread home ownership, the ABS has 
Figure 1 
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estimated that residential real estate accounted in 2006 for 66 per cent of household 
assets. As a result, changes in local amenities, to the extent to which they are capital-
ised in land values, have a large and concentrated impact on household wealth.
In summary, the Australian urban structure has been dominated by a small and stable 
group of sprawling primary cities, with very low population density, large lots, costly 
social overhead capital and high transport needs. Their governance has involved fairly 
weak local governments operating in a context where voters are highly exposed to, and 
hence very sensitive to, housing prices. 
The evolution of policy
This is the backdrop against which substantial pressures emerged in the last two 
decades, reflecting a mix of economic, political and social changes. These changes 
include tighter fiscal constraints on State Governments, accentuated by greater voter 
intolerance of budget deficits; widespread moves to reform infrastructure services, 
including by corporatising and in some cases privatising utilities while seeking to better 
control losses on, and subsidies to, public transport providers; a perception (backed 
up by opinion polls) that the electorate is becoming more volatile, not least because of 
the emergence of “aspirational” voters in once working class suburbs, increasing the 
risk faced by incumbent governments; and greater environmental consciousness and 
the rise of green voters, especially in the inner cities, including as a result of alarming 
(and often alarmist) claims about environmental risks. 
Simplifying somewhat, the reaction to these changes has involved two major elements: 
a greater reluctance by State Governments to invest in infrastructure and other forms 
of social overhead capital ahead of demand, a reluctance accentuated by pressures 
on newly commercialised utilities to meet rate of return targets; and the attempt to 
reduce or at least defer infrastructure spending – and also meet claimed environmental 
objectives − by using planning laws to promote denser settlement patterns, i.e. to 
direct expansion in the dwelling stock towards in fill rather than continued spread of 
the urban fringe. 
Controlling infrastructure spending
There is some evidence that efforts to control infrastructure spending were initially 
highly effective, at least in the sense that the existing capital stock was used more 
intensively. 
To examine these impacts, I use the contribution approach developed by Dean Parham 
for the Productivity Commission. This approach decomposes into sectoral growth 
rate trends in multifactor productivity, which is broadly the ratio of outputs to inputs 
(so changes in multifactor productivity are the result of changes in outputs, and their 
growth rates, compared to changes in inputs). For example, if a sector adds more to 
overall input growth in the market sector as a whole than it adds to the market sec-
tor’s overall output growth, then on balance, it reduces growth in the market sector’s 
multifactor productivity. The contributions approach therefore allows one to examine 
input, output and productivity trends for individual sectors and their contribution to the 
aggregate input, output and productivity trends for the market sector. 
Applying this approach to the infrastructure industries shows that they recorded strong 
productivity growth in the period following the reforms of the early 1990s – but also that 
that trend was subsequently reversed. 
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Taking the electricity, gas and water sector as a whole, its contribution to the market 
sector’s aggregate input growth over the 1993–94 to 1998–99 productivity cycle was 
less than half its contribution to output growth, so that (with about one per cent of 
the market sector’s input growth) it accounted for about three per cent of the overall 
improvement in multifactor productivity (MFP). Equally, transport (to which the ABS 
attributes the road capital stock) had a contribution to the growth of inputs in this period 
that was just over half its contribution to the growth of outputs. While it accounted for 
some 8.7 per cent of input growth, it therefore contributed 10.6 per cent of the increase 
in MFP. 
However, by 2003–04 to 2007–08, during the most recent (and likely incomplete) 
productivity cycle, both these sectors’ contributions to MFP growth had deteriorated 
greatly. 
While input growth in the market sector as a whole doubled in the more recent cycle 
compared to the period from 1993–94 to 1998–99, input growth in electricity, gas and 
water increased nearly 10-fold, with strong increases in both capital and labour inputs. 
Since the sector’s contribution to market sector output growth actually fell (from 0.09 
percentage points per annum to 0.03 percentage points per annum), it accounted for 
a significant share of the fall in MFP: contributing –0.17 percentage points per annum 
to the –0.2 aggregate annual decline. 
The outcomes for transport were less extreme, in that while the annual contribution 
to input growth nearly doubled (almost entirely because of an increase in the capital 
stock), the contribution to output growth increased too, albeit very slightly. As a result, 
the transport sector’s contribution to annual market sector MFP growth declined mark-
edly but remained (barely) positive, going from 0.19 percentage points per annum in 
the earlier period to 0.03 percentage points in the most recent cycle.
In short, taking the difference between the initial and most recent cycles in annual per-
centage point contribution to market sector MFP growth, the contribution for electricity, 
gas and water declined by 0.24 percentage points per annum while that for transport 
declined by 0.16 percentage points per annum. In both cases, the change appears to 
be the result of an unrequited acceleration in input growth, with an especially marked 
rise in the incremental capital/output ratio. 
The simplest interpretation of these trends is that the earlier phase involved a defer-
ral of outlays on inputs – a “squeezing of the lemon” – that reached limits in terms 
of some mix of economic and political acceptability. As those limits were reached, 
decisions were taken that either expanded capacity directly or imposed capacity 
expansion. Those decisions included the construction of extremely costly desalination 
plants; increases in reliability standards for electricity networks, subsequent to serious 
network failures in both Sydney and the greater Brisbane region, with the cost impacts 
of those increases being magnified by regulatory requirements imposing greater use of 
renewable energy sources; and greater spending on transport, with the ABS estimate 
of the value of the road capital stock increasing by 18 per cent over the period from 
2006–07 to 2010–11. 
From the point of view of consumers, the most direct impact of this change was a 
material increase in utility bills, highlighted in Figure 2.3 The initial wave of corporatisation 
and of reform generally had allowed price decreases; now, prices have been rising and 
seemed set to rise further. By and large, demand for utility services is highly inelastic, 
with the result that much of the impact of rising relative prices involves reductions in real 
incomes rather than substitution to other goods and services.4 Moreover, consumers 
tend to be more aware of utility bills than of many other expenses – because of their 
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size and periodicity, the absence of alternatives, and the extreme consequences of 
disconnection – making the pain associated with such sustained, on-going increases 
all the more acute. 
High consumer sensitivity has also attached to the transport system, though with 
access largely either not priced (as for most roads) or heavily subsidised (as with public 
transport), the form the problems take differs. Rather than involving direct monetary 
outlays, the consumer cost comes mainly in the form of degradation in service quality, 
most notably congestion. And the perception has been that these costs have increased: 
on the roads, with somewhat slower traffic speeds at peak and the peaks themselves 
lasting longer; and on public transport, with greater crowding and some reduction in 
service availability. 
While estimates of these costs are controversial, it is difficult to deny that there are 
indeed areas of severe congestion in the Australian transport system. For example, 
Sydney’s Eastern Distributor (the M1), the M5 East Motorway and the Concord to 
Lapstone section of the Western Distributor (the M4), are all congested 13 or more 
hours a day. Moreover, most of the main Sydney links – the harbour crossings, the M5 
and the M5 East, Southern Cross Drive and the M7 – average over 20,000 vehicles per 
lane daily, which is close to or exceeds theoretical carrying limits, and other major links 
(such as the Eastern Distributor, the M2 and the M4) are not far behind. Yet projections 
(again, controversial) are that traffic on the M5 will double by 2031, while traffic gener-
ally in the Sydney area will rise by around 80 per cent. Similar accounts could be given 
for at least Brisbane and Melbourne, with the latter also suffering congestion issues on 
parts of its public transport network. 
There is, as a result, an impression that here too the “squeezing of the lemon” has 
reached its limits, or will soon do so: with consequent pressures for increased outlays. 
The obvious question this raises is the extent to which these scarce resources – be it of 
utility infrastructure or of transport links – have been provided and used efficiently. But 
putting that efficiency question aside for a moment, what is nonetheless clear is that if 
the intention was to avoid increased outlays by reshaping settlement patterns, that goal 
has not been achieved or at least, has only been achieved to a modest extent. 
Figure 2 
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Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 6401.0, Dec-2011
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Promoting better land use
This brings me to the land use aspect of the urban policies pursued in recent years. As 
noted above, these have sought to contain the costs of population growth by promot-
ing what is generally referred to as “densification” through a combination of restrictions 
on the size of the urban area, the availability of land at or on the city fringe relative to the 
scope for in fill development (such as the construction of units in existing suburbs), and 
the extent of charges imposed on developers as contributions to infrastructure costs. 
While these measures have been implemented in different ways in the various jurisdic-
tions, the common theme has been a desire to reduce the urban sprawl that has 
been the most pronounced and persistent feature of Australia’s settlement pattern. 
Moreover, in doing so, State Governments have almost invariably clashed with local 
communities, not merely by imposing zoning and land use decisions that conflict with 
those taken by local bodies but also by transferring powers over land use away from 
elected local bodies to ministers or to entities appointed by ministers and, in several 
states, by narrowing or even eliminating appeals against planning decisions. 
While any such statement is obviously a rather grand generalisation, it seems fair to 
say that as planners and state governments became more attached to denser devel-
opment, local communities became increasingly opposed to it. And although local 
councils have often been able to hold up densification, they have rarely been able to 
prevent it altogether, as state governments typically have ultimate control. In contrast, 
state governments have had, and exercised, the ability to prevent development on the 
urban fringe, or failing that, to make locating there less attractive by limiting infrastruc-
ture provision in fringe areas. The result has been a tug of war over land release and 
zoning that raises obvious questions about efficiency.
From an efficiency perspective, there is nothing inherently undesirable about “sprawl”, 
i.e extensive land settlement. After all, land is a normal good, and hence demand for it 
will rise with income. So long as households value extending the urban fringe at more 
than its costs, the mere fact that those extensions involve increases in social overhead 
capital and in travel times should be neither here nor there. 
Similar considerations apply to local decisions about housing density: if local residents 
prefer a dispersed settlement pattern, with large, uniform, lots, to a denser pattern 
interspersed with small plots or multi-story dwellings, there is nothing inherently unde-
sirable about those preferences. Indeed, so long as the local residents, in taking the 
decision to impose dispersed settlement (or oppose densification), face both the costs 
and the benefits to which it will give rise (an assumption to which I shall return), that 
decision is likely to be more efficient than one taken centrally. 
Nor is it surprising that local residents might become more restrictive of potentially 
undesirable land uses over time. Amenity is not only a superior good but also a local 
public good, and hence its demand should be summed vertically. As the population in 
an area rises, the value placed on a given level of amenity will rise, but the gain to the 
individual undesirable land user (say, a polluter or other generator of negative externali-
ties) from locating in the area may not. As a result, the efficient degree of restrictiveness 
is likely to increase as population and income rises. 
But none of this denies that in practice, there may be, and likely are, factors that induce 
an inefficiently high level of urban dispersion. Four such factors stand out.
The first, and surely largest, is the tax system, and notably the tax preference to 
owner-occupied housing. That preference includes the exemption from income and 
consumption taxes of imputed rent; the exemption of owner-occupied housing from 
capital gains tax and from the means and assets tests for social security payments, 
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
194
A  G r e A t e r  A u s t r A l i A :  P o P u l A t i o n ,  P o l i c i e s  A n d  G o v e r n A n c e
195
SECT ION 4 .2
especially the pension and aged care benefits; and the tax exemption of imputed 
income from unpaid household labour. All these amount to a sizeable subsidy to land 
use, as land is a large part of what is purchased in the purchase of housing.5 
A second set of inducements to excessive dispersion comes from the under-pricing of 
goods and services that are complements to extensive land use. These include local 
public goods, such as schools, hospitals and police services, where homeowners do 
not face the incremental costs arising from their settlement decisions; and the absence 
of congestion charges on roads, which create a wedge between the social cost of an 
added resident at the city fringe and the private cost that added resident bears.6 The 
fuel excise does somewhat cut the other way – as it exceeds the marginal social cost 
of road use7 on all but the most congested urban roads – but that is unlikely to be 
sufficient to eliminate the net subsidy these price distortions provide to extensive land 
use. 
Third, misalignments between the distribution of costs and that of benefits distort 
decision-making in a way that could induce excess dispersion. In particular, the costs 
of densification, in terms of reduced amenity, typically fall on local communities; but 
given constraints on rates (notably in New South Wales) and more generally on council 
taxing and spending, local homeowners are unlikely to capture much of the benefits. 
This can create incentives to oppose rezoning decisions that increase density even 
if those decisions’ overall benefits exceed their overall costs. Somewhat perversely, 
the likelihood of that occurring is accentuated by State Government decisions that 
impose binding urban growth boundaries. That can confer on local councils a degree 
of monopoly power, which, when exploited, translates into unduly restrictive land use 
decisions.
Fourth and last, distortions in labour markets may induce excessive decentralisation of 
employment. An industrial relations system that ensures unionised employees receive 
compensation packages that exceed their opportunity cost, will result in firms moving 
towards areas with low land rents (to reduce their input costs) up to the point where the 
resulting increase in commuting costs for their workers forces the real wage back to the 
competitive level. This substitution of low priced land for high priced labour imposes 
social losses in the form of excess commuting and the possible sacrifice of economies 
of agglomeration. 
Given these factors, it is not necessarily inefficient for governments to “lean against” 
the pressures to population dispersion. And there is little doubt the “densification” poli-
cies have had some effect, as the density of Australian urban settlement has indeed 
increased, though some of that increase might well have occurred in any event. 
However, what is more questionable is the efficiency of the ways in which denser settle-
ment has been pursued. 
As a general matter, urban growth boundaries are not an efficient response to distor-
tions such as the absence of congestion charging. In effect, congestion charges would 
increase land rents at or near the city centre while reducing them on the city fringe; in 
contrast, a binding urban growth boundary increases land rents at all locations.8 This 
will induce inefficient substitution of capital for land, with the exact outcome depending 
on the degree of substitutability between these factors and on the extent to which 
population can shift to land located on the rural side of the boundary. Put slightly dif-
ferently, using a growth boundary to force development in a central city may avoid 
inefficient commuting but it does so at the expense of inefficient use of capital. 
Moreover, the restriction will distort the supply of housing, reducing its aggregate amount 
while shifting its composition away from low-cost, low-quality homes. Thus, while tax 
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preferences to homeownership raise the demand for new, high-quality housing, a 
binding urban growth boundary will cut its supply. This will increase prices in the quality 
range, low to high, (or building interval) in which buildings are produced in the market9, 
in a way that tax preferences cannot (without a restriction on land availability, prices 
in the building interval are determined by long run construction costs, which can be 
assumed to be constant). In turn, higher prices for higher quality homes will reduce the 
incentives to downgrade, allowing the housing stock to deteriorate and reducing the 
supply of low-quality, low-cost housing. There is consequently a distortion to the quality 
spread as well as to supply in aggregate, with the costs falling disproportionately on 
low-income households.
Finally, and still as a general matter, these inefficiencies and inequities will be accompa-
nied by a significant degree of ineffectiveness, especially in dealing with congestion. 
Even in the simplest model of a circular city with evenly spaced population working in 
a city centre, the elasticity of the city radius with respect to density is exactly –1/2, so 
that an increase in density of one per cent reduces the radius by only 0.5 per cent. This 
means ever larger increases in density are needed to reduce the radius, and hence 
achieve any given proportionate reduction in travel times. Moreover, in practice, the 
costs of increasing density are likely to rise very rapidly with the target level of density 
increase, not merely because of diminishing marginal returns to capital/land substitu-
tion but also because of the constraints imposed by existing settlement patterns and 
road structures. And to make matters worse, almost any feasible increase in density 
is likely to have only minimal impacts on public transport use, as it is unlikely to bring 
densities in any Australian city above the levels at which high frequency service can be 
justified, with the increasingly decentralised structure of employment making any public 
transport benefits all the more improbable.10 
There is consequently a risk that the main effect of forced densification will be to 
simply waste capital while increasing local congestion in the areas rezoned to denser 
settlement.11 
All of these problems have been compounded by the way the densification goal has 
been pursued, notably in New South Wales. An incoherent policy mix has combined 
very tight restrictions on land availability at Sydney’s urban fringe with capping of local 
council rates, reducing the incentives of local councils in the in-fill area to accept 
denser uses whose benefits they cannot appropriate. The resulting supply shortage 
has created enormous gains for those who can extract planning approvals12; and with 
the Labor Government allowing selective, centrally determined, rezoning, the outcome 
has been a system as tawdry as it is inefficient.13 The harm caused is then magnified as 
the predictable reduction in the availability of low cost housing has driven low income 
earners to areas very poorly serviced by public infrastructure, truly remote from jobs 
and at high risk of concentrating social problems, with all these disadvantages reflected 
in an increasingly steep housing/distance curve.14 
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Doing better in future
In short, Australian cities have at best postponed, rather than resolved, their difficulties. 
As the resulting tensions come to the fore, it is unsurprising that local residents are 
reluctant to accept sustained population growth. The question then is whether there 
are policy changes that might ease the current constraints. Four points can be made 
in this respect.
First, particularly in the area of land use, clearer policy objectives would help. Land 
is a resource like any other; the goal of policy should be to ensure it is used efficiently. 
Subject to avoiding monopoly pricing, policy ought to aim at maximising land’s unim-
proved value, which implies ensuring its allocation to most highly valued uses.15 In 
contrast, the general approach to land use policy in Australia is to define a smorgasbord 
of often conflicting and poorly thought through objectives, as the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) has recently done.16 
COAG’s “capital city strategic planning systems criteria” includes elements such as 
“social inclusion, health, liveability, community wellbeing, and matters of national 
environmental significance”, as well as “encouraging world-class urban design and 
architecture,” apparently without regard to cost, and in any event with no indication 
of how trade-offs between these myriad goals should be evaluated. To make matters 
worse, despite nine primary criteria and over 20 sub-criteria, COAG’s list does not 
include ensuring efficient use of land. Given such confusion at the body that is sup-
posed to be providing strategic guidance, it is hardly surprising land use outcomes are 
unsatisfactory. 
Second, in terms of the instruments that should be used to pursue those objectives, 
better pricing has a key role. In respect of infrastructure such as electricity, gas and 
water, there is a strong case in equity and efficiency for ensuring additional users bear 
the incremental costs of their supply, most directly through developer charges for the 
capital costs of extensions. This contrasts greatly with the current arrangements, which 
limit developer contributions and set user charges largely on the basis of averaged 
costs, with a significant element of geographical averaging. This results in encouraging 
inefficient settlement dispersion and penalising conservation. Matters are more difficult 
in respect of schools and other social services, but a move to vouchers, rather than 
direct provision, could help, were the voucher amount set to the marginal cost of effi-
cient system expansion. 
As for roads, the great merit of congestion charging is that it is a method of increasing 
the efficiency of road use that is not undermined by demand response: that is, by the 
fact that a reduction in congestion due, say, to capacity expansion, will induce short 
and long run traffic adjustments (Downs’ “triple convergence”17 in the short run and 
changes in location in the long run) that tend to return delays to their original level. As a 
result, congestion charging can increase the social return on efficiently timed capacity 
expansion, i.e. on building new roads or increasing the carrying capacity of existing 
ones, as the benefits are not dissipated through open access (which – in the classic 
but admittedly extreme case of perfectly elastic demand − would otherwise push use 
up to the point where all surplus was exhausted). Moreover, the price signal can help 
determine when capacity expansion should occur. And the gains will be all the greater 
if users have significantly different valuations of time, and charging allows the road 
surface to be allocated to those who value it most.
But congestion charging is certainly not a no-brainer. To begin with, any practical system 
of congestion charging has high costs, and given those costs and current levels of con-
gestion, it is not clear there would be net benefits from city-wide congestion charging 
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in any Australian urban area. Moreover, congestion charges reward governments that 
have underinvested in the reduction of congestion and could encourage monopoly 
pricing of roads. The interaction of congestion charges and existing taxes can also 
lead to increases in effective marginal tax rates on labour effort, causing deadweight 
losses.
Additionally, the conventional analysis of congestion charging assumes a dollar is a 
dollar, so the revenues transferred to government are a mere transfer. However, if some 
of those revenues are wasted, then the transferred revenues should be valued at less 
than a dollar, i.e. there is some shrinkage along the way, with that shrinkage itself being 
a welfare loss. If there is such waste (say on ill-conceived public transport projects), 
then it takes proportionately very little of it to eliminate any efficiency gains from con-
gestion charging.18
Last but not least, congestion charging will not remove the harm caused to exist-
ing residents by rapid population growth. To see this, assume the policy question is 
whether the incumbent motorists, i.e. those who used the road originally, are better off. 
The answer is that they will not be, in the absence of special income transfers back 
from government, as motorists as a group are worse off.19 Abstracting from the use of 
the revenues, their welfare with the charge in place will be lower than it was without it, 
and presumably even lower than it was prior to the increase in migration. So conges-
tion pricing, whatever its potential merits, is not a panacea and at least as matters now 
stand, the case for its implementation has not been made.
This brings me to the third policy prescription, which is better governance of urban 
infrastructure. It hardly needs to be said that there are still major weaknesses in the 
management of public transport. Again, New South Wales provides an extreme case, 
with costs per passenger kilometre in the Sydney rail system that are 40 per cent higher 
than those in Melbourne20: and Melbourne itself is no model of efficiency, especially in 
terms of track utilisation and the timeliness of capacity expansion. 
Moreover, it is clear that we still do not do a good job of selecting major infra-
structure projects – as highlighted by the now notorious case of the East-West rail 
project in Victoria, which was the top project recommended for funding in 2009 by 
Infrastructure Australia despite the fact that its costs were determined “on the back 
of a fag packet” by the then Victorian Labor Minister of Transport, the Commonwealth 
Infrastructure Minister and the head of the Victorian Department of Transport21 
and despite a cost-benefit appraisal that involved double counting of benefits and 
serious errors of analysis. 
Nor has the attempt to introduce commercial disciplines by relying on Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) been a clear success. While these may have merits in terms of 
productive efficiency, their use has complex, and often undesirable, impacts on the 
quality of public administration. In particular, because the incentives are high-powered 
(i.e. the private party secures substantial gains from reducing costs under the contract), 
these arrangements increase the returns to rent-seeking and to tainted deals between 
governments and private sector suppliers. Particularly with PPPs, the effects are then 
three-fold: they concentrate the gains from the project (as some share of these is now 
captured by the private participant), and by so doing, increase the pay-offs from col-
lusion between the public decision-maker and the project’s private beneficiaries; they 
allow crucial aspects of the project to be cloaked in commercial confidentiality, reduc-
ing the transactions costs of collusion; and they relax (or, more properly, are widely but 
incorrectly claimed to relax) the public sector budget constraint. Each of these effects 
induces a deterioration in the efficiency of decisions and overall outcomes.22
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Ultimately, PPPs are only as good as the governments that make them; and given 
governments intent on poor decisions, PPPs can not only make those decisions 
more (privately) profitable but allow them to be locked in through long term, judicially 
enforceable, contractual commitments. With scant transparency and limited public 
accountability, the predictable result is poor, but extremely costly, infrastructure 
decisions.
A fourth and final area then is improved transparency and accountability. While there 
are many dimensions to this, some of the greatest gains in the efficiency of Australian 
urban infrastructure, and hence in its ability to meet the needs of a growing population, 
could come from real decentralisation of taxing and spending decisions: that is, from 
a move to local governments that relied on land taxes to fund the construction and 
operation of social overhead capital, and that had autonomy in deciding both on the 
quantum of that capital and on the local settlement pattern. 
The recent trend, in contrast, has been to reduce or constrain the role of local com-
munities in planning decisions, including by restricting rights of appeal. That trend has 
suited some state governments, as it has allowed them to capture the rents from the 
exercise of discretion in determining planning applications; but is difficult to find any 
justification for it in considerations of efficiency.
After all, capitalisation into land prices provides a powerful signal of the efficiency or 
otherwise of the provision and financing of local public goods, as well as of the effi-
ciency of land use decisions. Local homeowners, who are directly exposed to those 
changes in land prices, should therefore be well placed to assess the net welfare impli-
cations of planning decisions, especially if they also face the costs of those decisions. 
Moreover, for most local public goods, financing through land taxes, which would be 
an essential element of such a decentralisation, would be far superior to other forms of 
cost recovery.23 Overall, local governments that were responsive to local homeowners, 
and sought to maximise the net value of land, would have clearer incentives to take 
efficient decisions in each of these respects than state governments or even more so 
the Commonwealth. 
This could no more bring us to nirvana than any other system of government, and 
would doubtless involve real problems of coordination; but could it really do worse than 
what we now have?
I am grateful to Peter Abelson, Geoff Cohen, Mark Harrison, Dean Parham, Jonathan 
Pincus and Alex Robson for very helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay. 
However, the views it expresses are strictly my own.
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endnotes
1  Productivity Commission, Performance Benchmarking of Australian Business Regulation: Planning, Zoning and Development 
Assessments, 2011, pages 28–29.
2  Since the Whitlam government, the Commonwealth has also intruded, and at least the current Gillard government seems determined 
to do so even more in future, further confusing the chain of accountability.
3  Water users were also affected by water rationing, which amounts to a price increase (with the added inefficiency that comes from not 
allocating the scarce resource to those who value it most highly).
4 In other words, income effects are large compared to substitution effects.
5  Land is also a complement to unpaid household work and hence the exclusion from taxes of the imputed income from that work 
amounts to a subsidy to land. Moreover, with land tax-favoured, there will be a subsidy to private car ownership, as garages take up 
land and are a complement to car ownership. This garage subsidy accentuates the impact of the non-pricing of congestion and partly 
offsets the impact of fuel excise taxes that (other than on congested routes) exceed the marginal social cost of urban road use.
6  This effect is clearly starkest with radial transport patterns, where residents at the city fringe commute into town. 
7  That is, the cost of otherwise avoided road wear plus externality costs from pollution, noise and the uninternalised component of 
accident costs.
8  In other words, while congestion charges make the bid-rent curve steeper, shifting in the point at which it intersects the x-axis, a binding 
urban growth boundary shifts the entire curve up. The exception is the pure open city model, where a city that inefficiently restricts its 
size simply bears the costs in terms of reduced population and where rents are pegged down by competition between cities. However, 
the assumptions underpinning that model are unlikely to hold, at least in the short run, for large cities such as Sydney. 
9  The quality range in which housing is built is called the building interval. The underlying notion is that the most efficient way to provide 
low quality, low cost housing is to build higher quality, higher cost housing and allow it to depreciate. Given that, there will, under normal 
conditions, be a lower boundary to the quality at which housing will be built, and an upper boundary above which there is no demand. 
The resulting range is referred to as the building interval.
10  Even in a monocentric city, viable, high frequency public transport requires some 2,000 people per square kilometre. Sydney’s 
population density is about 370 people per square kilometre. 
11  Indeed, as is readily shown, rezoning to in-fill may even reduce density, at least in the central business district. Thus, assume capital 
and land are good (but plainly not quite perfect) substitutes. That means small decreases in the price of land cause large decreases 
in the density of development on that land. Now, rezone an area to get rid of the park in an inner suburb. The first level of response 
is that the boundary of the metropolitan area moves in. This reduces land prices everywhere, but reduces them most adjacent to the 
central business district. So of all still inhabited areas, the reduction in density is greatest right next to the urban centre. This will force 
the boundary of the metropolitan area out further, closer to where it had been before the change in zoning. Indeed, lower land prices 
everywhere lead to lower densities everywhere, and so the boundary could go back very close to where it had been before. 
12  The Australian Financial Review reports, for example, that three houses in lower North Sydney were each valued at $1 million when 
zoned for low-density residential use. Once rezoned to mixed use, they sold for $14.5 million, an increase of 400 per cent. See B. Hurley 
(2011), ‘Smart Owners Reap Windfall’, The Australian Financial Review, 9 March, p3. 
13  In an open city model, with each urban area lacking market power in the market for urban locations, distorting a city’s housing supply 
and allowing its amenity to deteriorate (as the New South Wales government has done) would simply reduce land prices and incomes 
in that city, with the balance between the land price effect and the income effect depending on how amenities enter into the production 
function of firms. In practice, the New South Wales government seemed to act on the (likely correct) assumption that Sydney faces 
a downward sloping demand curve for location, at least in the short run, and hence that there was the scope to extract monopoly 
rents by restricting supply. It then seized those rents by taking control of land use decisions and effectively auctioning them off to its 
political supporters. This is plainly inefficient, as the “price” at which they were sold off reflected the willingness to supply of the political 
decision-maker, not the cost to Sydney residents. Moreover, such an approach raises the gains from monopoly, and hence increases 
the incentives to create monopoly power, as New South Wales government did by slowing the development of new housing lots.
14  The housing/distance curve relates house prices to distance from the city centre. Noting that the bid rent curve will be steeper than 
the housing/distance curve, Sydney is unusual among Australian cities in that this curve has become steeper, suggesting a rising price 
premium for inner areas. This may reflect rising congestion, but also the very low general desirability of housing on the city fringe.
15  As well as the caveat about avoiding monopoly pricing noted in the text, it is fair to note that in a complete model (in which households 
choose location to equalise utility while firms choose location subject to a zero profit constraint) changes in local amenity will be 
reflected in a mix of land value and income changes: in other words, should an area become more attractive, in equilibrium that will be 
reflected in a mix of increases in land rents and reductions in incomes. Obviously, the objective of policy should be to maximise the net 
worth derived from the land, which will encompass both these effects. That said, if the effect of amenities on the costs of production of 
mobile firms is small, the primary effect of changing the level of amenities will be on land rents and maximizing the unimproved value 
of land will provide a good approximation to the overall goal. 
16  The criteria can be found at http://www.coagreformcouncil.gov.au/agenda/cities.cfm
17  When a transport link is improved relative to alternatives, transport will converge to it from other links, from other modes and from other 
times of travel. This is the process of ‘triple convergence’ first analysed by the economist Anthony Downs and reflected in “Down’s law 
of traffic”, which basically says that subsequent to a capacity expansion, travel times on a congested link will return to pre-expansion 
levels.
18  Obviously, there is also a social loss if charges are set at the wrong level (say, at a level that maximises revenue).
19  I am obviously assuming away two special cases – the one in which there is hyper-congestion, i.e. traffic is on the backward sloping 
part of the supply curve, and the one in which differences between motorists in the valuation of time are so large as to result in a net 
gain in motorists’ welfare from the better allocation of road space. 
20  This measure represents total working expenses plus long-run average capital charges divided by passenger kilometres. Sydney’s unit 
costs per vehicle kilometer for rail are about 25 per cent higher than Melbourne’s. In both cases, the comparison excludes trams. 
21 (http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/baillieu-sorry-for-transport-blunder-20111120-1npe6.html)
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22  That the officials negotiating the contracts stand to gain far less from them than the private parties only increases the risk of outcomes 
that adversely affect taxpayers. This is, of course, merely a form of the principal-agent problems that are pervasive in the public sector; 
giving higher power-incentives to one side of the relevant contracts can make those problems all the more acute.
23  This is because such taxes are borne by landowners and cannot be shifted onto other parties. Precisely because of this incidence, 
they are efficient, in the sense that the revenue the government gets is exactly equal to that landowners lose. This contrasts with most 
other taxes, where the loss caused by the tax exceeds the government’s revenue gain, so taxpayers would be willing to pay more to 
the government to stop taxing them than the government collects from the tax. Of course, the efficiency of land taxes is subject to the 
important proviso that it is difficult to distinguish the value of land from that of improvements on it and that taxing improvements is not 
fully efficient. See generally Ken Henry and others, 2009, Australia’s Future Tax System: Report to the Treasurer, pp.48 and follows. 
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Water security:  
Water for the farm and the city 
John langford and nathan taylor
Professor John langford is a leader in urban and rural water management reform and received an Order of 
Australia in 2005. He’s currently the Director of UniWater, a joint initiative of the best minds in water research 
from the University of Melbourne and Monash University. John has worked as an engineer and water resource 
manager in the water industry. In 2004 he was selected by Engineers Australia as among the 100 most 
influential engineers in Australia. Among his many distinguishing career highlights John was managing director 
of the Rural Water Corporation, Victoria’s state-wide irrigation and rural water authority and the inaugural 
director to the Melbourne Water Research Centre. 
nathan Taylor is the Chief Economist at CEDA and a behavioural economist. He is responsible for the CEDA 
Research and Policy agenda which is undertaking an extensive series of reports into water, energy and 
population issues. The first volume examining water reform, Crisis and Opportunity: Lessons from Australian 
Water Reform, and a policy perspective on Australia’s Nuclear Options were released in 2011. Nathan has held 
policy roles at the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Western Australia, the 
WA Local Government Association and others. He is the author of a book on corporate governance and cultural 
change and the blog The Writings of a Naked Ape.
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Introduction
Fears the world’s burgeoning population would run out of food have not been realised 
because of human ingenuity and technological innovation. Over the past 200 years, 
applying the practices of industrialisation, greater access to fertile land and techno-
logical advances in a range of fields have combined to drive a rapid increase in the 
availability of food and fibre, much faster than any period since the agricultural revolu-
tion 10,000 years before. As a consequence, total production of cereals grew faster 
than population, from 877 million metric tonnes in 1961 to over 2494 million metric 
tonnes in 2009 while the world’s population more than doubled to around seven billion 
and real per capita incomes tripled. Australia plays an important role in ensuring global 
food security, with per capita agricultural exports nine times the global average and 
contributing 19 million tonnes of agricultural commodities to worldwide consumption.1 
However, further reforms are required to ensure ongoing global access to adequate 
levels of food. 
Water is of paramount importance to global food security and the ongoing liveabil-
ity of urban centres. The agricultural irrigation industry is the dominant consumer of 
Australia’s and the world’s water, accounting for approximately 70 per cent of total 
global freshwater use. Irrigated land is significantly more productive for agricultural pur-
poses than rain-fed land. Irrigated land represents 20 per cent of the world’s cultivated 
land, but 40 per cent of global food production and 46 per cent of the world’s agricul-
tural economic output.2 The high level of irrigation development and growth of cities 
since the Second World War has led to competition for water limited water resources, 
degradation of natural resources, including vital water resources, and unsustainable 
use of groundwater, particularly in India and China. 
This chapter considers issues associated with Australia’s food security currently being 
examined through CEDA’s Australian Water Project (AWP). The AWP is a joint venture 
between CEDA, Uniwater (a joint venture between the University of Melbourne and 
Monash University), and Harvard University. A draft discussion paper was released in 
November 2011 and the project is examining the key policies around Australian water 
management in the urban and agricultural settings. It will make recommendations as 
to how these policies can be improved in 2012. 
Australia’s exceptionalism 
The National Reform Agenda of 1994 consolidated a range of water policy and market 
reforms already underway into Australia’s first coherent national water reform agenda. 
Australia implemented a series of unique water management reforms, and tied water 
reform to broader economic reform. As a consequence, the Australian governments, 
with the support of the Productivity Commission and the National Water Commission, 
applied competitive economic reform initiatives to both the irrigation and urban water 
sectors. This has allowed Australia to develop expertise in managing water that is of 
global significance.
The key components of Australia’s reform program were the separation of water entitle-
ments from land, and creating a market to trade water entitlements (permanent) and 
seasonal allocations (temporary).3 The rationale for water trading was to enable more 
efficient use of scarce and valuable water resources (including by providing rewards for 
retiring marginal land).
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Water trading enables users, rather than central planners, to make complex deci-
sions about who should use water, where, when, and for what. The market allows 
water to be reallocated between uses, and gives water users the flexibility to respond 
to changes in their operating environment, including seasonal water availability and 
product market conditions. Market prices signal the opportunity cost of water and 
encourage users to make the most efficient decisions possible. Over 90 per cent of 
water trading in Australia occurs in the southern Murray-Darling Basin (MDB)4, which is 
now a highly interconnected river system able to respond rapidly to emerging climatic 
and international market conditions.
The growth in water trading, primarily driven by water scarcity and improved under-
standing of market arrangements, resulted in a significant increase in both the volume 
of water traded and the value of water entitlements. The capital gains associated with 
owning water entitlements have yielded an internal rate of return usually well in excess 
of 12 per cent per annum, exceeding that of an ASX indexed portfolio.5 
Realising the opportunity cost associated with water changed the investment incen-
tives and behaviours of irrigators.6 It stimulated investment in technologies designed to 
improve water use efficiency and reduced return flows. 
The outcome of water trading is that water moves to the most productive enterprise, 
and most productive sector.7 Water moves to the more efficient enterprises within each 
sector, evidenced by a continuing rationalisation of irrigators. As the scarcity of water 
increases, so does its price, which drives more efficient practices.
The recent stress test
Australia, along with parts of Southern Africa, has the most variable water resources 
in the world.8 Capacity to manage such variability was put to a severe test during the 
recent drought in South Eastern Australia. Wet months, where rainfall is in the top 90th 
percentile, are vital for generating run-off into storage reservoirs. Previously, the two 
longest historical sequences, each of three years without a wet month, were during the 
Federation drought and the Second World War drought. However, during the recent 
drought, South Eastern Australia underwent 15 years without a wet month, making it 
by far the driest period in recorded history. The result was a major reduction in water 
availability in the rural setting and major urban centres, such as Melbourne, which 
would have run out of water without water restrictions and other demand management 
measures being implemented. Figure 1 provides historical context on the extremely low 
level of water inflows associated with the recent drought.
Water trading was highly successful at reducing the impacts of the drought and acting 
as an automatic stabiliser for regional communities. At an aggregate level, economic 
modelling estimated that water trading more than maintained production and produc-
tive capacity in the southern MDB during the drought, increasing Australia’s gross 
domestic product by $220 million in 2008–09.9 These benefits were spread across 
all the states – New South Wales by an estimated $79 million, South Australia by $16 
million and Victoria by $271 million in 2008–09. 
The general movement of water was from producers with flexible irrigation demands 
to those with inflexible demands, such as long-lived perennial horticultural assets. The 
compensating flow of payments in the other direction helped to maintain individual farm 
businesses. For many irrigators, water sales were their only source of income for four 
dry years from 2006–07. Trade helped these irrigators survive and they are now able 
to respond to improved conditions. With improved water availability in the Murray and 
Murrumbidgee systems, and low water prices, rice growers are once again using their 
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water entitlements, and have begun buying allocations to expand production.
The rising cost of water encouraged farmers to find efficiencies. Consider the case 
of the Goulburn Irrigation District. In years when water allocations were low, water 
was purchased by the highest value users, such as horticulturalists. In contrast, dairy 
farmers found they could make more money by selling their water to horticulturalists 
and then purchasing feed, in some cases from failed wheat crops, giving wheat farmers 
some relief from the drought. 
In addition to ensuring optimal use of available water resources, water prices encour-
aged dairy farmers to pay more attention to the nutrition of their cows and productivity 
increased. As a consequence, many dairy farmers managed to increase milk produc-
tion as water allocation halved. Water allocations in the 1980s were typically 200 per 
Figure 1 
MurrAy sysTEM InFloWs sorTED In AsCEnDInG orDEr For All yEArs 1892–93 To 
2008–09 (ExCluDInG snoWy AnD MEnInDEE InFloWs) sHoWInG A ClusTEr oF yEArs 
FroM THE rECEnT DrouGHT HAvInG soME oF THE loWEsT InFloWs. 
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Figure 2  
norTHErn vICTorIAn DAIry ProDuCTIon AnD WATEr usE In THE vICTorIAn 
Goulbourn IrrIGATIon DIsTrICT
Source: Murray-Darling Basin Authority
Source: Dairy Australia and Goulbourn-Murray annual reports
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cent of water entitlements. The prolonged drought reduced water allocations to 100 
per cent during the period 2002 to 2005 but milk production increased as a result of 
dairy farmers achieving a threefold increase in the amount of milk produced per unit of 
water allocation; a remarkable achievement by any standards. There were few signs 
of stress in the market for seasonal water allocations during this period with alloca-
tions typically changing hands at around $60/ML. However, when water allocations 
fell below 50 per cent there was substantial stress on the dairy industry although the 
leading dairy farmers in the Goulburn Murray Irrigation District were still able to make 
good returns on equity even under these trying conditions.
In the words of Professor John Briscoe of Harvard University: 
“ Australia’s water management policies enabled it to do something that no other 
country could conceivably have managed – in a large irrigated economy (the Murray-
Darling Basin) a 70 per cent reduction in water availability had very little aggregate 
economic impact. This represents an achievement of global significance as human 
communities across the world respond to a changing climate.”10 
However, water markets were not fully liberalised: irrigation water was not freely traded 
with urban users or for environmental purposes. In particular, there were major environ-
mental issues for the Murray-Darling Basin during the prolonged drought. For example, 
agriculture and ecosystems in the Lower Lakes region, essentially collapsed.11 The lack 
of environmental water entitlement severely reduced the options available to managers 
of the region, already damaged by an over allocation of water entitlements to irrigation. 
Moreover, irrigation is subsidised, as irrigators are not charged the full cost of water, 
exacerbating the environmental damage and the cost of extracting environmental 
water entitlements.12 
Commonwealth takes responsibility for the  
Murray-Darling Basin
During the longest drought in recorded history, only 10 per cent of the political and 
public blame for the environmental crisis was attributed to the underlying issue of over 
allocated water entitlements and subsidised irrigation water prices.13 A political solution 
was adopted, in the form of the Water Act 2007. As justification for removing respon-
sibility for water planning from the states, the Commonwealth relied upon the Ramsar 
Convention, which it had signed, that committed it to protecting wetlands crucial for 
migratory birds. The primary author of the 2007 Act, the Honorable Malcolm Turnbull, 
is explicit about the motivation of the Federal Government, saying:
“ In the 1890s our founding fathers missed a big opportunity when they drafted our 
Constitution in not putting the management of interstate waters under federal juris-
diction. In 2007 we rectified that mistake with the Water Act.”14 
In conjunction with the Water Act of 2007, a Water for the Future program was launched 
involving a 10 year, 10-point $10 billion plan, to “save” the MDB. These initiatives have 
been endorsed by all but a few federal politicians, from all parties, in both houses, 
twice, in 2007 and 2008 and under two separate Federal Governments. Such political 
endorsements are unusual. 
The plan involved three elements:
A water buy-back of about $3 billion of entitlements; •	
Allocating almost $6 billion to upgrading irrigation infrastructure, with a portion of the •	
water savings being designated for environmental purposes; and
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A new statutory planning authority, the Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA) •	
which would establish and enforce Sustainable Diversion Limits (a planning/regula-
tory approach).
There was little public justification for these quantities or the elements of the program, 
but considerable criticism. As a result, almost none of the $6 billion allocated for infra-
structure investment has been spent as the proposed projects do not come close 
to meeting the normally very weak requirements for government investment in the 
area.15 
The MDBA’s initial ill-fated Guide to the Basin Plan followed the Water Act to the letter 
and asserted that: 
“ Over the past few decades….the focus has swung to looking at economics …and 
the role of the environment has been overlooked.”
The first attempt to implement the Act adopted a top-down, “experts know best”, 
approach to resolving environmental damage.16 It was not successful in engaging the 
relevant stakeholders—Australia’s water scientists and regional communities—and did 
not succeed in rebalancing water shares.17 
The Productivity Commission’s interpretation of the Water Act 2007 was that: 
“ It requires the Murray-Darling Basin Authority to determine environmental water 
needs based on scientific information, but precludes consideration of economic 
and social costs in deciding the extent to which these needs should be met.”18 
Effectively, the Water Act 2007 was a detour from the successful collaborative pro-
cesses that had established trade-offs between agricultural and environmental uses of 
water. The Living Murray Initiative, started in 200419, is an example of a program that 
was able to achieve a balance through a democratic process influenced by experts 
and engagement with the community.20 In determining environmental entitlements, it is 
important to establish the environmental trade-offs, because then the costs of remov-
ing water are explicit and quantifiable for regional communities. While the Living Murray 
Initiative method of rebalancing water shares was proven to be successful, the volume 
of water returned to the environment was always considered to be merely the first, 
small, tranche.
There is a need to return to the consultative processes established by the Living Murray 
Initiative to determine appropriate levels of environmental water entitlements, using an 
adaptive management approach. Secure environmental water flows will enhance the 
quality of environment management. 
Resolving over-allocation
In the five years immediately after the introduction of a cap on water entitlements 
in 1994, and the National Competition Policy that enhanced water trading, use of 
water increased by 29 per cent and the area irrigated increased by 22 per cent.21 
Unfortunately, this worsened the existing over-allocation in the MDB and exacerbated 
environmental damage during the drought. Therefore, a core issue for the Water for the 
Future program was the over-allocation of water entitlements in the MDB. 
Despite almost two decades of commitments by state and Commonwealth govern-
ments to move towards full cost pricing for irrigation water, it still hasn’t occurred.22 
Typically, taxpayers support irrigators in proportion to how much water they use. In this 
situation, the biggest users attract the greatest public subsidy. The existence of the 
subsidy makes the buy-back program considerably more expensive than otherwise. If 
governments had implemented pricing reforms so that the charges for irrigation water 
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were either the full economic value of that water (what it is worth) or the true economic 
costs of collection, storage and distribution, then the value of water entitlements in the 
secondary markets might have been closer to $20 per ML than $1200 or $2000/ML.23 
Furthermore, irrigators facing the real price of supplying water would presumably have 
demanded less than they do at the heavily subsidised price, reducing the quantum of 
entitlements required for environmental purposes. 
Few, if any, existing irrigation schemes generate sufficient revenue at current water 
charges to cover their existing capital costs, let alone the operating costs or the oppor-
tunity costs of the water itself.24 The $6 billion infrastructure “investment” initiative in the 
Water for the Future program largely represents a gift to irrigators. 
Whatever the conditions of cost recovery, it remains the case that water purchases from 
irrigators provide the most efficient method of securing additional environmental flows. 
There are numerous claims about the severity of the regional damage to be wreaked by 
the $3 billion buy-back of water entitlements. However, economic modelling strongly 
suggests considerably less detrimental effects than often claimed.25 
The key to achieving a sustainable allocation of water in the MDB is to ensure that the 
price of water achieves full cost recovery. 
Urban water security
Melbourne has historically relied on water supply from reservoirs that, for 90 years, had 
relatively reliable inflows. This reliability meant that, until recently, Melbourne’s water 
supply system was projected to be adequate until the 2030s, even with a moder-
ate growth in the population. However, by 2007, expectations changed with evidence 
that the most severe drought in history was in progress. Scientific advice was that 
the future would bring steep declines, of up to almost 40 per cent, of water inflows 
into Melbourne’s catchment areas.26 A similar pattern was predicted for all Eastern 
Seaboard capital cities.
It is clear that Melbourne’s historical water supply systems, and those of other capital 
cities, did not have the resilience to cope with the dual shocks of greater population 
growth and, especially, the unprecedented, prolonged drought. The planning institu-
tions for urban and rural water supply buckled under the stress. The National Water 
Commission stated: 
“ The government intervened in water planning and investment decisions, first by 
restricting demand then by directing large-scale investments to boost supplies. 
This blurred the lines of accountability and created uncertainty about the roles and 
responsibilities of those involved in water delivery and regulation.”27 
On the demand side a number of initiatives were launched to encourage water conser-
vation, severe restrictions were introduced and household water use dropped. Without 
these initiatives, Melbourne would have run out of water in 2009 (see Figure 3). It 
appears as though community’s use of water has experienced a sustained downward 
shift, with lower levels of use continuing in Brisbane and Melbourne. The experience of 
the drought revealed the potential to significantly alter community use of water. 
Major investments in augmentation were also undertaken, with approximately $30 
billion in new infrastructure deployed.28 These infrastructure investments have essen-
tially insured Australia’s major urban centres have sufficient desalination capacity to 
supply almost 50 per cent of capital city water needs, based on 2008/09 water con-
sumption,29 effectively removing the threat of drought to these major urban centres. 
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There are additional initiatives that could be undertaken to mitigate the cost of this 
insurance, but they require a new approach to urban water planning. 
The experience of the drought highlighted the challenges of having an urban water 
supply highly correlated with rainfall. There are numerous other actions that can be 
taken to reduce the overall demand for water. These include enhanced water efficiency 
measures, rainwater tanks and precinct scale wastewater treatment and distribution 
systems. However, current investment decisions, and pricing proposals, are based on 
the assumption that water from reservoirs has an economic resource value of zero. 
Urban water trading that accurately priced water would enable better investment 
decisions. 
As Australian cities sprawl the costs of providing water services to urban development 
on the fringes are increasing. Innovative local solutions or a combination of local and 
centralised water systems is likely to be more cost effective. The critical question is to 
know which solutions best fit particular locations. Evaluation of the total lifecycle costs 
of water from the source to the point of use and then through to the point of wastewa-
ter treatment and discharge to the environment, including costs that are not currently 
accounted for such as the costs of stormwater management including the costs of 
mitigating nitrogen loads in stormwater. Knowledge of these lifecycle costs is essential 
to assessment of the cost effectiveness of the diversity of innovative local solutions 
to water supply, wastewater and stormwater in particular locations. This knowledge 
is also essential in developing cost reflective pricing that give price signals as to the 
actual costs of developing in particular locations. Cost reflective pricing is an essential 
first step before introduction of third party access regimes to avoid the exploitation of 
subsidies inherent in postage stamp water pricing across a city.
The stress test of the drought had some commentators predicting Australia’s capital 
cities would soon become ghost towns.30 These predictions proved to be unfounded. 
In the short run, this was due to community acceptance, even enthusiasm, for demand 
management through non-price means. In the longer run, the introduction of more 
competition; the adoption of technological options; better demand management; and 
whole of water lifecycle pricing will mean that Australia’s urban centres have access to 
sufficient water to ensure their ongoing ability to provide reliable, safe water supplies to 
growing populations, at reasonable and sustainable prices. 











































































Estimated storage volume without 
water conservation and restrictions
Recorded storage volume 
Figure 3  
MElbournE’s sTorAGEs – obsErvED (WITH WATEr EFFICIEnCy MEAsurEs) AnD 
WITHouT WATEr EFFICIEnCy MEAsurEs. 
Source: Melbourne Water
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Strategic opportunities
Australia’s irrigation industries and water management policies can enable the nation to 
exploit a substantial economic opportunity. World food prices are likely to continue to 
rise, due to a combination of falling rates of growth in agricultural productivity, increasing 
global population, climatic changes influencing the amount of arable land and usable 
water, and changing diets in the rapidly developing countries of Asia. For instance, both 
China and India rely on mined groundwater that is rapidly being depleted and polluted 
while their economic growth is driving an expansion in caloric demand. While world 
population is forecast to grow by over 33 per cent to 2050, world caloric demand is 
set to increase by 45 per cent. The opportunity for Australia is especially pronounced 
due to the global decline in growth of developed country crop yields: measurable but 
comparatively sluggish growth prior to 1950, historically rapid growth for the subse-
quent four decades 1950−90, the green revolution, and then a substantial slowdown 
from 1990 onwards.31 
With the right policy frameworks, Australia’s agricultural sector could significantly 
improve the efficiency of its use of water. Currently approximately 70 per cent of 
agricultural output in Australia is based on flood irrigation.32 One option to improve 
efficiency is to create a smart grid that utilises cloud computing and network sensors. 
Such intelligent, interconnected systems enable exploitation of existing infrastructure 
to full capacity, delivering a superior water distribution service that enables preventa-
tive maintenance, and allows operators to cope with extreme circumstances without 
greatly sacrificing performance. This form of technological deployment requires the 
whole of life services of water to be costed in order to justify investments. 
The improved services that advanced water supply infrastructure deliver can result 
in substantive improvements to agricultural profitability. For instance, in horticulture, 
juicing apples are worth approximately two cents while eating apples are worth 30 
cents.33 Traditional manual irrigation results in about half a crop of apples being of 
juicing quality. However, with automated irrigation, moisture sensors and, ultimately 
with plant sensors, a very substantial increase in eating apples can be achieved while 
also delivering something like a 75 per cent improvement in water productivity. 
To capitalise on Australia’s agricultural strategic opportunities requires that the water 
management reform, begun in 1994, be continued. Rather than building or modernising 
irrigation infrastructure in an attempt to achieve social policy outcomes34, investment 
decisions should be financed by irrigators to meet the quality demanded by the market. 
More accurate pricing of water services in both the rural and urban environment will 
create the appropriate incentives to encourage such investments. 
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Introduction
Australia’s history of regional assistance policy
Australian governments are under constant pressure to intervene to support the 
economies of particular regions, particularly those that grow more slowly. The most 
prominent recent example is the Commonwealth Government’s “Commitment to 
Regional Australia” in September 20101 that promised $10b over eight years, partly 
implemented through the Investing in Australia’s Regions package in the May 2011 
budget.2 Other examples include the Victorian Government’s Regional Growth Fund 
allocating $1b over eight years,3 and the Royalties for Regions program of the West 
Australian Government, allocating over $1b per year. Although some of this money is 
for improved regional services, a significant proportion purports to develop regional 
economies.
Such substantial spending on regional assistance has a rich heritage in Australia, as 
shown in Judith Brett’s Quarterly Essay, Fair Share.4 State-owned enterprises from 
the Post-Master General to electricity and irrigation utilities to government airlines had 
mandates to subsidise regional services. Soldier settlement programs explicitly aimed 
to boost regional populations. The Commonwealth Government redistributes tax rev-
enues between the states using a process that aims to enable states and territories 
to provide Australians with services at the same standard irrespective of location. This 
effectively provides additional revenues to states with more people in remote areas, 
that are costly to service.
In part this spending was driven by what Judith Brett identifies as an “historic sense of 
entitlement to special treatment”, often expressed as a claim to a “fair share”. In fact 
spending per capita on services such as schools, police and hospitals is often higher 
in regional areas than in capital cities.5 Of course, the higher costs of remote delivery 
mean that the quality of services in regional areas may be lower, and much of the 
debate is driven by the tension between spend and outcome. 
Popular support for equal regional service outcomes may be weakening. As Brett 
shows, additional spending on regional services was historically justified as recom-
pense to the bush for having to pay higher prices as a result of tariff barriers, and by 
the belief that national security required Australia to “populate or perish”. The popular 
imagination also clung to the “Australian legend” of the itinerant male bushworker, 
whereas urban workers did not seem to be distinctive from their counterparts in cities 
the world over. These motivations are breaking down. Tariffs have been dismantled. 
The University of Western Australia no longer bans books that point out that much of 
Australia cannot support large populations. And increasingly the Australian archetype 
is a successful graduate with migrant parents in a big city. 
Economic and service objectives
While there is a strong moral argument for providing services to Australians wherever 
they live, it is less clear that it is worthwhile to encourage equal economic opportuni-
ties – let alone outcomes – in every region. Economic opportunity varies substantially 
between regions depending on natural resources (such as mining, agriculture, ports 
and rivers), existing infrastructure (such as transport links, buildings and communica-
tions), and most importantly, people. The fundamental assumption of the theory of 
comparative advantage is that on average people will be better off if governments 
encourage trade between areas with different advantages rather than mandating equal 
outcomes.
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However, there is often substantial overlap – and confusion – between the policy objec-
tives of better regional services and regional economic development. For example, a 
ministerial media release in 2010 asserted that a $100m spend to build community 
facilities such as playgrounds and sporting fields would “not only improve community 
facilities but at the same time support local jobs and boost local economies”.6 
It is valuable to be clear about which aim a regional policy is really trying to serve. 
There is a strong moral case for equitable provision of regional services. By contrast, 
government interventions to raise economic development in slower growing regions 
are harder to justify on equity grounds – and as discussed below, are potentially futile. 
Regional economic development policies have different priorities to regional services 
policies. Policies aimed at regional services should be explicitly directed to the areas of 
greatest need. Needs may arise if service quality is low because delivery costs more in 
sparsely populated areas. Alternatively, needs may be greatest in fast growing regions 
where population growth outstrips infrastructure build.
This chapter focuses on suggestions that government should intervene to promote 
economic development in slow-growing regions. It considers the questions, which poli-
cies do little for economic development but are equitable because they aim to provide 
regional services? Which policies are efficient because they accelerate economic 
growth? And of policies aiming to increase net economic growth, which are effective 
because they have worked in practice in the past, and might work in the future?
In analysing these questions, we tend to use population growth as a proxy for economic 
growth. This is clearly imperfect – some of the fastest growing regions in Australia 
such as Hervey Bay and Cairns also have among the highest unemployment rates. 
Nevertheless, population and economic growth are closely correlated over time. And if 
anything, measuring population understates the economic growth of large capital cities 
relative to regions as capital city income per capita is higher and unemployment rates 
are generally lower.7
Patterns of regional development
Geography of development in Australia 
Despite decades of government intervention to promote economic development in 
regions outside our capital cities, the long-run trends have prevailed. Australian capi-
tals have steadily gained in share of the population; inland areas, particularly towns 
of less than 25,000 people have lost share; capital city satellites within 150km of a 
major capital, and coastal cities have grown substantially (Figure 1). These patterns of 
population growth are matched by analysis of shifts in shares of employment between 
Functional Economic Regions.8 
This long-term pattern continued through the last decade. Capital city satellites and 
coastal cities grew faster than capital cities; inland cities and regional areas grew more 
slowly. Although some have suggested that the slow growth of inland cities and rural 
areas in the last decade is a consequence of the decade of drought on the east coast,9 
it is consistent with a much longer pattern.
However, it is notable that over the last decade, no city with more than 25,000 people 
lost population. Of course, some smaller towns are shrinking, particularly as their popu-
lation moves to the larger regional centres. The fastest growth areas are principally the 
satellite cities close to major capitals, generally also on the coast, such as Mandurah 
near Perth, and the Gold and Sunshine Coasts near Brisbane, as well as a number 
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of the West Australian and Queensland coastal cities such as Geraldton and Hervey 
Bay.
Theory of development
These Australian patterns shouldn’t be a surprise. Agglomeration economics – the 
benefits that accrue to individuals and businesses when they concentrate in the same 
place – is becoming increasingly influential in explaining the central role of large urban 
areas in economic growth.10 It is entirely consistent with this theory that the most rapidly 
growing areas are in or close to major capital cities, and that inland regional cities grow 
faster than their surrounding districts. Australia is more concentrated than any other 
country in the OECD, with 64 per cent of its population living in just 10 per cent of the 
regions.11 Australia is a series of concentrated cities with large relatively unpopulated 
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Potential policy interventions
Areas of policy focus
Given these large-scale historic economic forces, what can Australian Governments do 
that would promote economic and population growth in our slower growing regions?
Policy interventions that simply redistribute growth from one Australian region to another 
are unlikely to promote net economic growth. In general, markets encourage economic 
growth wherever it is most efficient, so government intervention to move economic 
activity will usually impose a drag that is ultimately paid by the entire community as 
lower productivity and lower living standards. For example, providing subsidies for 
businesses to set up in a particular region ultimately just redistributes activity around 
Australia, but with the additional costs of the subsidy and the associated taxation borne 
by the Australian community.
Instead, successful regional economic policy makes a particular region more produc-
tive than it would be otherwise. In technical terms, it increases “endogenous growth”. 
Such policies could increase the total size of the Australian pie, making both the region 
and Australia better off.
The OECD’s work on regional development suggests that higher regional economic 
growth can be driven by education, supporting infrastructure (such as transport links), 
and propensity for innovation.12 Proximity to other regions with large populations and 
higher growth rates also influences growth – consistently with the rapid growth of 
“capital satellites” in Australia. These findings are consistent with new growth theory, 
which explains productivity growth as ultimately a consequence of education, infra-
structure and innovation, alongside institutions that promote competitive markets and 
reliable legal frameworks.13 
Regional job creation 
Despite this theory, Australia has a long history of regionally focused job creation pro-
grams, particularly where industries are in decline. Faced with local job losses, there is 
often substantial political pressure for government to “do something”. But as outlined 
above, business encouragement and job creation programs are unlikely to do more 
than redistribute economic activity around the country, imposing costs on taxpayers 
in the process. Even worse, it is not obvious from the available evidence that they 
succeed in creating local jobs. 
For many of these programs, evidence of their impact is simply not collected, as numer-
ous reports by Auditors-General have complained.14 
Where evidence is available, these programs appear to have little impact, much less 
justify the costs that they impose on other taxpayers. As a case study we reviewed 
government spending of $90m in Adelaide to encourage new businesses and job 
creation following a number of high profile plant closures. We found little link between 
unemployment rates and either plant closures or government spending, as illustrated 
in Figure 3.15 
This is reasonably consistent with interviews conducted with the people employed in 
the Mitsubishi motor vehicle plant closure in Adelaide. These showed that 12 months 
after closure, only 13 per cent of the workforce were still unemployed, three per cent 
were retired but would prefer to be working, and four per cent were not working due 
to a disability.16 
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The Adelaide case study may not be representative – manufacturing workers in these 
areas are often highly skilled and may be more valuable to other employers than the 
subjects of other job attraction schemes. However, the case study is a reminder that 
government intervention to “create jobs” may have little impact on the target region – as 
well as being expensive. The general failure to collect evidence about these programs, 
encourages the suspicion that those responsible are aware of the significant possibility 
that they neither work, nor justify their costs.
Education
By contrast with regional job creation programs, there is at least some theoretical 
justification for government intervention to increase education levels in regions that 
are growing relatively slowly. In Australia this often translates into advocacy for a 
regional university in the belief that it will contribute to long-run economic growth for 
the region.
Figure 3 
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Unfortunately, advocacy for regional universities often does not analyse carefully 
whether they are contributing to long-run productivity. Many of the claims about regional 
universities focus on their employment of academic staff, attraction of students, and 
the associated economic activity servicing these people.17 But on this basis, a regional 
university is ultimately just another regional job creation scheme that redistributes activ-
ity around Australia, but does not contribute to productivity growth and overall living 
standards. Headline numbers about the economic activity attributable to the university 
are only rigorous if they include analysis about how much economic activity would have 
been generated if the university had been located in or close to a major capital. In any 
case, such analysis is highly dependent on dubious assumptions about the “multiplier 
effects” of regional or urban academic jobs. 
There are clearly costs to redistributing activity through regional universities, which are 
generally more costly per student. The Commonwealth Government pays a regional 
loading per student to regional universities recognising their own claims that teaching 
at regional campuses has higher costs as a result of remoteness and fewer economies 
of scale.18 
If regional universities in Australia succeed in accelerating regional productivity growth 
rather than merely redistributing activity, one would expect that university cities would 
innovate more than cities without a university. But patenting rates – a partial if not 
perfect proxy for innovation – are not materially higher for university cities in Australia 
than for non-university cities of a similar size.19 Although some point out that there 
are many other facets to innovation that should be measured,20 patenting rates are 
the measure used in the only study (from Sweden) referred to by the Commonwealth 
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations to justify claims that 
regional universities increase total economic productivity.21 There is little evidence in 
Australia that regional universities contribute to productive innovation on this measure.
Similarly, one would expect that the private sector would grow faster in university cities 
than in non-university cities. If regional universities do more than redistribute growth, 
then this would not merely be a one-off increase in private sector employment. Instead, 
one would expect to see these cities generating more economic activity – and growing 
employment faster – than in non university cities. But the data shows no material differ-
ences in private sector employment growth.
One would also expect university cities to have higher local participation rates. Higher 
education participation rates are generally higher in larger cities. But in cities of similar 
size, participation rates of school leavers appear to be similar, whether or not there is a 
substantial local higher education campus, as illustrated visually in Figure 4.
However, this analysis of school-leavers may understate the impact of regional univer-
sities on the participation of mature age students. Regional universities attract more 
mature age students than urban universities, with a higher proportion of students 
who care for others at least 10 hours a week (31 per cent vs 17 per cent at urban 
universities).22
Nevertheless, the presence of a local university does not seem to be the major driver 
of university participation. The majority of students from regional areas who attend 
university do so in major urban areas, as shown in Figure 5. Indeed, on the assumption 
that students from remote areas do not have a local regional university, the presence of 
a local university only diverts about 11 per cent of potential higher education entrants 
from an urban to a regional university.
Nor do regional universities significantly influence school leavers who participate in 
higher education to stay in their home town. Again, analysis of the census shows 
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that the presence of a local university has little impact on the number of people who 
participated in higher education, and who still lived in their “home town” aged 22.23 
Regional universities do have a significant impact in attracting people to their region, 
who then stay after completing their studies, disproportionately in domestic service 
sectors. Graduates of regional universities are much more likely to reside in regional 
areas than graduates of urban universities (66 per cent vs 16 per cent). However, 
regional university graduates in disciplines leading to employment in the market sectors 
of the economy (other than agriculture) generally move to large cities after their studies. 
By contrast, 34 per cent of graduates who went to regional universities and then stay 
in a region work in education. This local service sector employs much more of the 
graduate workforce in regions than in urban areas, where only 22 per cent of graduates 
work in education, whether or not they attended a regional university.24 
Therefore, there is limited evidence that regional universities contribute to endogenous 
economic growth – that is, productivity growth rates higher than otherwise. However, 
clearly they succeed in redistributing economic activity around Australia. They probably 
Figure 4 
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contribute substantially to improving the labour pool for regional services, and it is likely 
that they play a significant role in the cultural and social life of their area. However, it is 
hard to find clear evidence in Australia that they increase total economic growth and 
productivity.
Infrastructure
Governments also allocate significant funds to regional infrastructure on the basis that 
it will contribute to economic growth. The Victorian Government’s Regional Growth 
Fund documents, for example, note $220m in local road funding, justified on the basis 
that it will “further support regional growth”.25 Again, it is obvious that such spending 
improves regional services, and the quality of life in regional areas. But it is hard to find 
evidence that the costs of infrastructure deliver higher economic growth than simply 
leaving the money in taxpayer pockets.26 The spending may well provide services 
benefiting the community that only government can provide. But these programs then 
need to be justified on this basis rather than claiming the rhetorical force of contributing 
to economic growth.
Local involvement
The area of regional policy that perhaps requires most attention is the role of govern-
ment in encouraging local networking and participation to create new businesses and 
activities. The shift towards “place-based” approaches adopted in the European Union 
over the last decade emphasises the need for local involvement and local govern-
ment to identify local assets, and then determine local strategies.27 There are some 
success stories internationally,28 although it is seldom obvious which interventions are 
responsible for improvement, nor is it clear if the benefits outweigh the costs of similar 
but unsuccessful interventions elsewhere.
Such local involvement is not a new prospect for Australian regional development. A 
paper in 2002 by Paul Collits, then a Manager of Regional Policy in the NSW Department 
of State and Regional Development, cited half a dozen studies and a number of pro-
grams over the previous 15 years emphasising the importance of local involvement and 
ownership for local strategies.29 More recently, one fifth of the Victorian Government’s 
Regional Development Fund is for the Putting Locals First Program that funds opportu-
nities for development identified by local organisations and governments. 
However, local involvement does not necessarily lead to productive investment in the 
right skills and infrastructure that leverage genuinely distinctive local assets to sustain 
businesses for the long term. Local leadership has many political incentives to propose 
projects that redistribute resources from elsewhere in Australia to improve local services 
and facilities, and increase local spending in the short-term, but do little to promote 
long-term local businesses or increase national productivity. 
Indeed, it is arguable that the allure of “free” government money for such local projects 
may divert local leadership from the hard choices implicit in building sustainable local 
businesses. Being honest about which assets are truly distinctive, building a network 
of relationships, and creating businesses competitive with the outside world despite 
remoteness is always going to be a challenge. It is easy to see how attention could be 
distracted by “farming the grant” rather than “building the business”.
However, it is unlikely that Australian governments would adopt a policy of official 
neglect simply to send an unambiguous message that viable activity must be sustain-
able without government intervention. And some viable long-term activities do require 
government support for infrastructure and skills that private enterprise is unlikely to 
supply given problems of coordination, free-riding, and spill-overs.
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As a result, there is real tension between the desires to promote genuine local initiative, 
to respond to political imperatives, and to target genuinely productive infrastructure. 
This tension makes it all the more important that programs for regional economic devel-
opment are clear about their objectives, and require rigorous evaluation as a condition 
of government intervention. This clarity and rigour would make it more likely that gov-
ernment intervenes to promote economic development only when it is truly required.
Conclusion
The evidence is underwhelming that the current suite of government policy interven-
tions are doing much to increase Australian regional growth and productivity. Evidence 
is often unavailable. Over the long run, patterns of regional development reflect long-
term economic and social shifts, rather than regional policy initiatives. Where evidence 
for particular programs can be gathered, there are seldom clear indications that they 
have increased regional growth rather than just redistributing activity around Australia, 
and no evidence that they have increased regional activity by more than they have 
reduced it elsewhere in Australia. 
Objectives of improving regional services are often blurred with claims about driving 
higher economic growth. If intervention in a region genuinely increases economic pro-
ductivity of the region, then it is ultimately in the interests of all Australians – which is 
presumably why proponents of regional assistance are quick to make this claim even 
when the major impact is to improve regional services. Improving regional services is 
often a legitimate equitable goal, but it imposes costs on the rest of the Australian com-
munity. The historical forces that encouraged governments to pay these costs may be 
weakening. Clear eyed analysis of whether government intervention will truly promote 
regional economic growth is therefore even more important today than in the past.
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Much of the story of Australia is the story of the peopling of Australia: births and deaths; 
immigration and emigration; learning, caring and working. 
As a consequence, many of the issues of our time have a population dimension. Informed 
discussion is important to ensure that discussions in this field are constructive. 
CEDA has played a long and worthy role in fostering balanced and informed debate in 
this area and does so again through this volume. 
This volume provides much updated information and discussion, with the coverage 
achieved being ably summarised in the introduction by Jonathan Pincus and Graeme 
Hugo, who deserve our thanks for their oversight of this project. 
The appropriate questions at the end of the discussion are now those of policy. There 
is widespread agreement as reflected in this volume that the impacts of population are 
important for the economy, our society and our environment. 
Therefore policy engagement in some form is inevitable. Certainly, responsive policy 
that seeks to improve the benefits and minimise the harms from population change, in 
each of these dimensions, seems widely endorsed and desirable. 
However, there is disagreement over the precise responsive policy settings and in 
judging and weighting the impacts. There are also differing views over more pro-active 
policies, those which deliberately and consciously seek to influence the course and 
nature of population growth itself. 
Treasury’s three Ps: population, participation and 
productivity
According to Treasury, the three Ps are central to our national well-being: population, 
participation and productivity. Alternative population settings affect each in major 
ways. 
For instance, from where we start now at a population of about 22 million, Australia 
could with a one per cent migration rate, (and fertility stabilising) move toward a popula-
tion of around 40 million or more by mid-century. 
If, by contrast, Australia adopted a policy of zero net migration, the population would 
peak within three decades at around 25 million and thereafter decline steadily. 
An historical trend growth rate of 1.25 per cent per annum, met by balancing the net 
natural increase with net overseas migration as needed, would lead to a population of 
around 35 million at mid century. 
So the total population is indeed a matter of public choice, especially through net 
migration. 
But there are also options to alter the natural increase and work force participa-
tion. These were the focus of the Howard Government’s activities around the “Babies 
Budget” of 2004 (where the Treasurer spoke of one baby for each partner and “one 
for your country”) and significant increases in fertility then followed, contrary to many 
projections of continuing decline and assertions of policy ineffectiveness. 
Global insight does show why the Treasurer was right. Other comparable countries 
have managed to have both higher fertility than Australia and higher female labour 
participation rates than Australia. By one calculation Australia may have almost half 
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a million fewer women in the work-force than is the pattern for comparable Anglo-
American countries, let alone for Scandinavian countries.1 
To improve this situation, there is much that can be done in workplace policies. It is no 
accident that female participation rates are the nation’s highest by far in the ACT where 
public service working conditions for women today far exceed arrangements that apply 
in most Australian workplaces. 
But government has an important role beyond that of model employer, especially in 
carefully balancing the incentive effects of its social security policies to induce improved 
participation appropriately. In doing so there are inevitable dilemmas. JK Galbraith saw 
one such dilemma as the trap of believing “the now compelling supply-side doctrine 
that the rich were working because they had too little money, the poor because they 
had too much”. It is encouraging to see some recognition of this in recent Australian 
debate over unemployment support. 
A particularly reliable circuit breaker for this dilemma is education. The effects of 
increased education levels upon labour force participation are quite profound and quite 
universal and show no signs of diminishing returns over quite large ranges of increased 
educational participation across countries and over time.2
Next, there is much that can be done to enhance productivity growth itself. There 
do remain significant areas of incomplete micro-economic reform and there are many 
opportunities for catch-up to world best practice by Australian business and public 
and not-for-profit organisations and for addressing the large under-performing tails of 
weak practice in these areas. The opening of the Australian economy and weaning 
business and labour off protectionism has helped mightily, and recidivism here must 
be resisted. But the capability to compete well requires investment and here there is 
growing realisation that we may well have sold ourselves short in infrastructure provi-
sion and in education investment and innovation. 
Perhaps what is really needed now is not another Intergenerational Report, which after 
all, has had its impact in displaying the implications of an ageing population – but a 
Future Generation Report which displays the participation and education and training 
solutions for the downsides of the changing population age structure. The “narrative” 
that former prime minister Paul Keating says that we lack, might even be found here.
A population policy framework
So a positive population policy is possible. Indeed there will be a policy one way or 
another. The options are population policy by default (muddling through), by manipu-
lation (policy by technocrats or interest groups) or by design (balancing democratic 
populism with leadership and vision). The constructive question is how can we further 
encourage good policy by design?
Well-informed policy
One lesson from the earlier era of successful Australian reform is that good policy is 
well-informed policy. Unfortunately the remorseless abolition of dedicated government 
research agencies for this area such as the Bureau of Labour Market Research, the 
Bureau of Immigration, Population and Multicultural Research, the Bureau of Industry 
Economics, and the Economic Planning Advisory Commission limits the contemporary 
non-partisan evidence base for policy formation, for modest savings. 
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Social science research in universities has been squeezed out by high student-staff 
ratios and by government research funding formulae which reward international journal 
basic research and not applied Australian analysis. The field is instead left more to 
consultancies and think tanks with a specific viewpoint, so that advice becomes more 
that of “policy-based evidence” rather than “evidence-based policy”. Politicians and 
bureaucrats are increasingly ill-equipped consumers of this material.
The Productivity Commission does remain as a bastion of more rigorous insight, but 
even it depends upon a Treasurer’s reference for its inquiries and upon the beneficence 
of the government of the day for adequate resourcing. 
While various existing researchers do seek to summarise the state of knowledge on 
population as they see it, some key uncertainties consequently remain, especially in a 
thin research market. These uncertainties include that:
The economic effects on per capita income and incomes of the existing population •	
are not well understood because of the reliance upon simulation models (as noted 
in the Introduction and Chapter 4.1 by Jonathan Pincus and Judith Sloan). These 
models do not yet allow for dynamic effects (such as entrepreneurship and innova-
tion), externalities and public goods (such as defence benefits, knowledge access 
and synergy) and economies of scale, all of which may be of the essence in the 
population arena.3 
The social effects of population change on the requirements for an ageing popula-•	
tion are not well understood using standard demographic projection methods. Such 
projections normally assume constant absolute migration levels projected into the 
future, which therefore miss the potential for slowing the growth of dependency 
pressure4 through constant or even growing rates of population. 
The environmental effects of population change all too rarely distinguish key dis-•	
tributional aspects of analysis such as the difference between population growth 
(eg natural increase) and population relocation (eg net migration) on greenhouse 
emissions; or how most water use is predominantly about the activities of a small 
and declining rural population, whereas road congestion is more directly a mass 
population urban commuters’ issue. 
The defence and national security effects of population change often focus on •	
recruitment or public finance issues (as seen in Mark Thomson’s chapter 1.1) but 
there are wider and perhaps more subtle foreign affairs and soft-diplomacy issues 
once termed “global positioning” by former prime minister Malcolm Fraser that also 
need close scrutiny to determine if population size and movements can be impor-
tant in boosting this.
Understanding of public attitudes toward migration is considerably inhibited by the •	
dominant forms of attitudinal polling that ask aggregate level questions such as is 
immigration too high, without interrogating the depth and intensity of attitudes and 
knowledge and without reviewing what levers will influence these attitudes or meet 
concerns. (Andrew Markus, in Chapter 3.1, offers illustration of the benefit of such 
interrogation).
Methodologies exist to deal with all of these deficiencies, but the funding and institu-
tional support for such research is limited. All too often we have scraps and suggestions 
of knowledge rather than a secure knowledge base that can overwhelm the particular 
predilections of any small group of researchers.
Despite their fundamental importance to good national policy, humanities and social 
science research funding by government is one-tenth that of the sciences. This is 
not to say that sciences need to be cut, but that supplementation for the key policy 
disciplines is also needed. Each approach pays its way.5 
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For the present, ongoing work by organisations such as CEDA is even more crucial 
than usual in providing balance in the market place of ideas, as this present volume 
well demonstrates.
Whole of government
A second lesson of the Australian reform era of the later decades of the twentieth 
century and early twenty-first century is that whole of government approaches are 
needed. Nowhere is this more evident than in the population field. Ministerial and 
bureaucratic and federal-state silos mean that decisions made may too often ignore 
the consequences for others. 
For example:
Immigration decisions by a Federal Minister that vary immigration levels up or down •	
with little notice mean that state planning for roads and sewerage and land release 
is severely compromised. 
Education decisions for the provision of professional skilled graduates by universities •	
and VET college provision of technical skills training are fundamentally compromised 
if new arrangements for temporary entry overseas skill supply are announced without 
consultation.
New child care, aged care support or social security funding schemes substantially •	
impact upon hospital provision, schooling and retirement home requirements and 
even work-force availability.
Changes in retirement policy, health care and pharmaceutical arrangements or •	
dental care all flow through strongly to education and infrastructure requirements.
At the very least, improved policy co-ordination arrangements by central agencies and 
federal-state bodies assist. For example the establishment of new agencies with some 
foresight capability such as Skills Australia, Infrastructure Australia and the COAG 
Reform Council help ensure that more information is provided and shared and that 
informed input and consultation is better facilitated.
An Australian Population Council would also seem to be a fitting complement to these 
other initiatives. It could advise government upon the broad framework for its popu-
lation-related decisions and in the process help keep the numerous decision-makers 
informed of the context in which they operate. 
In particular, advice to government might include consideration of the merits of alterna-
tive population paths or ranges, as in monetary policy, rather than singling out any 
inevitably arbitrary number that would anyway appropriately vary as associated condi-
tions change. Good policy advice would also encompass structure as well as numbers 
and would be comprehensive across fertility and participation, as well as immigration. 
Skills Australia does precisely this for the work-force and skills formation at present, and 
it has enhanced government understanding without compromising the responsibility of 
governments for taking the decisions for which they will be held accountable.
As the Hawke era showed, buy-in via consensus and shared understandings of the 
nation’s problems and potential can allow a break-through for the log-jam of vested 
interests that so bedevil visionary policy. The current tendency of ongoing adversarial-
ism in Australian politics has cost us the bi-partisanship that supported much good 
policy during the height of the reform period. This earlier approach helped position 
Australia very well for GFC type challenges, compared to most other OECD countries. 
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Transparent government spending review
A third lesson from the earlier reform era was that systematic and transparent review 
of new government policy proposals served Australia well. This happened principally 
through the legislation review and regulation review processes and also to an extent 
through the Treasury’s internal tax policy matrix process (as well as the one-off Henry 
Tax Review). In each case the government action had to establish its necessity (show 
that a genuine market failure was being addressed), and its effectiveness, meaning that 
it could reasonably be expected to remedy the problem. Further it was required that the 
government action would adopt the lightest touch response consistent with achieving 
the objectives of the policy. Empirical evidence was required for each step. 
Unfortunately, the processes were all too often by-passed and watered down and 
alternatives were often weakly defined or evaluated and evidence was selective. But 
a framework and a transparent procedure that has served Australia well is there and 
can be revitalised. It is to be hoped that the new Parliamentary Budget Office will 
facilitate more such evaluation alongside the efforts of the Auditor General and the all 
too constrained efforts of Infrastructure Australia to provide transparent cost-benefit 
evaluation for major infrastructure projects. As CEDA’s work program has shown, major 
investments in infrastructure such as the National Broadband Network could well have 
benefitted substantially from this approach.
However, where invigoration is especially needed is in the spending arena. This has 
never been subject to transparent, systematic, comprehensive evaluation across all 
spending proposals. Rigorous cost-benefit or like analyses of all major spending is the 
administrative reform that Australian Government most needs if special pleading and 
pork barrelling is to be better restricted. This is where the interstices of government 
are least exposed to the sunshine. This is the area of government most affected by 
population policy – health, education, social security and infrastructure spending. 
CEDA fills some of these gaps through its work program. This could be complemented 
by a revival of university engagement with these fields. Bodies such as the Melbourne 
Institute and the Crawford School of Economics and Government are important 
contributors, but new initiatives could also be undertaken such as a collaborative 
cross-university National Consortium of Economic Research or a Council of Economic 
Review comprising independent economists to hold government to account through 
expert evaluation of spending, tax, regulation and macro-economic policy. 
Mutual responsibility
A fourth lesson of previous reform success is that principles of “conditionality” or 
“mutual responsibility” can and should be applied. It might be argued, for instance, 
that concrete policy progress be in train in ameliorating environmental impacts or pro-
viding complementary infrastructure before expansive new population growth policies 
are agreed. This would potentially deliver more buy-in from those suspicious of the 
potential for promises to be delayed or derailed. In the population area, for example, 
government promises of an infrastructure body to oversee this area at a federal level in 
the 1990s took a decade to be implemented, and then by a new government. 
There may be concern in the population area that delay means that immediate labour 
shortages will not be assuaged by, say, increases in skilled migration. Pressure from 
employers will be hard to resist since this seems a common-sense point. But there are 
two worries. One is that the short-term solution may reduce commitment to long-term 
action. For example, there may be resultant reduced effort by firms and governments 
in domestic skills formation and in education and training.6 Mutual responsibility would 
require complementary domestic action in skill and knowledge management.7 
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The second worry is that the seeming short-term benefit is actually largely illusory, 
even though the perception is understandable. The fact is that in this area there is 
abundant and consistent research which confirms that for every existing job vacancy 
filled by a new migrant, spending by or for those migrants generates at least as many 
new job vacancies. For example, a new overseas carpenter needs a car which requires 
a new automotive engineer who needs a home which requires a new brick-layer. The 
studies show a broadly balanced outcome for the macro-economy in the short-term 
in the sense that more migrants create as many jobs as they fill. Population policy then 
may be incorrectly targeted if the goals chosen are short-term or immediate problems. 
Population policy might therefore be better recognised as more usefully being under-
stood as a vehicle for enhancing the longer-term development of Australia through 
broad-based labour force enhancement and global integration, not a short-term labour 
market panacea. 
The good policy imperative
A fifth and final lesson from earlier reform success is that good policies should be 
pursued wherever they are identified. This means that no specific population policy 
imprimatur may be needed for many worthy policies that will complement population 
policy and which may influence population impacts in areas such as the environment, 
social change and economic prosperity. Awareness of population context may certainly 
help here in good policy formation, as argued above, but opportunities for achieving 
good policy outcomes irrespective of broader population policy settings should be 
taken where they are identified. This especially applies in areas that are likely to be seen 
anyway as further removed from core population number matters and the more that 
beneficial outcomes will ensue from the policy irrespective of the population situation. 
For example, there is no denying that there are important urban problems of crowding 
and pollution to be dealt with. Nor that population change plays a role in exacerbating 
these. But it is important to say that such problems will also occur irrespective of 
population policies as there are also wider causes at play. Therefore they should be 
addressed by direct urban and environmental policies, not just by relying on population 
control. The behaviour of the existing population in this sphere is as much an issue as 
population numbers are for the future.
Similarly there is no denying that Australia has environmental problems such as river 
salinity and biodiversity loss. But many of these are the products of practices of a 
small and declining rural share of the population, not the growing cities. Rural land use 
issues arise in Australia because of supply to world markets and are largely unrelated 
to local population. Direct environmental policies and sensible planning policies are the 
required first best response and domestic population control issues may actually have 
limited impact.
Complementary population policies may still at times be useful. For example the actual 
success of regional migration programs is little appreciated. In the first five years of 
their operation, numbers under these programs rose to 25 per cent of the skilled entry 
program, and are capable of further beneficial development.8 This might operate by the 
greater delegation of decision-making to state and regional authorities as in Canada, to 
encourage better community support arrangements. There is also a possible need to 
tighten criteria around eligible areas for regional migration so large metropolitan areas 
are excluded and smaller provincial centres are included. It is a puzzle why cities such 
as Canberra, Newcastle and Wollongong have not in the past been eligible for some 
migration regional concession schemes, while metropolitan Melbourne has been.
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Australian achievement
The assimilation of people from all around the world in reasonable harmony and 
prosperity, and certainly as much or more than any other nation, has been a worthy 
achievement. Australia now rates as number one in the OECD Quality of Life Index and 
number two in the UN’s Human Development Index. Our cities rate well in Liveable City 
rankings. 
Such metrics are always to be taken with a grain of salt as they depend on the regimen 
adopted, the weights applied and the measures used. But it is true that Australia has 
been able to re-invigorate and sustain its living standards more than many countries. It 
has done this through well-targeted and competitive economic reforms and by building 
a worthy safety net across education, health and income. Australia actually does stand 
as an exemplar, for all its faults, as to how betterment is possible. 
For this achievement to continue or even be enhanced, one way forward is a popula-
tion policy supported by the principles and approaches discussed here. It does not 
normally feature in the reform discussion of major analysts and decision-makers. But 
there is a case to be made that many commentators here are a little like generals 
fighting the last war. The focus on industrial relations, tax, privatisation and regulation 
is worthy and more remains to be done and important pay-offs await. But when close 
scrutiny and good empirical work is also applied to neglected areas such as education, 
training, infrastructure and innovation, even greater pay-offs can be discerned.9 
There is an argument we should take standard economic evidence seriously in a con-
sistent way, and not just when it suits a pre-conceived approach to policy. If so, we 
need to also move reform to include a new phase of generating enhanced competitive 
capability. The Australian people are at the centre of this need and of its potential. 
Australia actually had the world’s highest per capita income in the second half of the 
19th century. It was democratically and socially progressive by the standards of the day, 
and its affluence came not simply because of the exploitation of natural resources, but 
also because the country was integrated with the global economy and it was a clever 
country. Australia defied the “resource curse”. It had more patents per capita than any 
other. School participation rates were ahead of any other country. Universities were 
established as early as the 1850s. Migrants were chosen carefully and were skilled 
ahead of migrants to North America – even our convicts were Britain’s finest.
InITIATIvE  InCrEAsE In GDP
Australia-Indonesia Free Trade Agreement 0.02%
A Single National Workplace Relations System 0.05%
The Bracks Motor Vehicle Reform Package 0.06%
The Henry Tax Review Reforms accepted 0.07%
Increased Superannuation Guarantee (from 9% to 12%) 0.33%
The National Broadband Network 2.00%
The Henry Tax Review complete package 2.50%
The COAG Human Capital Reform Agenda (schools and health) 3.00%
The Bradley Higher Education Review Reform Package 6.10%
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The now significantly deregulated Australian economy, combined with strong welfare 
safety net arrangements (although it is acknowledged there is still some excessive 
middle class welfare) provides the opportunity for Australia to “go back to the future”. 
This may particularly be expected if complementary policies on education, infrastruc-
ture and innovation can be enhanced and operate within a sensible population policy 
framework. The framework could seek to embed the characteristics listed above and 
throughout this volume. It doesn’t hurt that it would also help with matters neglected in 
our historical past such as gender issues, indigenous issues and the environment.
Thanks are due to Jonathan Pincus for comments. The views expressed are those of the author. 
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